Kevin Donald Toyne

The insured was involved in two motor vehicle accidents and claimed statutory accident benefits.

After disputes arose, the insured elected to have her claims determined by a FSCO arbitrator.

The parties attended a settlement meeting where the insured signed a release for $165,000, but she subsequently sought to rescind the settlement, claiming she did not understand its finality.

The insurer applied to the Superior Court of Justice for a declaration that a binding settlement was reached.

The court dismissed the application, holding that under the Insurance Act, once an insured elects arbitration, the FSCO arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact and law, including whether a binding settlement was reached and whether it was validly rescinded.

The Court dismissed an appeal from a civil contempt finding against a lawyer who returned trust funds to his client despite a Mareva injunction.

The Court held that civil contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional act that breaches a clear order with notice, and does not require contumacious intent.

The Court also held the motions judge erred by reopening and setting aside the initial contempt finding on evidence that should have been filed at the liability stage.

The Attorney General brought a motion for a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, regarding $205,100 in Canadian currency seized by police during a domestic assault arrest.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the police officers' lay opinion evidence was inadmissible and the Crown failed to establish reasonable grounds.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the currency was proceeds of unlawful activity, noting the money was bundled, tested positive for controlled substances via a canine sniff, and the respondents' explanation for the cash was not credible.

The preservation order was granted.

The respondents, who had previously been found in contempt of court and sentenced, sought an adjournment of their upcoming compliance and sentencing hearing.

They requested the adjournment to allow time to seek a stay pending appeal in the Court of Appeal and to accommodate a religious holiday.

The applicant opposed the adjournment.

The court dismissed the motion for an adjournment, noting the urgency of determining compliance with the court's orders and the respondents' delay in seeking a stay.

Following earlier findings of civil contempt for non-compliance with a Mareva injunction and related disclosure orders, the court determined sentence.

The contempt involved repeated failures to disclose assets and the whereabouts of trust funds, deliberate obstruction of examinations, and ongoing refusal to purge contempt despite multiple opportunities and clarifying endorsements.

Applying civil contempt sentencing principles that emphasize proportionality, coercion, deterrence, denunciation, and compliance, the court imposed conditional sentence orders on two contemnors and an intermittent custodial sentence on the contemnor found most deliberately defiant.

The court also awarded the successful moving party substantial indemnity costs of the contempt process.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from the alleged transmission of a sexually transmitted disease during their marriage.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the statement of defence as scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding it was not plain and obvious that a spousal relationship could not give rise to a per se or ad hoc fiduciary duty to disclose a known or suspected sexually transmitted disease.

The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, striking several paragraphs of the statement of defence that were inflammatory, irrelevant, or improperly pleaded motive.

Following a motion to strike portions of a statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs payable to individually named defendants whose claims had been struck as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff had asserted a $10 million claim against individual employees and directors of corporate defendants without adequately pleading separate acts or interests beyond their corporate roles.

The individual defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the claims constituted tactical harassment.

The court found the claims against the individuals lacked proper particulars but concluded the circumstances did not justify elevated costs.

Partial indemnity costs were instead fixed at reduced amounts reflecting duplication of work with corporate defendants’ counsel.

The defendants moved under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging civil conspiracy, unlawful interference with economic interests, trespass, and breach of confidence arising from alleged GPS tracking of the plaintiff’s service vehicles to obtain customer information.

The court held that the pleadings for civil conspiracy lacked the required material facts and particulars but granted leave to amend.

The claim for intentional interference with economic interests was struck without leave to amend because the pleadings failed to allege unlawful means directed at a third party as required by the Supreme Court’s formulation of the tort.

Allegations against individual corporate officers were struck as an abuse of process for failing to plead independent tortious conduct.

Claims for trespass to chattels and breach of confidence were allowed to proceed, while the trespass to land claim was struck with leave to amend.

A police officer was ordered dismissed in seven days unless he resigned before that time, pursuant to s. 68(1)(b) of the Police Services Act.

The officer submitted his resignation on the seventh day.

An arbitrator ruled the resignation was ineffective, denying the officer his accumulated sick pay credits.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found the arbitrator's interpretation of the statutory time period was both reasonable and correct.

The application was dismissed.

A bankrupt sought discharge while the trustee opposed on the basis that the bankrupt abandoned a matrimonial equalization claim that could have generated funds for creditors.

The trustee argued the bankrupt’s change of litigation position caused the estate to incur substantial legal fees and lost a potential recovery.

The court held that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act duty requiring a bankrupt to aid in realization of assets does not obligate a bankrupt to alter positions in separate family litigation, particularly where doing so would affect personal family interests.

The trustee’s litigation strategy was reasonable but the costs could not be shifted to the bankrupt absent an agreement or misconduct.

The court granted the discharge with only a short suspension reflecting prior delay.

