Court File and Parties
CITATION: Jonker v. Township of West Lincoln, 2023 ONSC 1948
COURT FILE NO.: DR-22-144JR DATE: 2023/03/27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
HAROLD JONKER
J. Pineda and K. Pridgen, on behalf of the Applicant
-and-
THE TOWNSHIP OF WEST LINCOLN
-and-
THE INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER FOR THE TOWNSHIP OF WEST LINCOLN
T. Hanrahan and A. Mannell, for the Respondent, Township
S. Pierce and J. Wilkes for the Proposed Respondent, Integrity Commissioner
HEARD: March 13, 2023
RULING ON MOTION
A.J. GOODMAN J.:
[1] The applicant, Harold Jonker (“Jonker”) brings this motion to add the Integrity Commissioner for the Township of West Lincoln (“the Commissioner”), to the application for judicial review, pursuant to s. 9(2) of the Judicial Review Procedures Act, RSO 1990, c. J. 1, (“JRPA”).
[2] The respondents to this motion are the Commissioner and the Township of West Lincoln, (“the Township”), both of whom oppose the relief being sought.
[3] For the following reasons, the motion is dismissed.
Background:
[4] The applicant was a Councilor for the Corporation of the Township of West Lincoln. The Township is a municipal entity in the Province of Ontario.
[5] Pursuant to 223.3(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, SO 2001, c. 25, a municipality is authorized to appoint an “Integrity Commissioner”. The Commissioner reports to council and performs functions assigned by the municipality with respect to specific areas of responsibility, such as the application of the code of conduct for members of council.
[6] Aird & Berlis LLP is the Integrity Commissioner for the Township of West Lincoln (incorrectly identified in the proposed application as “John Mascarin, acting in his capacity as The Integrity Commissioner for the Township of West Lincoln.
[7] The Original Application sought judicial review of Township Council’s Decision of July 18, 2022, (“the Decision”) to impose penalties and remedial measures on Jonker related to his continued participation in the Freedom Convoy Rally in Ottawa during February 2022, after the demonstration was deemed unlawful. The Original Application was issued 31 days after the Decision was made.
[8] Prior to the Original Application being served on the Township, it was amended on September 23, 2022, through the filing of a “Fresh as Amended Notice of Application for Judicial Review”. The Amended Application also sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s Report (“Report”) dated July 12, 2022, which recommended that the Township impose penalties and remedial measures upon the applicant related to his participation in the demonstration.
[9] Despite the addition of the relief in the Amended Application which pertained to the Report, the applicant did not seek to add the Commissioner as a party to the proceeding at the time the Original Application was being amended in September 2022.
[10] The Township first learned of the Amended Application 70 days after the Decision was made, when it was served on the Township’s Chief Administrative Officer on September 26, 2022. The Original Application was not provided to the Township until November 3, 2022.
[11] The applicant did not advise the Township of his definitive decision to add the Commissioner as a party to the proceeding until December 2, 2022 – 137 days after the Decision was made.
[12] The Commissioner received a formal complaint concerning the applicant’s participation in the demonstration. On July 12, 2022, the Commissioner issued its Report. While dismissing a number of other allegations of contravention against the applicant, the Commissioner determined that Jonker contravened the Township’s Code of Conduct in two respects that warranted penalties and remedial actions.
[13] First, the Commissioner found that the applicant breached the duty of loyalty in s. 4.1(g) of the Code of Conduct (“the Code”) by continuing to participate in the demonstration after it had been deemed unlawful and the Emergencies Act had been invoked. The Councilor remained a vocal representative of the demonstration after it had been deemed unlawful, while at the same time continuing in his role as a member of Council. According to the Commissioner, a clear conflict between the two roles emerged and Jonker was no longer able to fulfill his duty of loyalty to the Township. The Commissioner reported that Jonker ought clearly to have known that his participation in an illegal activity could not have promoted public confidence nor could it in any way be viewed as upholding the spirit of the laws of Ontario and Canada as he is required under the Code.
[14] Second, the Commissioner found that the applicant had breached s. 7.3 of the Code by failing to file the Disclosure Statement declaring gifts and benefits he received in the form of “fuel and food” during his participation in the demonstration. The Commissioner concluded, based on the applicant’s responses to the allegations, that the applicant’s role in the demonstration “was or could be perceived to be indirectly related to his role as a member of Council.”
