Jennifer M. Lynch

The appellant challenged admission of drug evidence after a found s. 10(b) breach, arguing exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s Grant analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter requires police to provide a detainee with a renewed opportunity to consult counsel before a strip search incident to arrest.

The Court held that, given the highly invasive nature of strip searches, the right to reconsult is necessary to fulfill the purpose of section 10(b).

The Court found two additional Charter breaches: a 20-minute delay in informing the appellant of his right to counsel, and the failure to provide an opportunity to reconsult before the strip search.

However, after a fresh section 24(2) analysis, the Court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the global sentence of 15 months' imprisonment for drug trafficking and breach of undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, clarifying that the sentencing judge's finding was factual and that addiction was properly weighed against aggravating factors, including the commercial motive, repeat offending, and breach of release conditions.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding it within the appropriate range and that a conditional sentence was insufficient for denunciation and deterrence.

This decision addresses a pre-trial application by two accused, Nicole Fife and Leonida Pilliatis, seeking to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging breaches of their Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rights.

The court found that while the initial detention of both accused was lawful, Ms. Fife's Charter rights were breached by the police failing to promptly inform her of the reason for detention and her right to counsel, and by interrogating her after she invoked her right to counsel.

Mr. Pilliatis's Charter rights were not breached.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court excluded the evidence (drugs and statements) against Ms. Fife due to the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches, but found the evidence admissible against Mr. Pilliatis.

The appellant sought a reduction in his six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his difficult upbringing, that the sentence was comparatively too high, and that the lack of cash seized indicated his motivation was addiction rather than profit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons, noting the admitted quantity of fentanyl supported an inference of trafficking, including a financial motive, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought Charter applications under ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a residence and a pat-down search.

The accused challenged the sufficiency of the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) based on a confidential informant's tip.

The court found the judicial summary sufficient for the accused to make full answer and defence and upheld the search warrant's validity.

The court also dismissed the s. 10(a) and 10(b) claims, finding the brief delay in advising the accused of his right to counsel during a pat-down search was justified by officer safety, and the delay in implementing the right to counsel was reasonable given the circumstances.

The applications were dismissed.

Daniel Dubajic, a first offender, was convicted on 73 counts related to possessing colossal amounts of drugs (106 kg cocaine, 5 kg fentanyl, 30 kg crystal methamphetamine, 4 kg MDMA) for trafficking and numerous firearms (57 handguns, 8 long guns, 15,000 rounds of ammunition) for transfer.

The Crown sought a 25-year sentence, while the defence proposed 15 years.

The court imposed an 18-year sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, but also considering the law of diminishing returns and the offender's rehabilitative potential as a first offender, finding his role was not at the top of the trafficking hierarchy.

After applying 3 years and 1 month of credit for pre-sentence custody (including Summers and Duncan credits), the remaining sentence to be served is 13 years and 10 months.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion seeking the exclusion of evidence (drugs and firearms) seized during the execution of a search warrant at his residence, alleging violations of his rights under sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient evidence to ground a reasonable belief for the search, and that police violated his right to counsel by delaying access, failing to hold off on questioning, and delaying notification of additional charges.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the ITO contained compelling, credible, and corroborated information from confidential informants.

The court also found no section 10(b) breaches, concluding that the delay in accessing counsel was reasonable to ensure privacy, the questioning was justified by officer safety, and the delay in notifying the applicant of new charges did not impact his Charter-protected interests.

The appellant, a truck driver, appealed his convictions for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, following a retrial.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, with the central issue being the appellant's knowledge of the drugs found in his trailer.

The trial judge, sitting alone, rejected the appellant's testimony and concluded that knowledge was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial judge's application of circumstantial evidence principles correct (including considering inferences from lack of evidence), and no material misapprehension of evidence that led to a miscarriage of justice.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine, possession of crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime following the execution of a search warrant at a residence.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession of drugs and cash found in a basement bedroom closet.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, relying on the presence of his wallet, mail, and male clothing in the room.

The court found the accused not guilty of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, but guilty of the lesser included offence of simple possession.

Motaz Haj pleaded guilty to two counts of fentanyl trafficking, one to an undercover officer and one as a party to a sale that resulted in a fatal overdose.

