Faisal Mirza

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal and a stay of proceedings in a multi-accused robbery trial, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence and granting a stay for lost evidence.

The respondents cross-appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence due to insufficient reasons and in granting a stay without assessing prejudice.

The Crown's appeal was granted, setting aside the acquittals and stay, and ordering a new trial on those counts.

The respondents' cross-appeals against conviction were dismissed as the similar act rulings had benefited them or were consented to, and other grounds lacked merit.

In this addendum to a prior decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario finalized the terms of probation for the appellant, Ahmed Marzouk, after having allowed his sentence appeal.

The court varied the sentence to two years less a day followed by a one-year probation, and subsequently ordered that the probation terms include those agreed to by counsel plus 60 hours of community service.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and a three-year sentence.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of identity evidence, the admissibility of rebuttal evidence, and the rejection of alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the identity evidence sufficient and the rebuttal evidence properly admitted.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in principle by over-emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for a youthful first offender with strong rehabilitative prospects.

Consequently, the sentence was varied from three years to two years less a day, followed by one year of probation.

A motion to file fresh evidence was dismissed as it merely confirmed existing evidence of rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant, Noordin Premji, appealed a 13.5-year prison sentence for heroin importing.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the appellant's advanced age (77 at sentencing) as a mitigating factor, contrary to the principles established in R. v. M. (C.A.).

Considering the appellant's significantly deteriorated health and the Crown's concession, the court performed its own sentencing analysis.

While rejecting a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the offence, the court varied the sentence to nine years, emphasizing that this reduction was due to the highly unusual circumstances of the appellant's advanced age and severe medical problems, not a general change in sentencing approach for large-scale drug importing.

The Crown appealed a 12-month sentence imposed on a young Black first-time offender for possession of a loaded handgun.

The trial judge had significantly reduced the sentence based on social context evidence of systemic anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal held that while social context evidence of anti-Black racism is highly relevant to assessing an offender's moral blameworthiness and rehabilitative prospects, it does not reduce the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence.

The Court also held that the Gladue framework for Indigenous offenders does not apply directly to Black offenders, though it can inform the approach.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to two years less a day, but permanently stayed due to the passage of time.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping for ransom and conspiracy to kidnap.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the 33-month delay between his arrest and the completion of his trial violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge made errors in calculating the delay, the recalculated delay still fell within the Morin guidelines and was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance set out in Jordan.

The offender was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, overcapacity magazines, and crack cocaine.

At sentencing, the defence introduced a social history report detailing the offender's experiences with systemic anti-Black racism, poverty, and trauma, including the murder of his brother.

The court accepted that these systemic factors and the offender's likely PTSD reduced his moral culpability.

However, emphasizing the paramount principles of denunciation and deterrence for firearms offences, the court declined to impose a conditional sentence.

The offender was sentenced to 24 months' incarceration, reduced by credit for pre-trial custody and strict house arrest bail, resulting in a net sentence of 10 months and 18 days.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine following a lengthy police surveillance operation dubbed 'Project Odyssey'.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in his handling of a confidential informant privilege application, in refusing to stay proceedings for alleged police misconduct, and in rendering unreasonable verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the in camera, ex parte procedure used for the privilege claim, upholding the trial judge's factual findings regarding police conduct, and concluding the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly supported the convictions.

The Crown sought leave for eight organizations and groups to intervene in an appeal concerning the role of systemic racism and background factors in sentencing of racialized, non-Indigenous offenders and the use of judicial notice and social context evidence in sentencing proceedings.

The motions judge granted leave to all proposed interveners, finding that the issues transcended the interests of the parties and were of significance to the administration of criminal justice.

The interveners were well-recognized organizations with relevant expertise and could offer perspectives different from those of the Crown and respondent.

The appellant was convicted of eleven human-trafficking, sexual and violent offences including robbery, assault causing bodily harm, procuring prostitution, financial benefit from prostitution, proceeds of indictable offence, sexual assault causing bodily harm, assault, transport to a bawdy house, trafficking a person, financial benefit from trafficking a person, and withholding a travel document.

