William Ross Gilmour

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover monies advanced to the defendant under a demand promissory note and related financial transactions.

The defendants raised a limitations defence under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the claim was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period.

The court held that the issuance of a $500,000 cheque drawn on the corporate defendant’s account constituted a payment on account and acknowledgment of the debt, restarting the limitation period under s. 13 of the Act.

The defendant’s admissions during cross‑examination further confirmed acknowledgment of liability.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The respondent had purported to accept a Rule 49 offer to settle after a supervisor was appointed over the corporate appellants and after transferring his interest in a shareholder loan to his daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the supervision order contained a stay provision and Rule 11 applied to the transfer of interest.

Consequently, accepting the offer and bringing the motion to enforce were steps in the proceeding that required leave of the court, which was not obtained.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's hearsay statements to her mother and a videotaped statement to police under the necessity exception.

The complainant was unavailable to testify on the trial date for medical reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision that the necessity requirement was met, as there was evidence that the complainant would not be available to testify within an acceptable period of time.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a developmentally disabled complainant and an eight-month custodial sentence.

The majority held that the complainant’s videotaped and oral out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the principled hearsay exception because the evidence established necessity through her indefinite inability to testify and threshold reliability through timing, demeanour, absence of apparent fabrication, and corroborative admissions by the appellant.

The court further upheld findings that the complainant lacked capacity to consent to the sexual activity and that the defence of honest but mistaken belief had no air of reality, given the appellant’s knowledge of her significant cognitive limitations and failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain capacity and consent.

The s. 11(b) delay argument and sentence appeal were also rejected.

A dissent would have ordered a new trial on the basis that necessity was not established because the complainant’s unavailability may have been temporary and the inability to cross-examine her impaired full answer and defence.