Oscar Strawczynski

This decision resolves a carriage motion between two competing proposed class actions (the Bonnick Action and the Blackford-Hall Action) concerning alleged predatory practices in the consumer marketplace for HVAC equipment.

The court interpreted the newly enacted section 13.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, which focuses on efficiency, productivity, and proportionality.

The court granted carriage to the Bonnick Action, finding its regional scope and targeted case theory against the alleged mastermind and lender corporations to be more efficient and cost-effective than the Blackford-Hall Action's national scope and broader conspiracy claims against multiple defendants.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to return a pre-authorized debit payment of $83,734.05 made post-NOI (Notice of Intention to file a proposal) to the respondent, less amounts owing for post-NOI fuel purchases.

The motion judge found the payment constituted a prohibited remedy under section 69(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the parties had entered into a legitimate agreement to pay past debts in order to secure future fuel supply.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant co-applicant for an outstanding credit card balance of $26,067.74.

The defendant argued she never signed the credit card application and that her husband managed the finances.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that under section 68(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, the defendant was deemed to have entered into the credit agreement by using the card, making her jointly and severally liable for the debt.

The plaintiff, Unlimited Motors Inc., sought to continue a $30 million action for breach of contract and other claims after it had lapsed, requiring a status hearing under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for a 2.5-year delay unacceptable, primarily due to a deliberate choice to prioritize another lawsuit.

The plaintiff also failed to provide robust evidence demonstrating an absence of non-compensable prejudice to the defendant or trial fairness, despite the defendant's own inaction on its counterclaim.

The motion to continue the action was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.

The Landlord, Varsity Investments Inc., sued the Tenant, 1666862 Ontario Inc., and its guarantors for breach of a commercial lease, claiming accelerated rent and damages after the Tenant ceased operations.

The Landlord alleged the Tenant was in default due to insolvency, abandonment, and repudiation.

The Tenant counterclaimed for wrongful termination of the lease, arguing the Landlord's distress was illegal.

The court found that the Tenant was not in breach of the lease, did not repudiate it, and that the Landlord's actions of changing locks and purporting to distrain for non-existent arrears constituted an illegal distress, thereby terminating the lease.

The Landlord's action was dismissed, and the Tenant's counterclaim for damages was allowed.

The appellants appealed an application judge's discretionary decision to order the sale of a property rather than its partition, and brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding it could have been obtained prior to the hearing with reasonable diligence.

The appeal was also dismissed, as the appellants failed to identify any error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the application judge's conclusion that an order for sale was appropriate given the number of owners and the nature of the land.

This costs endorsement followed successful summary judgment motions by the Bachly Defendants, the Township of Oro-Medonte, and the third party W.R. Hodgson, dismissing the plaintiffs' grading claims and the Bachly Defendants' third-party claim against Hodgson.

The court assessed the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs sought by the successful parties against the plaintiffs.

It determined that the plaintiffs were liable for the costs of the Bachly Defendants and the Township, and also for the third party Hodgson's costs, applying principles that allow for third-party costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff when the third-party proceedings were a natural and inevitable consequence of the plaintiff's action.

The court fixed specific amounts for partial indemnity costs for each successful party.

The plaintiffs brought claims for lot grade deficiencies against the defendants (Bachly Investments Inc., 411931 Ontario Ltd. o/a Heights of Moonstone, The Township of Oro-Medonte) and a third party claim was brought by the Bachly Defendants against W.R. Hodgson.

The defendants and third party brought summary judgment motions to dismiss these claims, primarily arguing they were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that there was no evidence of professional negligence against Hodgson.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiffs' grading claims were statute-barred as they knew or ought to have known of the issues by summer/fall 2010, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of standard of care or causation against Hodgson.

The court also found that a prior release only covered a specific driveway issue and not the broader grading claims.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by a lawyer seeking payment of unpaid legal fees.

The defendant argued that significant portions of the claim were released by bankruptcy, statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, or subject to review under the Solicitors Act.

Applying the factors for setting aside default judgment from appellate authority, the court found the defendant had an arguable defence on the merits despite having deliberately failed to defend earlier.

The court also expressed concern about the plaintiff’s strategy of delaying issuance of a final invoice until after the defendant’s discharge from bankruptcy.

Balancing fairness, potential prejudice, and the integrity of the administration of justice, the court concluded the matter should proceed on its merits.

The respondents, who had previously been found in contempt of court and sentenced, sought an adjournment of their upcoming compliance and sentencing hearing.

They requested the adjournment to allow time to seek a stay pending appeal in the Court of Appeal and to accommodate a religious holiday.

The applicant opposed the adjournment.

The court dismissed the motion for an adjournment, noting the urgency of determining compliance with the court's orders and the respondents' delay in seeking a stay.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claim against the respondent.

The corporate appellant's claim was struck because its corporate charter had been revoked when the action was commenced, making it a nullity, and the limitation period expired before it was revived.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the individual appellants' claims, finding that the motion judge erred by striking the entire action based on an improper post-hearing communication from the respondent's counsel without giving the appellants an opportunity to make submissions.

Following earlier findings of civil contempt for non-compliance with a Mareva injunction and related disclosure orders, the court determined sentence.

The contempt involved repeated failures to disclose assets and the whereabouts of trust funds, deliberate obstruction of examinations, and ongoing refusal to purge contempt despite multiple opportunities and clarifying endorsements.

Applying civil contempt sentencing principles that emphasize proportionality, coercion, deterrence, denunciation, and compliance, the court imposed conditional sentence orders on two contemnors and an intermittent custodial sentence on the contemnor found most deliberately defiant.

The court also awarded the successful moving party substantial indemnity costs of the contempt process.

In consolidated family and estates proceedings arising from an elderly mother's transfer of Trinidad property to one son, the court dismissed the son's attempt to stay an earlier order requiring reconveyance and an accounting.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the son wilfully failed to comply with the prior order and was in civil contempt, although his contempt was later purged when he signed the transfer in court.

The court also struck his separate action against siblings without leave to amend as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, constituting an abuse of process, and being statute-barred.

A guardianship application respecting the mother's property was adjourned because mandatory service requirements had not been satisfied and a less restrictive alternative might be available.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against several respondents for failing to comply with a Mareva injunction and subsequent court orders requiring disclosure of financial information and accounting for funds obtained following a tax sale.

The respondents failed to provide sworn financial statements, refused to fully participate in examinations, failed to surrender passports as ordered, and did not produce required documentation tracing the disposition of funds.

The court applied the test for civil contempt and found the orders were clear and unequivocal and that the respondents deliberately failed to comply despite multiple opportunities and a consent order specifying detailed disclosure obligations.

The court concluded the evidence established contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondents were found in contempt but were given an opportunity to purge the contempt before sentencing by complying with the outstanding disclosure orders.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment after depositing over $400,000 into the defendants’ joint account based on the mistaken belief that a mortgage had been registered to secure the advance.

During submissions, the plaintiff relied on theories including unjust enrichment, equitable subrogation, and estoppel.

The responding party argued these causes of action had not been pleaded and that granting judgment on that basis would be procedurally unfair.

The court held that the pleadings should first be amended to properly reflect the legal basis of the claim and allow the defendant to respond.

The motion was adjourned with directions requiring amended pleadings, completion of undertakings, and supplementary materials before the continuation of the summary judgment motion.

The appellant purchaser appealed a trial judgment finding an Agreement of Purchase and Sale null and void.

The agreement was conditional upon the purchaser being approved to assume the first mortgage.

The trial judge found that the condition was not fulfilled, the purchaser had no intention of assuming the mortgage, and the condition could not be waived.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample support in the record for the trial judge's conclusions.