William Ross Gilmour

This endorsement addresses the determination of costs following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' action against the defendants Stewart and Indicom on appeal.

The Court of Appeal had referred the costs below back to the motion judge.

The court applied principles for assessing costs, including the custom that costs follow the event and the requirement for fairness and reasonableness.

It was determined that costs should be awarded as if the defendants had been wholly successful at the summary judgment stage.

The court adjusted the hourly rate for the defendants' counsel and reduced claimed hours for settlement discussions and observing other parties' motions, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs for both the summary judgment motion and the action to the defendants.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision on Highway 410.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol based on observations of slurred speech, unsteadiness, and odour of alcohol.

The defence argued the accused's symptoms were caused by shock or head injury from the severe collision impact.

The court found that while the Crown's case was circumstantial and the accused's symptoms were consistent with both impairment and trauma, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was impaired by alcohol rather than suffering from the effects of the collision.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

In an interpleader proceeding concerning completed criminal bail, the court determined entitlement to $20,000 deposited as cash bail for a non-resident accused.

The evidence established that the funds originated from the accused’s employer and were paid to counsel in trust for the accused’s benefit, then deposited with the criminal court for the limited purpose of securing compliance with the recognizance.

Applying trust principles, the court held that any assignment of the bail monies to the surety operated only during the life of the recognizance and did not confer a continuing beneficial interest after the criminal proceeding concluded without breach.

Once the bail purpose ended, the express trust was exhausted and the funds reverted to the settlor through counsel in trust.

Aftercare was added as a respondent, the funds were ordered paid to Gilmour Barristers in trust for remittance to Aftercare, and no costs were ordered.

Following a lengthy commercial dispute involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, misuse of confidential information, wrongful dismissal, and fraudulent conveyances, the court determined the allocation and scale of costs arising from two trials and related proceedings.

The litigation involved numerous parties and mixed results, with certain defendants fully successful and others partially liable.

The court concluded that the complexity of the litigation and the magnitude of the claimed costs warranted referral of most quantification issues to an assessment officer under Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded in several instances, including where unproven allegations of fraud or serious misconduct had been advanced, while partial indemnity costs applied to others depending on conduct and settlement offers.

The court also considered the appropriateness of Bullock and Sanderson orders in allocating responsibility among defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover monies advanced to the defendant under a demand promissory note and related financial transactions.

The defendants raised a limitations defence under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the claim was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period.

The court held that the issuance of a $500,000 cheque drawn on the corporate defendant’s account constituted a payment on account and acknowledgment of the debt, restarting the limitation period under s. 13 of the Act.

The defendant’s admissions during cross‑examination further confirmed acknowledgment of liability.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff.

The applicants, two female youth hockey players and their mother, filed human rights complaints against the Brampton Youth Hockey Association (BYHA), its president, and the Ontario Hockey Federation (OHF).

The daughters alleged discrimination on the basis of sex regarding their exclusion from team dressing rooms, unequal changing facilities, and discriminatory comments from teammates.

The mother alleged reprisal after she was removed from a volunteer committee for filing the complaints.

The Tribunal found that while the OHF's dressing room policy was not inherently discriminatory, the BYHA discriminated against the daughters by failing to provide equal access to pre- and post-game activities, failing to arrange comparable changing rooms, tolerating discriminatory comments, and failing to investigate their complaints.

The Tribunal also found that the BYHA and its president committed a reprisal against the mother.

The applications against the OHF were dismissed.

The BYHA was ordered to pay a total of $18,000 in damages for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The respondent had purported to accept a Rule 49 offer to settle after a supervisor was appointed over the corporate appellants and after transferring his interest in a shareholder loan to his daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the supervision order contained a stay provision and Rule 11 applied to the transfer of interest.

Consequently, accepting the offer and bringing the motion to enforce were steps in the proceeding that required leave of the court, which was not obtained.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's hearsay statements to her mother and a videotaped statement to police under the necessity exception.

The complainant was unavailable to testify on the trial date for medical reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision that the necessity requirement was met, as there was evidence that the complainant would not be available to testify within an acceptable period of time.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a developmentally disabled complainant and an eight-month custodial sentence.

The majority held that the complainant’s videotaped and oral out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the principled hearsay exception because the evidence established necessity through her indefinite inability to testify and threshold reliability through timing, demeanour, absence of apparent fabrication, and corroborative admissions by the appellant.

The court further upheld findings that the complainant lacked capacity to consent to the sexual activity and that the defence of honest but mistaken belief had no air of reality, given the appellant’s knowledge of her significant cognitive limitations and failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain capacity and consent.

The s. 11(b) delay argument and sentence appeal were also rejected.

A dissent would have ordered a new trial on the basis that necessity was not established because the complainant’s unavailability may have been temporary and the inability to cross-examine her impaired full answer and defence.