The appellant received a sentence of five and one-half years' incarceration, less three months for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

On appeal, the appellant raised three main arguments: (1) that the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Marakah fundamentally changed the law of search and seizure and entitled him to a new trial to challenge the admissibility of text messages; (2) that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof; and (3) that the verdicts on counts 1 (robbery) and 11 (withholding a travel document) were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three arguments and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and use of a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The charges arose from an altercation in which the appellant shot one of two men who approached him and his friends.

The trial judge found the appellant shot deliberately and rejected claims of accident and self-defence.

On appeal, the primary issue was whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings that the danger to the appellant had passed and that the victim posed no danger.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement following a judge-alone trial.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain expert evidence regarding memory and stress-induced adrenaline, this error did not undermine the conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, which was supported by the appellant's own admissions regarding striking the complainant and tearing her underwear with intent to engage in sexual activity.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the unlawful confinement conviction, finding that the restraint was momentary rather than for a significant period of time, and that any confinement formed an integral part of the sexual assault, triggering the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions for the same conduct.

The offender, a young Black man, was convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and carrying a concealed weapon.

At sentencing, the defence introduced expert reports detailing the history and impact of anti-Black racism in Canada, as well as a specific social history report on the offender.

The court admitted these reports, finding that systemic racism, socio-economic disadvantage, and the offender's personal history of trauma and educational failure constrained his choices and lessened his moral blameworthiness.

The court also found that the offender's Charter rights under ss. 7 and 10(b) were violated during his arrest.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months, reduced to 12 months to remedy the Charter breaches, followed by 18 months of probation, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation can be achieved through a more restrained sentence when viewed through a systemic lens.

The appellant, Jose Manuel Lopes-Cabral, appealed his impaired driving conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to stay charges for unreasonable delay under *R. v. Jordan*.

The appellant contended the 18-month presumptive ceiling was breached, or alternatively, that the delay was unreasonable even if below the ceiling.

The court found the total delay did not exceed 18 months, placing the onus on the defence to show unreasonable delay and meaningful steps to expedite.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the defence failed to take meaningful and sustained steps, particularly by refusing to schedule a Crown pre-trial meeting while awaiting disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking cocaine contrary to s. 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown's case relied on evidence that the appellant sold nine ounces of cocaine to an intermediary, who subsequently sold it to an undercover officer.

The trial judge accepted the intermediary's testimony and found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge also found that guilt could be independently established through police surveillance evidence.

The appellant appealed, challenging the trial judge's treatment of the intermediary's evidence, particularly regarding credibility assessment and reliance on demeanour.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of trafficking cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of marijuana.

He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on three grounds: that the trial judge reversed the onus by drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his employer as a witness; that the trial judge improperly relied on cross-examination on an affidavit sworn as part of a Rowbotham application; and that the trial judge made adverse factual findings insufficiently grounded in the evidence.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in not imposing a conditional sentence and failed to consider the over-representation of African-Canadians in the prison system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The Crown appealed acquittals for assault with intent to resist lawful arrest.

The trial judge found the arrest unlawful because the officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds to believe the respondent breached a bail condition by "attending" a prohibited location, considering only his walking past it.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in law by limiting the circumstances considered for objective reasonableness, failing to include the respondent's prior drug trafficking arrest at the location, the nature of the location, and physical barriers.

The court also held that the respondent's flight, occurring after the decision to arrest but before its execution, was a relevant factor for objective grounds.

The appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of drug and firearm offences following a search executed pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge dismissed their Charter section 8 application challenging the validity of the warrant.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant regarding the corroborating evidence from the property manager.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed errors in principle by refusing cross-examination and by relying on his own assessment of the confidential informant's reliability to deny the motion.

The court held that when the defence demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination will generate evidence tending to discredit the grounds for the warrant's issuance, cross-examination must be permitted.

The convictions were quashed and new trials ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari, which sought to quash their committal for trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the certiorari judge's finding that the preliminary inquiry judge reasonably inferred from circumstantial evidence that the appellants had constructive possession of the entire contents of a stash house.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing a certiorari application arising from a preliminary inquiry committal in a homicide prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her limited jurisdiction by choosing between competing inferences reasonably available on the evidence and by preferring the inference favourable to the appellants.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence was incapable of placing one appellant within the scheme to do violence, holding that any relative weakness in the evidence was irrelevant at the committal stage.

The appeals were dismissed.