[15] The Commissioner has no power to impose penalties. Instead, the Commissioner makes recommendations to Council about the appropriate penalties and remedial measures. The Commissioner recommended that Council issue a formal reprimand of the applicant and impose a 30-day suspension of his remuneration as a Councilor. For remedial measures, the Commissioner recommended that the applicant account for the monetary value of food and fuel provided to him as a gift or benefit during the demonstration and that the applicant provide proof that funds equal to the monetary value of those gifts or benefits have been refunded.
[16] On July 18, 2022, Council received the Commissioner’s Report and imposed penalties and remedial measures consistent with the recommendations in the Report.
[17] On August 19, 2022, the applicant issued a notice of application seeking to judicially review the Decision. The applicant did not name the Commissioner as a respondent and sought no relief regarding the Report. On September 23, 2022, the applicant amended his application, purporting to seek relief regarding the Commissioner’s Report, again without naming the Commissioner as a party.
[18] On October 19, 2022, the applicant informed the Township that he was considering adding the Commissioner as a party. On November 3, 2022, applicant’s counsel sent an email to counsel for the Township stating his position that the Integrity Commissioner was not a separate legal entity but advising that he wished to have a discussion prior to deciding how to proceed with respect to seeking the proposed amendment to the application.
[19] On November 10, 2022, after some back and forth between lawyers, the applicant confirmed through counsel that his “intention is not to add the IC as a separate party.” On November 11, 2022, counsel for the Township advised applicant’s counsel of her view that Jonker should either add the Commissioner as a separate party, or abandon the relief pertaining to the Decision.
[20] The applicant subsequently reversed course and, following a further exchange of correspondence, on November 29, 2022, applicant’s counsel informed the Commissioner that he “anticipate[d] bringing a motion to amend in order to name the Commissioner as an individual respondent.” Following a case conference on December 22, 2022, the applicant served the Commissioner with the motion to add it as a respondent, enclosing the proposed fresh as amended Notice of Application. This marked the first time the Commissioner was served with the proposed application or any of the prior pleadings in this matter.
Issue:
[21] The Applicant seeks the following relief against the Commissioner: (1) a judicial review of the Commissioner’s Report; (2) a declaration that the Commissioner’s Report is ultra vires; (3) a declaration that the Commissioner’s Report is invalid due to errors in law, jurisdiction, fact, or mixed fact and law; (4) the disclosure of all information relied on by the Commissioner in creating the Report; and (5) an order of certiorari quashing the Commissioner’s Report.
[22] The principal issue with respect to the applicant’s motion to add the Commissioner as a party to this proceeding after the expiry of the applicable limitations period is the following: Has the applicant discharged his onus of demonstrating there are “apparent grounds for relief” with respect to the application to judicially review the Commissioner’s Report?
Positions of the Parties:
[23] The applicant submits that there is no evidence that the respondents will suffer non-compensable prejudice if the Commissioner is named as a respondent in the judicial review. Neither party will lose the limitation defence provided in s. 5(1) of the JRPA. Moreover, even a loss of limitations defence is not to be taken as non- compensable loss. The question is whether other loss will be suffered.
[24] The applicant submits that that the facts and issues will remain the same, whether or not the integrity commissioner is added as a respondent. The motion is brought out of an abundance of precaution, to ensure that all necessary parties are before the Divisional Court.
[25] The Commissioner opposes the motion to grant discretionary relief to add it as a party to the application as it is well beyond the expiry of the applicable limitation period. In the alternative, the applicant’s motion ought to be dismissed principally because the proposed application contains no viable grounds for relief.
[26] The applicant sought to commence the proposed application as against the Commissioner on December 22, 2022, more than four months after the expiry of the applicable 30-day limitation period to seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s Report dated July 12, 2022. The Commissioner submits that the applicant has ignored the statutory test for leave to extend the applicable limitation period set out in the JRPA. This court ought not to exercise its discretionary authority to extend the time for commencing an application for judicial review where the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the proposed application raises “apparent grounds for relief”.
[27] The applicant asserts that it was unreasonable for the Commissioner to have found that the demonstration was unlawful after the Government of Canada invoked the Emergencies Act. The Commissioner was bound to consider the applicant’s actions based on the state of the law at the relevant time. Any other decision concerning the lawfulness of the demonstration would have been ultra vires the Commissioner. The balance of the applicant’s complaints are equally unsupported by the record before the Court.
[28] The Township supports the Commissioner’s position. The Township says that in the circumstances, there is no basis upon which an extension of time can be granted, as the applicant has failed to provide evidence that explains the delay or demonstrates that there are apparent grounds for the relief sought. In the absence of such evidence, and based on the evidentiary record before the court, it is apparent that the timing of service of the Amended Application on the Township and his delay in adding the Commissioner as a party to this proceeding were deliberate elements in his overall strategy concerning the conduct of this litigation. The Township requests that the motion and the entire proceeding be dismissed.
