Jennifer M. Lynch

The appellant challenged admission of drug evidence after a found s. 10(b) breach, arguing exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s Grant analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter requires police to provide a detainee with a renewed opportunity to consult counsel before a strip search incident to arrest.

The Court held that, given the highly invasive nature of strip searches, the right to reconsult is necessary to fulfill the purpose of section 10(b).

The Court found two additional Charter breaches: a 20-minute delay in informing the appellant of his right to counsel, and the failure to provide an opportunity to reconsult before the strip search.

However, after a fresh section 24(2) analysis, the Court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the global sentence of 15 months' imprisonment for drug trafficking and breach of undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, clarifying that the sentencing judge's finding was factual and that addiction was properly weighed against aggravating factors, including the commercial motive, repeat offending, and breach of release conditions.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding it within the appropriate range and that a conditional sentence was insufficient for denunciation and deterrence.

This decision addresses a pre-trial application by two accused, Nicole Fife and Leonida Pilliatis, seeking to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging breaches of their Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rights.

The court found that while the initial detention of both accused was lawful, Ms. Fife's Charter rights were breached by the police failing to promptly inform her of the reason for detention and her right to counsel, and by interrogating her after she invoked her right to counsel.

Mr. Pilliatis's Charter rights were not breached.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court excluded the evidence (drugs and statements) against Ms. Fife due to the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches, but found the evidence admissible against Mr. Pilliatis.

The appellant sought a reduction in his six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his difficult upbringing, that the sentence was comparatively too high, and that the lack of cash seized indicated his motivation was addiction rather than profit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons, noting the admitted quantity of fentanyl supported an inference of trafficking, including a financial motive, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

Daniel Dubajic, a first offender, was convicted on 73 counts related to possessing colossal amounts of drugs (106 kg cocaine, 5 kg fentanyl, 30 kg crystal methamphetamine, 4 kg MDMA) for trafficking and numerous firearms (57 handguns, 8 long guns, 15,000 rounds of ammunition) for transfer.

The Crown sought a 25-year sentence, while the defence proposed 15 years.

The court imposed an 18-year sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, but also considering the law of diminishing returns and the offender's rehabilitative potential as a first offender, finding his role was not at the top of the trafficking hierarchy.

After applying 3 years and 1 month of credit for pre-sentence custody (including Summers and Duncan credits), the remaining sentence to be served is 13 years and 10 months.

The appellant, a truck driver, appealed his convictions for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, following a retrial.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, with the central issue being the appellant's knowledge of the drugs found in his trailer.

The trial judge, sitting alone, rejected the appellant's testimony and concluded that knowledge was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial judge's application of circumstantial evidence principles correct (including considering inferences from lack of evidence), and no material misapprehension of evidence that led to a miscarriage of justice.

Motaz Haj pleaded guilty to two counts of fentanyl trafficking, one to an undercover officer and one as a party to a sale that resulted in a fatal overdose.

The court considered a joint submission for a six-year sentence, with the primary issue being the credit for pre-sentence custody, particularly concerning harsh conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized the devastating impact of fentanyl and the victim's death as aggravating factors, balanced against the guilty plea, remorse, and difficult custody conditions.

The judge ultimately accepted the joint submission for a six-year sentence, crediting the offender with time served, including enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and a further credit for harsh conditions, followed by a two-year probation period.

The accused, Faysal Adow, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (drugs) seized following his arrest for impaired care and control and subsequent arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found that the initial arrest for impaired care and control was unlawful due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

Consequently, the subsequent search of the vehicle, which led to the discovery of drugs, was an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court also found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter for delayed provision of rights to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the adjudication on the merits, leading to the exclusion of the evidence and a finding of not guilty on all counts.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to vacate a Justice of the Peace's release order for the respondent, Daniel Dubajic, and to detain him pending trial.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law and that the decision was clearly inappropriate, particularly regarding the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in assessing the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences (specifically the "use" of firearms), and the potential sentence.

The court also found the proposed release plan inadequate.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ordering Dubajic's detention on secondary and tertiary grounds, while agreeing with the Justice of the Peace's assessment on the primary ground (flight risk).

This appeal concerns the interpretation and application of section 76(5)(e) of the Securities Act regarding insider trading and tipping liability for successive tippees.

The appellants received material non-public information about a takeover bid for Masonite International Corporation through a chain of tippers.

The core issue is whether successive tippees who did not have actual knowledge that their source was in a special relationship with the issuer "ought reasonably to have known" this fact.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Ontario Securities Commission's findings against Miller but reversed the Divisional Court's decision to overturn findings against Cheng, restoring the OSC's liability and sanctions determinations.

The moving party sought production of documents and information held by a court‑appointed receiver in connection with an investigation related to alleged securities fraud proceedings before the Ontario Securities Commission.

The court considered whether the principles governing third‑party production established in R. v. O'Connor and R. v. McNeil applied to records held by a receiver acting as an officer of the court.

It held that although receivers generally are not required to disclose investigative materials beyond their reports, that protection cannot override an accused’s constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

Applying the O'Connor framework, the court required the moving party to demonstrate that the requested records were “likely relevant.” Only limited categories of documents met that threshold, including certain materials from lawyers, the accountant, and recovered emails, while most requests were rejected as speculative fishing expeditions.