Mara Greene

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and arson after his wife died in a deliberately set house fire.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on after-the-fact conduct regarding his fabricated statements to an insurance adjuster, and on the burden of proof concerning his defence that the deceased committed suicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstances of the fabricated statements could constitute independent evidence of concoction, and that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The appellant and his co-accused were convicted of first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to provide an adequate limiting instruction regarding his prior acts of violence, failing to properly instruct the jury on his statements to civilian witnesses including a Vetrovec warning, and misdirecting the jury on liability under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the jury instructions, noting the lack of objections from trial counsel and the overall fairness of the charge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a young person, was involved in a gun battle on a crowded street during which an innocent bystander was killed by a bullet fired by a rival shooter.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed the accused for trial on second degree murder.

The motion judge quashed the committal for murder but remitted the matter for manslaughter.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the accused's participation in a mutual shootout caused the victim's death.

The Court also held that the accused could be committed for second degree murder under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code, as he engaged in a dangerous act for an unlawful object that he knew was likely to cause death.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the committal for second degree murder was restored.

The appellant was charged with building a deck without a permit.

The municipal prosecutor served a summons on the appellant's counsel, requiring him to testify against his client regarding correspondence he had sent on the client's behalf.

The appellant's motion to quash the summons was dismissed by the motion judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the summons, holding that calling opposing counsel to testify against their client is highly undesirable and should only be permitted in the most exceptional circumstances where the proper administration of justice demands it, which was not the case here.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred regarding the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant was not serving any sentence when sentenced on these charges, having completed his prior sentence nine months earlier.

The trial judge properly gave 2:1 credit for the nine months of pre-sentence custody.

The totality principle under s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code had no application.

The total sentence of 42 months was well within the appropriate range.

The appellant was charged with aiding and abetting Russian nationals to enter Canada without proper documentation.

After a 45-day trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial on his own motion, citing a potential apprehension of bias because he had previously written reference letters for the court reporter, whom the self-represented accused had called as a witness.

The Crown successfully applied to quash the mistrial order.

The accused appealed the quashing order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for an apprehension of bias and emphasizing that a mistrial should only be granted as a last resort.

The police responded to a 911 call reporting individuals with handguns in a strip club parking lot.

Officers set up a roadblock at the exit and stopped the first vehicle to leave.

The occupants, who matched the general description of the suspects, were asked to exit the vehicle.

One occupant fled, was apprehended, and found to possess a loaded handgun.

The other occupant was subsequently searched, and a loaded handgun was also found on him.

The trial judge admitted the evidence, but the Court of Appeal excluded it, finding violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the initial detention and subsequent searches were justified under the common law police powers and did not violate the Charter.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including sexually assaulting two 14-year-old boys, and was designated a dangerous offender by the trial judge.

On appeal, the appellant argued he should have been designated a long-term offender, asserting his risk could be managed in the community with chemical castration and strict supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The court noted the appellant's unwillingness to take sex-inhibiting drugs and the unavailability of the required level of community supervision.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment after stabbing an unarmed victim eight times during a fistfight with a concealed prohibited weapon.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his remorse, characterizing the victim as vulnerable, and imposing a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's remorse was not genuine, that the unarmed victim was vulnerable to a concealed weapon, and that the brutal circumstances of the attack justified a sentence at the high end of the range for aggravated manslaughter.

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for a convenience store robbery and possession of a stolen vehicle, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the stolen getaway vehicle days prior to the robbery, and speculative theories regarding his knowledge of the store's panic button and a knife used in the robbery.

Exculpatory evidence included DNA from masks that did not match the appellant and an eyewitness description of the getaway driver's hair colour that did not match the appellant's red hair.

The Court of Appeal found the evidence too tenuous to support an inference of guilt and concluded the verdicts were unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The self-represented appellant was convicted of mischief following a jury trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing several errors occurred during the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excusing prospective jurors who had been victims of break and enters without the parties' consent, in proceeding with 11 jurors over the appellant's objection without considering s. 644(1.1) of the Criminal Code, and in giving an inappropriate instruction on the late disclosure of an alibi.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and, given the unusual circumstances and age of the minor offence, entered a stay of proceedings.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association (Ontario) brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning a costs order made against an accused following a dismissed pre-trial motion for third-party records.

The Crown opposed the intervention, arguing the record was inadequate to resolve the broader policy issues.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding the moving party had the expertise and interest to provide a positive contribution, leaving the scope of argument to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence for production of marijuana.

The trial judge had more than doubled the custodial sentence originally sought by the Crown because the appellant failed to attend his sentence hearing and was arrested on another drug possession charge in the interim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge overreacted to these post-conviction circumstances and failed to adequately apply the parity principle respecting the sentencing of co-accused.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to twelve months plus pre-trial custody.

The appellants appealed a sentence imposed for failing to remit $750,000 in GST funds.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in rejecting unchallenged submissions regarding the appellants' financial circumstances without notice, a conditional sentence was not appropriate.

The court held that the massive fraud on the public ordinarily called for a penitentiary sentence, and although mitigating factors justified a reformatory sentence, general deterrence required a custodial term.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, assault with intent to resist arrest, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of a related cocaine possession charge, that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction on reasonable doubt, and that evidence should have been excluded due to an unlawful detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent, the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof, and the police had reasonable grounds to pursue and detain the appellant when he fled.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after losing control of his vehicle while speeding on a wet road.

He appealed his convictions, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated and the Attorney General lacked authority to prefer the indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code after his committal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's analysis.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in principle regarding the appropriateness of a conditional sentence.

The sentence was reduced from two years less a day to 15 months imprisonment.

The appellant, a used car dealer, was convicted of fraud and possession of stolen property relating to the sale of stolen and revinned vehicles.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the doctrine of wilful blindness.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the wilful blindness doctrine and failed to consider significant evidence probative of his state of mind.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge correctly articulated the wilful blindness doctrine, he failed to address a large body of potentially significant evidence that pointed away from a finding of wilful blindness.

This deficiency in the reasons foreclosed meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting the victim outside a restaurant.

At trial, the victim's prior consistent statement identifying the appellant to police at the hospital was admitted.

The defence relied on this statement in closing arguments to suggest the victim fabricated the identification under pressure.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a limiting instruction was unnecessary and potentially confusing because the defence itself had relied on the statement to support its theory, and it was clear the statement was not offered for the truth of its contents.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery following a jury trial and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment with an order for increased parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on prior discreditable conduct and by failing to leave the defence of theft with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as part of the narrative and there was no air of reality to the theft defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's lengthy criminal record and poor prospects for rehabilitation justified the increased parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to poor identification evidence and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate under Sheppard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the identification by a witness who had previously met the appellant, along with circumstantial evidence, reasonably supported the verdicts.

The Court also held the trial judge's reasons were adequate to permit appellate review.