William Ross Gilmour

The applicant brought a motion to remove the respondent corporation's solicitor of record on the grounds that the lawyer was taking instructions exclusively from two individuals with significant conflicts of interest relative to the corporation.

The applicant sought the appointment of an inspector to investigate the corporation's financial affairs, suspecting misappropriation of funds by a director and treasurer.

The court found that the two individuals instructing the lawyer had glaring conflicts of interest, creating a substantial risk of impaired representation and compromising the integrity of the administration of justice.

The court ordered the removal of the solicitor and required the corporation to retain new counsel with unconficted instructing parties.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The trial judge had dismissed the charges, finding the complainant's evidence to have "frailties" and accepting the respondent's denial and evidence of mobility issues.

The Crown argued two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred by permitting reputation evidence regarding the complainant's veracity, and second, that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding a photograph and the respondent's admission of possible accidental touching.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of reputation evidence given the lack of objection and the trial judge's non-reliance on it, and concluding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate and clearly explained the basis for the acquittal.

The appellant, G.R., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a nine-year-old victim and his 5.5-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that new evidence from the complainant during re-examination rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal found that most of the "new" evidence was already known from the preliminary inquiry, trial counsel did not seek an adjournment or re-open cross-examination, the trial judge did not rely on the new detail to support the Crown's case, and the evidence concerned the least serious of the allegations.

The sentence appeal argued the sentence was at the high end of the range.

The court found no error in law or principle by the trial judge and upheld the sentence, noting the appellant's breach of trust.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, L.C., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault, seeking a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence, consisting of two affidavits from the appellant's sister, aimed to challenge the credibility of one of the complainants by suggesting prior discussions (collusion) among the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to admit the fresh evidence.

The court found the appellant's sister's evidence lacked credibility due to her bias and inconsistencies, and it was not sufficiently probative to undermine the trial judge's finding that the complainant's testimony was untainted by collusion.

This judgment addresses three charges against Mr. Singh under the Ontario Securities Act (OSA) for unregistered trading, distribution without a prospectus, and fraud, as well as two Charter applications.

The court first dismissed Mr. Singh's application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding the net delay constitutionally tolerable after accounting for defence-caused delay and the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete exceptional event.

It also dismissed his s. 7 Charter application, which alleged his right to make full answer and defence was violated by the virtual nature of the trial, concluding he was able to participate effectively.

Subsequently, the court found Mr. Singh guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all three OSA charges, determining he was the operating mind of Rockfort and Greenview, engaged in unregistered trading and distribution of securities, and committed fraud by misrepresenting the companies as mortgage investment corporations that held no mortgages and by making other material misrepresentations to investors.

The moving party, Sharon Joseph, brought a motion to set aside or vary an order of Benotto J.A. which had dismissed her motion to expedite an appeal of an interlocutory order.

The interlocutory order in question had granted a stay of guardianship proceedings pending the disposition of an appeal regarding the validity of a marriage.

The Court of Appeal found no error in Benotto J.A.'s reasoning that the order was procedural and interlocutory, and therefore no appeal lay to the Court of Appeal.

The court also noted that determining the marriage's validity first was efficient.

The motion to vary was dismissed, and the purported appeal was quashed.

T.C. appealed convictions for sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to admit certain emails as evidence of fabrication, improper emphasis on DNA evidence in jury instructions, and an erroneous answer to a jury question regarding a test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary ruling, no improper emphasis in jury instructions, and a proper response to the jury's question.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson causing damage to property and mischief endangering life arising from two incidents involving damage to a vehicle belonging to the mother of his former girlfriend.

The appellant was acquitted of a third mischief charge involving a slashed tire.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's admission and reliance on similar fact evidence and her identification of the appellant from security video footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's identification of the appellant from video evidence or in her conclusion that the two offences were likely committed by the same person based on striking similarities.

The court also granted leave to appeal sentence to eliminate the victim fine surcharge.

This endorsement addresses the determination of costs following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' action against the defendants Stewart and Indicom on appeal.

The Court of Appeal had referred the costs below back to the motion judge.

The court applied principles for assessing costs, including the custom that costs follow the event and the requirement for fairness and reasonableness.

It was determined that costs should be awarded as if the defendants had been wholly successful at the summary judgment stage.

The court adjusted the hourly rate for the defendants' counsel and reduced claimed hours for settlement discussions and observing other parties' motions, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs for both the summary judgment motion and the action to the defendants.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision on Highway 410.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol based on observations of slurred speech, unsteadiness, and odour of alcohol.

The defence argued the accused's symptoms were caused by shock or head injury from the severe collision impact.

The court found that while the Crown's case was circumstantial and the accused's symptoms were consistent with both impairment and trauma, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was impaired by alcohol rather than suffering from the effects of the collision.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

Following a lengthy commercial dispute involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, misuse of confidential information, wrongful dismissal, and fraudulent conveyances, the court determined the allocation and scale of costs arising from two trials and related proceedings.

The litigation involved numerous parties and mixed results, with certain defendants fully successful and others partially liable.

The court concluded that the complexity of the litigation and the magnitude of the claimed costs warranted referral of most quantification issues to an assessment officer under Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded in several instances, including where unproven allegations of fraud or serious misconduct had been advanced, while partial indemnity costs applied to others depending on conduct and settlement offers.

The court also considered the appropriateness of Bullock and Sanderson orders in allocating responsibility among defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover monies advanced to the defendant under a demand promissory note and related financial transactions.

The defendants raised a limitations defence under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the claim was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period.

The court held that the issuance of a $500,000 cheque drawn on the corporate defendant’s account constituted a payment on account and acknowledgment of the debt, restarting the limitation period under s. 13 of the Act.

The defendant’s admissions during cross‑examination further confirmed acknowledgment of liability.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff.