Bari Crackower

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that his discussions with co-conspirators amounted to a concluded agreement, and that the trial judge misapplied the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had agreed to join the conspiracy to import cocaine by airplane.

The court also held that the trial judge properly applied the Carter framework and did not improperly rely on hearsay evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

This document serves as a formal header for an appeal decision, primarily noting the imposition and continuation of a publication ban under section 539 of the Criminal Code.

It explicitly states that the full judgment is subject to a statutory non-publication order, pending the outcome of the underlying trial, and is therefore not publicly accessible.

The document outlines the specific provisions of section 539 regarding the restriction of evidence publication from preliminary inquiries.

The appellant, Frank Marrone, appealed his conviction for possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: unreasonable verdict, conflict of interest of his original defence counsel, and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds, finding the verdict was reasonable and no actual impairment of representation due to the alleged conflict.

However, the Court found that the trial judge's repeated, unjustified criticisms and characterizations of defence counsel's conduct, including accusations of "lulling" the Crown and misrepresenting facts, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the possession for the purpose of trafficking charge.

The offender was found guilty of multiple drug trafficking offences, including possession of 21 kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court rejected the offender's argument that he believed the fentanyl was cocaine, finding he was operating a high-level commercial enterprise.

Weighing the severe aggravating factors of the quantity and nature of the drugs against mitigating factors including restrictive bail conditions and pandemic-related pre-trial custody, the court imposed a global sentence of 16 years, reduced to 14 years and 9.5 months after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, having been convicted of drug trafficking offences, applied to reopen his trial prior to sentencing to adduce fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence related to findings in a separate proceeding that a police officer had deliberately misled another officer to obtain search warrants.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence.

The court concluded that the application was an attempt to reverse a tactical decision made by defence counsel at trial, who had chosen to challenge a different warrant rather than pursue the missing video evidence.

The applicants brought a joint omnibus Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence following their arrest during the execution of a search warrant at a condominium unit.

They alleged multiple Charter breaches, including unreasonable search and arbitrary detention due to the police's dynamic entry and use of handcuffs, unlawful strip searches, failure to preserve CCTV evidence, and delays in fulfilling their informational and implementation rights to counsel.

The court found that the dynamic entry, manner of detention, and strip searches were reasonable and justified for officer safety.

The court also dismissed the lost evidence claim.

However, the court found breaches of s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) due to unjustified delays in informing the applicants of the reasons for their arrest and their right to counsel, as well as delays in facilitating access to counsel.

Despite these breaches, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) or exclude evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the breaches were not systemic, had minimal impact on the applicants' trial fairness, and the evidence was not obtained as a result of the breaches.

The applicants, charged with drug and gun offences following a police investigation, challenged the search warrants that led to their charges under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

They argued that the police failed to preserve relevant CCTV footage and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that a police officer deliberately misled the affiant and the issuing justice, and intentionally failed to seize relevant CCTV video, violating s. 7.

The court also found that the search warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating s. 8.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police misconduct was egregious and subverted the search warrant process, warranting the exclusion of the seized evidence.

The appellant, Kester Ellis, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether cell phone location tracking data, obtained under a facially invalid warrant (a s. 8 Charter breach), should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and whether the Crown's opening statement contained inadmissible and prejudicial investigative hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the unintentional nature of the warrant error, minimal privacy impact, and societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court also found the Crown's opening statement to be permissible narrative evidence, not improper hearsay.

The accused, Christopher Janisse, faced an eight-count indictment for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The trial proceeded on a written statement of facts.

Janisse conceded guilt on two counts of possession of cocaine for trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found him not guilty of two counts of trafficking cocaine, determining that the circumstantial evidence, while suspicious, did not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found Janisse guilty of a third trafficking count and two counts of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for trafficking, concluding that the totality of circumstantial evidence established his knowledge and control of a drug stash house and the large quantities of drugs found.

The final judgment was guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, and not guilty on counts 4 and 5.

The defendant was charged with multiple drug trafficking and breach of conditions offences.

The defence brought an application to exclude evidence under s. 10(b) and s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing a delay in access to counsel.

The court found that the initial delay in access to counsel was justified due to ongoing public and officer safety concerns related to an unrecovered firearm and the need to preserve evidence.