Two competing procedural motions arose in litigation concerning control of a corporate bank account following the separation of spouses involved in a family business.

The respondents sought leave to examine a bank employee whose interactions with the applicant were central to allegations about improper changes to corporate signing authority that resulted in the freezing of a corporate account.

The court held that the evidence was relevant and that any delay in seeking the examination resulted from prior counsel’s error, which should not prejudice the parties.

Leave was therefore granted to examine the bank employee.

The applicant’s motion to examine opposing counsel about the authenticity and delivery of a corporate requisition was found premature due to potential solicitor‑client privilege concerns and the availability of alternative avenues for obtaining the information.

The Independent Police Review Director brought a motion to quash a summons to witness issued to an investigator and for a declaration that counsel to the OIPRD was not required to bring the investigative file to her cross-examination.

The underlying application for judicial review sought to defer interviews of two police officers facing criminal charges until after their criminal trial.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence sought from the investigator and the investigative file was not relevant or necessary for the judicial review application, as it exceeded the narrow focus of the proceeding.

The Court of Appeal released a costs endorsement following an appeal and cross-appeal.

The respondent, RSM Richter Inc., was the successful party and was awarded costs.

The court fixed the costs of all proceedings, including the motion, stay, appeal, and cross-appeal, at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the appellant personally rather than by the estate.

The appellant faced allegations before the Ontario Securities Commission regarding an alleged Ponzi scheme.

He sought a third-party production order from a court-appointed receiver in an unrelated proceeding to obtain documents for his defence.

The motion judge granted partial production.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not an 'interested person' in the receivership because he sought the documents for a collateral purpose.

Furthermore, the Court found it inappropriate for the Superior Court to make interlocutory procedural orders regarding a proceeding pending before a tribunal.

The appeal was dismissed and the receiver's cross-appeal was allowed.

The moving party sought production of documents and information held by a court‑appointed receiver in connection with an investigation related to alleged securities fraud proceedings before the Ontario Securities Commission.

The court considered whether the principles governing third‑party production established in R. v. O'Connor and R. v. McNeil applied to records held by a receiver acting as an officer of the court.

It held that although receivers generally are not required to disclose investigative materials beyond their reports, that protection cannot override an accused’s constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

Applying the O'Connor framework, the court required the moving party to demonstrate that the requested records were “likely relevant.” Only limited categories of documents met that threshold, including certain materials from lawyers, the accountant, and recovered emails, while most requests were rejected as speculative fishing expeditions.

Following the dismissal of an action and related summary judgment proceedings, the successful defendants sought substantial partial indemnity costs against the plaintiffs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and assessed the reasonableness of the claimed fees, hourly rates, and the nature of work performed.

The court emphasized that costs awards should relate to steps authorized by the rules and excluded various client communications and strategic consultations that were not directly tied to procedural steps in the litigation.

Significant reductions were applied to certain categories of claimed work, including general preparation and work associated with abandoned or unnecessary motions.

The court ultimately fixed global cost awards payable by the plaintiffs to each set of defendants.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant law firm for professional negligence arising from advice given during a share purchase transaction.

The plaintiffs alleged the law firm failed to properly advise them on the risks associated with a pending wrongful dismissal lawsuit against the target company, resulting in a liability that exceeded the negotiated indemnity.

The defendant law firm moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of the standard of care without expert evidence, and failed to prove that the alleged negligent advice caused their damages.

The appellant contractor commenced an action more than two years after the last work was completed and more than two years after a reasonably-timed invoice would have been sent and payment made or refused.

The motion judge concluded the action was barred by the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiffs and defendants, two brothers and their respective holding companies, engaged in a complex corporate divorce involving a transportation business, ProNorth.

The court determined that the brothers were equal 50/50 shareholders in the holding company, rejecting the defendant's claim of a 62/38 split.

The court found the defendant brother engaged in oppressive conduct by wrongfully excluding the plaintiff from a shareholders' meeting and removing him as a director.

As a remedy, the court ordered the defendant to purchase the plaintiff's shares at a fair value of $4,455,000, based on an en bloc valuation of $8.91 million.

The court also resolved disputes over several jointly owned properties, ordering the defendant to purchase the plaintiff's interests in properties used by the business, and directing the partition and sale of others.

The court awarded the plaintiff $180,000 in damages for exclusion from management, offset by $105,000 awarded to the company for the plaintiff's wrongful detention of a corporate aircraft.

Finally, the court found the company's accountant breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by swearing an affidavit contrary to the corporate records, awarding nominal damages of $100.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff had sued the moving party, a lawyer, in negligence for knowingly breaching a Mareva order by paying trust funds to his client.

The motion judge found that the claim raised a potentially novel cause of action that should be determined on a fully developed record at trial.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the recent Court of Appeal decision in Combined Air did not change the principle that novel causes of action are best determined at trial, and denied leave to appeal.