Jordan David Sobel

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to file a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendant's property in Richmond Hill, Ontario.

The plaintiff claimed a 50% undivided ownership interest in the property based on a partnership agreement executed in 2017.

The defendant disputed the plaintiff's ownership claim, alleging he solely funded the property purchase and that the plaintiff's contribution was insufficient to establish partnership rights.

The court found the plaintiff demonstrated a triable issue regarding her interest in the property and granted leave to issue the CPL, finding the equities supported the order.

Costs were ordered to be in the cause.

This trial involved claims for unjust enrichment between parties following the breakdown of a common law relationship that lasted from 2012 to 2017.

The applicant claimed compensation for unpaid labour provided to the respondent's wallpapering business, occupation rent for properties, and ownership disputes regarding jointly owned real property.

The respondent counterclaimed for unjust enrichment based on renovation work and mortgage contributions.

The court found the applicant entitled to $81,000 for unpaid labour to the business, the respondent entitled to $30,625.83 for half of mortgage payoff funds advanced to the applicant, and the parties to be equal 50% owners of the jointly purchased property.

No occupation rent was awarded to either party.

This endorsement concerns the costs of a motion brought by the Furneys under Rule 59.06 to set aside or vary the dismissal of their appeal and for an extension of time.

The court previously dismissed the Furneys' motion, finding it to be an abuse of process.

The respondents were awarded full indemnity costs.

The court also issued a prohibition order preventing the Furneys from filing further materials in this matter without satisfying all costs awards and obtaining leave of the court, due to their continued abuse of process.

The defendants/appellants brought a motion for a stay of a writ of possession pending appeal, following previous unsuccessful attempts to challenge a judgment granting judgment on a second mortgage and striking their defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the underlying appeal meritless and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents.

The court also addressed the issue of costs, noting concerns about multiple counsel representing parties with identical interests.

The moving parties brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside or vary the dismissal of their appeal and for an extension of time.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed their appeal.

The court found that Rule 59.06 is for rare circumstances and not for relitigation of matters already determined.

The moving parties' allegations regarding their lawyer's representation were not accepted and did not alter the uncontroverted fact of their mortgage default.

The motion was deemed an abuse of process, being the latest in a series of unsuccessful attempts to delay enforcement of their mortgage responsibilities.

The motion was dismissed, and the responding parties were awarded costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court declined to make a Rule 2.1 order.

The appellants sought to overturn a summary judgment granted against them, which included full indemnity costs under a second mortgage, and the striking of their statement of defence and counterclaim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants were liable under the mortgage, their pleadings were unparticularized, and that other outstanding claims did not justify delaying judgment.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend due to the unintelligible nature of the pleadings and the appellants' failure to seek amendment or provide proposed amended pleadings.

This is a motion to review the decision of Justice M.L. Benotto dismissing a motion for an extension of time to appeal.

The Court of Appeal panel found that Benotto J.A. applied the correct test and saw no basis to interfere with her discretionary decision.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice (Family Court Branch) dated February 23, 2016 and April 18, 2016.

The appellant sought relief in the family court proceeding that was contingent upon successfully setting aside an outstanding mortgage in a separate fraudulent conveyances action.

The motion judge properly declined jurisdiction, finding that the motion should have been brought in the fraudulent conveyances action rather than in the family law proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a professional corporation, sought a charging order against the respondent's property for outstanding legal fees from two matrimonial litigation matters.

The court dismissed the request for the Newmarket litigation, finding the applicant was not instrumental in preserving or recovering property in that context.

However, the court granted the charging order for the Lindsay litigation, broadly interpreting "recover" and "preserve" under section 34(1) of the Solicitors Act to include regaining possession of property wrongfully retained by another.

The court also affirmed that a charging order can attach to future funds and found prima facie evidence that the respondent might be unable to pay the fees without selling the property.

The plaintiff moved for leave under Rule 48.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck off.

The court applied the four-factor framework governing restoration motions, including whether delay was intentional, whether there was inordinate and inexcusable delay, whether the plaintiff rebutted any presumption of prejudice, and whether the defendant demonstrated actual prejudice.

The court found the delay was not intentional or contumelious and that the action had originally been set down for trial within a reasonable period after commencement.

The plaintiff provided evidence addressing delay and asserting no prejudice, while the defendant produced no concrete evidence of actual prejudice beyond general assertions.

Balancing the factors and the interests of the parties, the court granted leave to restore the action to the trial list and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs for the indulgence.