The court also found that the defendant later waived his right to counsel.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine (lesser included), possession of fentanyl for trafficking, possession of heroin/carfentanil for trafficking, possession of methamphetamine for trafficking, two counts of breach of recognizance, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

Motaz Haj pleaded guilty to two counts of fentanyl trafficking, one to an undercover officer and one as a party to a sale that resulted in a fatal overdose.

The court considered a joint submission for a six-year sentence, with the primary issue being the credit for pre-sentence custody, particularly concerning harsh conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized the devastating impact of fentanyl and the victim's death as aggravating factors, balanced against the guilty plea, remorse, and difficult custody conditions.

The judge ultimately accepted the joint submission for a six-year sentence, crediting the offender with time served, including enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and a further credit for harsh conditions, followed by a two-year probation period.

This was a joint application by the defendants for relief under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a declaration that searches conducted under two warrants breached their rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The application challenged the validity of the warrants and the police conduct in obtaining consent for information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach and that the warrants were properly issued based on the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The three co-accused applicants brought a pre-trial motion challenging the validity of a search warrant that led to the seizure of firearms and drugs.

The Crown asserted Confidential Informant privilege over portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and provided a redacted version along with a proposed judicial summary.

In this Step 6 Garofoli ruling, the court held that the proposed judicial summary sufficiently alerted the defence to the nature of the redacted information, allowing them to challenge the warrant by argument or evidence.

The Crown was permitted to rely on the unredacted ITO to support the issuance of the warrant.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant and utterances made upon arrest, alleging breaches of s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained significant inaccuracies and misleading information regarding the applicant's residence at the searched unit, leading to a s. 8 breach.

A delay in providing access to counsel also constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the serious state misconduct and significant impact on the applicant's privacy and counsel rights warranted exclusion of the evidence and utterances.

The accused, charged with multiple drug trafficking offences, brought an application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that a tracking warrant was improperly issued.

The tracking warrant was based on information from a confidential informant.

Applying the Debot framework, the court found the informant's information was compelling, highly credible, and materially corroborated by police surveillance of counter-surveillance techniques.

The court concluded there were reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was trafficking drugs and that the tracking warrant was validly issued.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, a key Crown witness recanted her videorecorded police statement in which she described witnessing the respondent sell cocaine.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the witness under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act but dismissed the Crown's application to admit the statement for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made multiple errors in his hearsay analysis, including improperly assessing necessity based on the overall strength of the Crown's case, failing to recognize the witness's availability for cross-examination as a procedural safeguard, and improperly exercising his residual discretion.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Tuan Bui, applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20 months and 14 days (622 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a significant, unexplained 15-month delay in disclosure by the Crown, which was not excused by the COVID-19 pandemic or the alleged complexity of the case.

The court also determined that periods of defence unavailability did not cause the delay.

Consequently, the charges against the accused were stayed.

The defendants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking offences.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the substantial quantities of cocaine involved and their high-level involvement in the drug trade, and mitigating factors such as their guilty pleas, personal circumstances, restrictive bail conditions, and the anonymous surrender of firearms.

For Johnson, the court also considered his testimony at another trial.

The Crown proposed sentences of five years for Brown and seven years for Johnson.

The court imposed sentences of four years and seven months for Brown and six years and five months for Johnson, granting modest additional credit for restrictive bail conditions and the surrender of firearms, and limited credit for Johnson's testimony, which was found to be of little assistance to the prosecution.

Ancillary orders for DNA samples and firearm prohibitions were also imposed.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing a six-hour delay in accessing counsel violated his s. 10(b) rights.

The court found the police violated the accused's s. 10(b) rights due to inadequate resource allocation, which constituted a serious institutional disregard for Charter rights.

The evidence was found to be temporally and contextually connected to the breach.

Applying the *Grant* factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, thus excluding the heroin and other items seized from the vehicle.

The accused, Sabrullah Khan, was charged with trafficking heroin.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the transfer of a package containing 991.36 grams of heroin to an individual (Mr. Rilling) whom Khan did not know, in suspicious circumstances.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Khan knew the package contained heroin or was wilfully blind to its contents.

The court considered the totality of circumstantial evidence, including the absence of direct evidence and the evidence that Mr. Hatemi (the drug network leader) often employed "blind couriers." The court found that while an inference of knowledge was reasonable, it was not the *only* reasonable inference, as it was also plausible that Khan was an unwitting courier.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt, and Khan was found not guilty.