Andrea M. Mannell

The respondent, having been successful in the main application for judicial review, sought partial indemnity costs of $45,000.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded due to the public interest exception, or alternatively, that the amount claimed was excessive.

The Divisional Court rejected the public interest argument, noting the applicant had a personal financial motivation for the proceeding.

However, the court agreed the claimed amount was excessive for a half-day hearing on a narrow issue, and fixed costs at $10,000 all-inclusive.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a municipal council decision reprimanding him and suspending his pay for 30 days due to his participation in the Freedom Convoy protest.

The applicant argued the council failed to consider his section 2 Charter rights when imposing the penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the council was bound by the Integrity Commissioner's finding of misconduct, and any Charter arguments were relevant only to the Commissioner's finding, not the council's subsequent discretionary penalty decision.

The plaintiff was successful on a summary judgment motion brought by the defendant and sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The defendant argued that the parties should bear their own costs due to the plaintiff's conduct, or alternatively, that costs should be reduced.

The court rejected the defendant's arguments regarding the plaintiff's conduct and the use of Toronto counsel, but also declined to award substantial indemnity costs or penalize the defendant for refusing to mediate.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $39,325.00, after making a reduction for overlapping time among the plaintiff's legal team.

The plaintiff, a slip priority note holder, sued the defendant sailing club for breach of contract after the club unilaterally changed its summer dockage rates, eliminating a long-standing 20% rate differential for slip priority holders.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing no such agreement existed or was breached.

The court found a valid contract based on objective intent and conduct, including 40 years of consistent application of the 20% differential.

The court determined the club breached this agreement by unilaterally altering its terms and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering damages and specific performance of the original rate differential.

The applicant, a municipal councilor, sought to add the Integrity Commissioner as a respondent to his application for judicial review of a decision imposing penalties for his participation in the Freedom Convoy.

The motion was brought months after the 30-day limitation period under the Judicial Review Procedures Act had expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to provide a cogent explanation for the delay and failed to demonstrate apparent grounds for relief, as the Commissioner's findings regarding the unlawfulness of the demonstration and the applicant's breaches of the Code of Conduct were reasonable.

The applicant brought an application to quash a resolution and by-law passed by the respondent municipality to conditionally appoint a member to fill a potential council vacancy.

The vacancy was anticipated because a sitting councillor was running in a provincial election.

The court found that the Municipal Act requires a vacancy to actually exist and be declared before an appointment can be made.

The resolution and by-law were quashed for illegality as they were passed without jurisdiction.

The defendant moved for the release of proceeds held in trust from the sale of her home.

The plaintiffs had previously obtained a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on an ex parte motion, claiming an interest in the property based on an alleged agreement of purchase and sale.

The property was subsequently sold by a mortgage lender after the defendant defaulted, and the net proceeds were held in trust.

The court found that the CPL should have been discharged due to the plaintiffs' failure to make full and fair disclosure on the ex parte motion and because equitable factors favoured discharge.

The court also declined to order the funds held as security under Rule 45.02, noting the plaintiffs' claim was ultimately for damages.

The motion was granted and the funds were ordered released to the defendant.

The Township of West Lincoln brought a motion under Rule 38.11 to set aside a consent order declaring a watercourse on the applicants' property to be a navigable waterway, which effectively created a natural severance.

The Township argued it was an affected person because the order bypassed its planning authority over lot creation and impacted a demolition agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Township's statutory planning authority and contractual agreements did not constitute a proprietary or economic interest required to give it standing as an affected person under Rule 38.11.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an application where the applicants sought a declaration of adverse possession over disputed lands.

The court previously granted the applicants ownership of a portion of the lands (Common Grounds) but not the entirety.

The respondent, deemed the successful party for costs, sought substantial indemnity costs for both the current and a prior related application.

The applicants sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, finding that the respondent's offers to settle did not meet the requirements of Rule 49.10 and that the applicants' conduct did not warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The parties were ordered to equally share the costs of implementing the judgment.

The applicants sought ownership by adverse possession of a triangular parcel of land ("Disputed Lands") on their property's eastern border.

The respondent, the registered owner of the adjoining property, conceded a portion of these lands ("Common Grounds") but disputed the remainder.

The court found that the applicants established adverse possession of the "Common Grounds" due to their continuous, open, and exclusive use, and the mutual mistake regarding ownership.

However, the court found insufficient evidence to establish adverse possession of the balance of the "Disputed Lands." The judgment declared the applicants as lawful owners of the "Common Grounds" and ordered the necessary land registry amendments.

This is a motion to review the decision of Justice M.L. Benotto dismissing a motion for an extension of time to appeal.

The Court of Appeal panel found that Benotto J.A. applied the correct test and saw no basis to interfere with her discretionary decision.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application regarding failed contracts of purchase and sale for condominium units, the successful respondent sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $42,000.

The applicants argued no costs should be awarded as the application was not vexatious.

The court rejected the applicants' argument, finding the respondent was prima facie entitled to costs.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court found the requested amount excessive and fixed partial indemnity costs at $22,386.23 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicants sought a declaration that "Reservation Agreements" for condominium units were binding contracts and that the respondent engaged in bad faith bargaining by proposing inconsistent terms in subsequent draft agreements of purchase and sale.

The court found that the Reservation Agreements were not binding contracts because they lacked essential terms, specifically the precise identification and location of the condominium units, and indicated that further terms (like down payment) needed to be agreed upon.

The court also noted that the Planning Act prohibited offering land for sale prior to plan approval at the time the agreements were made.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.