Jordan David Sobel

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment related to a mortgage default.

The defendants argued they were victims of a fraudulent scheme involving the plaintiff and others, which explained their delay in bringing the motion and provided an arguable defence.

The court applied the Mountain View Farms factors and found that the interests of justice favoured setting aside the default judgment, given the evidence of fraud and the vulnerability of the defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to file a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendant's property in Richmond Hill, Ontario.

The plaintiff claimed a 50% undivided ownership interest in the property based on a partnership agreement executed in 2017.

The defendant disputed the plaintiff's ownership claim, alleging he solely funded the property purchase and that the plaintiff's contribution was insufficient to establish partnership rights.

The court found the plaintiff demonstrated a triable issue regarding her interest in the property and granted leave to issue the CPL, finding the equities supported the order.

Costs were ordered to be in the cause.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Koehnen J. dated March 19, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion in a brief endorsement and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

This trial involved claims for unjust enrichment between parties following the breakdown of a common law relationship that lasted from 2012 to 2017.

The applicant claimed compensation for unpaid labour provided to the respondent's wallpapering business, occupation rent for properties, and ownership disputes regarding jointly owned real property.

The respondent counterclaimed for unjust enrichment based on renovation work and mortgage contributions.

The court found the applicant entitled to $81,000 for unpaid labour to the business, the respondent entitled to $30,625.83 for half of mortgage payoff funds advanced to the applicant, and the parties to be equal 50% owners of the jointly purchased property.

No occupation rent was awarded to either party.

The appellants sought a panel review of a single judge's decision dismissing their motion for an extension of time to perfect their appeal.

The underlying action against Dominion Lending Centres Inc. and others for alleged mortgage fraud was dismissed by the Superior Court as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants argued the single judge dismissed the motion solely on procedural grounds without considering the merits.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting the single judge explicitly found the grounds of appeal devoid of merit and the lower court's reasons cogent.

The motion for panel review was dismissed with costs.

The parties brought competing motions under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to determine the validity of a Release signed by the mortgagor, which purported to waive her right to sue the mortgagees and her real estate agent.

The mortgagor had entered into a series of increasingly expensive private mortgages brokered by her real estate agent, who concealed that the lenders were his family members and their companies.

The court found that the real estate agent was the directing mind behind the loans and had breached his fiduciary duty.

The court held that the Release was void and unenforceable because its execution was an unconscionable transaction resulting from an inequality of bargaining power and an improvident bargain, characterized by exorbitant borrowing costs and illegal fees.

This endorsement concerns the costs of a motion brought by the Furneys under Rule 59.06 to set aside or vary the dismissal of their appeal and for an extension of time.

The court previously dismissed the Furneys' motion, finding it to be an abuse of process.

The respondents were awarded full indemnity costs.

The court also issued a prohibition order preventing the Furneys from filing further materials in this matter without satisfying all costs awards and obtaining leave of the court, due to their continued abuse of process.

The defendants/appellants brought a motion for a stay of a writ of possession pending appeal, following previous unsuccessful attempts to challenge a judgment granting judgment on a second mortgage and striking their defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the underlying appeal meritless and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents.

The court also addressed the issue of costs, noting concerns about multiple counsel representing parties with identical interests.

The moving parties brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside or vary the dismissal of their appeal and for an extension of time.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed their appeal.

The court found that Rule 59.06 is for rare circumstances and not for relitigation of matters already determined.

The moving parties' allegations regarding their lawyer's representation were not accepted and did not alter the uncontroverted fact of their mortgage default.

The motion was deemed an abuse of process, being the latest in a series of unsuccessful attempts to delay enforcement of their mortgage responsibilities.

The motion was dismissed, and the responding parties were awarded costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court declined to make a Rule 2.1 order.

The appellants sought to overturn a summary judgment granted against them, which included full indemnity costs under a second mortgage, and the striking of their statement of defence and counterclaim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants were liable under the mortgage, their pleadings were unparticularized, and that other outstanding claims did not justify delaying judgment.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend due to the unintelligible nature of the pleadings and the appellants' failure to seek amendment or provide proposed amended pleadings.

The plaintiff obtained a summary judgment against the defendant vendor for an aborted real estate transaction.

After the appeal period expired, the plaintiff filed a writ of seizure and sale against the vendor's property.

However, prior to the writ being filed, the vendor had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with a third-party purchaser.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interim order to prevent the transfer of the property and declare its writ valid.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the principle that once an agreement of purchase and sale is signed, the purchaser acquires an equitable interest in the property, and a subsequently filed writ of execution against the vendor does not bind the purchaser's interest.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) over a property acquired by a partnership for development.

The parties disagreed on the partnership agreement's interpretation after a zoning application was refused.

The court found a triable issue regarding an interest in land but declined to exercise its discretion to grant the CPL, noting the property was not unique, was acquired for investment, and damages would be an adequate remedy.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff lawyer brought a motion for a charging order over settlement funds received by the defendant, his former client.

The settlement funds were from a professional negligence claim the client brought against the lawyer for missing a limitation period.

The client brought a cross-motion for an assessment of the lawyer's accounts from a previous action.

The court dismissed the motion for a charging order, finding the lawyer was not instrumental in recovering the settlement funds.

The court granted the cross-motion for an assessment, finding special circumstances existed, including inadequate communication about accounts, disproportionate fees, and involuntary payment.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant to file a statement of defence.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to compel the plaintiff to answer a 91-question Demand for Particulars before filing the defence.

The court found that the defendant already had sufficient information to plead, as evidenced by a previously filed draft statement of defence, and that most of the demanded particulars were either already in the statement of claim or within the defendant's knowledge.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer only one demand regarding specific statutory provisions relied upon, and ordered the defendant to file his statement of defence within 20 days thereafter.

This is a motion to review the decision of Justice M.L. Benotto dismissing a motion for an extension of time to appeal.

The Court of Appeal panel found that Benotto J.A. applied the correct test and saw no basis to interfere with her discretionary decision.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, a personal injury lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action against the respondent, another lawyer who took over his client's file.

The respondent had given a personal undertaking to protect the appellant's account but later revoked it on the client's instructions.

The Divisional Court found that while the trial judge erred in concluding the undertaking ended when the appellant's separate action against the client was dismissed, the trial judge correctly held that the claim against the respondent was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice (Family Court Branch) dated February 23, 2016 and April 18, 2016.

The appellant sought relief in the family court proceeding that was contingent upon successfully setting aside an outstanding mortgage in a separate fraudulent conveyances action.

The motion judge properly declined jurisdiction, finding that the motion should have been brought in the fraudulent conveyances action rather than in the family law proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to produce an affidavit of documents.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction because the order was purportedly made under Rule 76, despite the litigation continuing under the ordinary procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order did not refer to Rule 76, and even if it had, it would be a mere technical irregularity that did not deprive the motion judge of jurisdiction.

The applicant, a professional corporation, sought a charging order against the respondent's property for outstanding legal fees from two matrimonial litigation matters.

The court dismissed the request for the Newmarket litigation, finding the applicant was not instrumental in preserving or recovering property in that context.

However, the court granted the charging order for the Lindsay litigation, broadly interpreting "recover" and "preserve" under section 34(1) of the Solicitors Act to include regaining possession of property wrongfully retained by another.

The court also affirmed that a charging order can attach to future funds and found prima facie evidence that the respondent might be unable to pay the fees without selling the property.

The appellants appealed an order regarding disclosure and examination of garnishees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order under appeal was interlocutory rather than final, as it did not dispose of the appellants' rights on a final basis.

Costs of $8,500 were awarded to the garnishees on a partial indemnity basis.