The court considered a joint submission for a six-year sentence, with the primary issue being the credit for pre-sentence custody, particularly concerning harsh conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized the devastating impact of fentanyl and the victim's death as aggravating factors, balanced against the guilty plea, remorse, and difficult custody conditions.

The judge ultimately accepted the joint submission for a six-year sentence, crediting the offender with time served, including enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and a further credit for harsh conditions, followed by a two-year probation period.

The accused, Faysal Adow, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (drugs) seized following his arrest for impaired care and control and subsequent arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found that the initial arrest for impaired care and control was unlawful due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

Consequently, the subsequent search of the vehicle, which led to the discovery of drugs, was an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court also found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter for delayed provision of rights to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the adjudication on the merits, leading to the exclusion of the evidence and a finding of not guilty on all counts.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to vacate a Justice of the Peace's release order for the respondent, Daniel Dubajic, and to detain him pending trial.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law and that the decision was clearly inappropriate, particularly regarding the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in assessing the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences (specifically the "use" of firearms), and the potential sentence.

The court also found the proposed release plan inadequate.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ordering Dubajic's detention on secondary and tertiary grounds, while agreeing with the Justice of the Peace's assessment on the primary ground (flight risk).

Enforcement Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission applied for an order authorizing the disclosure of certain radio advertisements, interviews, and transcripts to the Ministry of the Attorney General's Civil Remedies for Illicit Activities Office (CRIA).

The records were required to provide notice to investors about the claims and distribution process for returning funds collected from a fraudulent scheme.

The Commission granted the application, finding it in the public interest to allow CRIA to communicate through the same channels used to solicit investors, and authorized the disclosure without notice to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a merits decision and a sanctions decision of the Ontario Securities Commission.

The Commission had found that a set of contracts marketed as a tax planning vehicle constituted an 'investment contract' and therefore a 'security' under the Securities Act.

The Commission concluded that the appellants breached the Act by selling these securities without being registered and without filing a prospectus, imposing trading bans, administrative penalties, and costs.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Commission's application of the test for an investment contract was reasonable and that the sanctions imposed were proportionate and justified.

Staff of the Commission and the respondent reached a settlement agreement regarding allegations of insider tipping, making misleading statements to Staff, and breaching the confidentiality of an investigation.

The respondent admitted to tipping a colleague about material undisclosed facts regarding a public company, lying under oath, and disclosing his compelled examination.

The Commission approved the settlement, which included a six-year ban on trading and acting as a director or officer, a $350,000 administrative penalty, and $50,000 in costs.

The Commission found the settlement fell within the range of reasonable outcomes and was in the public interest, noting mitigating factors such as the respondent's loss of employment and agreement to cooperate with Staff.

The respondent, a former CFO and director of a reporting issuer, entered into a settlement agreement with Staff of the Commission regarding his participation in a manipulative trading scheme prior to becoming an officer.

The respondent admitted to participating in transactions that created a misleading appearance of market activity at the direction of the company's founder.

The Commission approved the settlement, finding it in the public interest given the respondent's lack of market experience, voluntary resignation, cooperation, and lack of profit.

The respondent was ordered to pay $12,500, subjected to one-year trading and director/officer bans, and reprimanded.

The respondent, former CEO and director of a public company, admitted to participating in and facilitating manipulative trading in the company's shares by providing his trading account access to the company's founder.

Staff of the Commission and the respondent reached a settlement agreement.

The Commission approved the settlement, finding it in the public interest, and ordered a reprimand, a $12,500 administrative penalty, and two-year bans on trading, acquiring securities, and acting as a director or officer of a reporting issuer.

The respondent brought a motion to adjourn the hearing on the merits pending his appeal to the Divisional Court regarding a dismissed motion for a stay based on solicitor-client privilege.

Staff opposed the adjournment, citing its pending motion to quash the appeal.

The Commission found that proceeding with the hearing would not significantly expedite the matter, as the majority of the hearing would occur in September regardless of the outcome of Staff's motion.

The motion to adjourn was granted, and the hearing was rescheduled to September.

The respondent requested that the Commission's reasons dismissing his motion on solicitor-client privilege be kept confidential from the public, arguing that publication would render the claimed privilege moot in the event of an appeal.

The Commission dismissed the request, finding that the open court principle applies and the respondent failed to establish any prejudice, as the reasons did not describe evidence that could fairly be considered legal advice.