Relevant Legal Principles:
[29] The applicant advances the Rules of Civil Procedure in support of his position. Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a Court shall presumptively grant leave to amend a pleading. That Rule provides as follows:
On motion at any stage of an action the court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
[30] In addition to Rules 26.01 and 26.02, this motion is also governed by Rule 5.04, which effectively incorporates elements of 26.01, and also addresses the joinder of parties and grants the court a measure of discretion as to whether an amendment joining a party to an original proceeding should be permitted.
[31] Rule 5.04(2) complements Rule 26.01, dealing specifically with the addition of a party:
At any stage of a proceeding the court may by order add, delete or substitute a party or correct the name of a party incorrectly named, on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
[32] The inclusion of the word “may” in Rule 5.04 means that the court retains discretion to refuse the amendment, even in the absence of non-compensable prejudice. The onus on proving prejudice is on the party alleging it, unless a limitation period has expired, in which case the party seeking the addition must lead evidence to explain the delay and displace the presumption of prejudice.
[33] So we need turn to the relevant statute that provides for certain obligations and requirements for judicial review.[^1] The JRPA was amended in 2020 to impose a 30-day limitation period for bringing an application for judicial review, as well as the authority for a court to extend the time for making such an application. Section 5(1) and 5(2) of the JRPA now provide:
5(1) Unless another Act provides otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be made no later than 30 days after the date the decision or matter for which judicial review is being sought was made or occurred, subject to subsection (2).
5(2) The court may, on such terms as it considers proper, extend the time for making an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay.
[34] The JRPA provides that an application for judicial review may be commenced as of right within 30 days of the decision sought to be reviewed. If that 30-day limitation period has expired, an application for judicial review may only be commenced with leave of the Court. While the decision to grant leave is discretionary, it is clear that s. 5(2) of the JRPA provides that leave may only be granted where two mandatory conditions are met: where there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any other person affected by reason of the delay.
[35] The “apparent grounds for relief” condition requires an assessment of the substantive merits of the application for judicial review. The Court may not grant leave to commence an application for judicial review unless it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief, even where there is otherwise no substantial prejudice or hardship caused by the delay.
[36] The Divisional Court has confirmed that the two requirements in s. 5(2) are mandatory. In Unifor and its Local 303 v. Scepter Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5683 (“Unifor”), the newly amended s. 5 of the JRPA was interpreted by Matheson J. for the court, at paras. 17 and 18:
[17] Subsection 5(2) must be interpreted in context and giving meaning to all of its words. Subsection 5(1) is important context. The legislative reform introduced a 30-day time limit, which should be given force. Moving to s. 5(2), an extension of time is not mandatory where the two factors referenced in that subsection are satisfied. On the contrary, the subsection provides that an extension is in the court’s discretion. The two factors mentioned are prerequisites to the exercise of that discretion. They are necessary, but do not preclude the consideration of other circumstances. Given the time limit in s. 5(1), the length of delay and any explanation offered for it would be relevant considerations.
[18] Therefore, s. 5(2) does not foreclose a consideration of the length of delay, and any explanation offered for the delay, in the exercise of the court’s discretion. The impact of these facts may vary depending on the case and will now be considered in the context of a 30-day time limit.
[37] In the same decision, the Divisional Court also confirmed that the “apparent grounds for relief” condition requires a consideration of the substantive merits of the case. While Matheson J. declined to grant leave in Unifor following a delay of more than eight months in bringing the application for judicial review, she also considered the substantive merits of the motion based on a review of the record in assessing the “apparent grounds for relief” requirement, at paras. 21 and 22:
The question of whether the application raises apparent grounds for relief calls for a consideration of the merits. In this case, the applicant raises two grounds in support of its application: that the Arbitrator’s reasons for decision failed to justify the finding of a core or essential requirement, and that the Arbitrator failed to undertake a proper accommodation analysis. Yet the Award does show the line of reasoning followed by the Arbitrator, given the parameters agreed to [by] the parties. He considered the evidence, the arbitral jurisprudence, and relevant legal principles, as applied to the question put before him. With respect to the accommodation analysis, the applicant appears to be attempting to change the streamlined process and question put forward by the Arbitrator, in hindsight, rather than showing that the Award was unreasonable. It agreed to the process and that question, and the Arbitrator proceeded in turn.
While the applicant need not show that it has a successful application on the merits to have apparent grounds for relief, I find that these grounds for relief, I find that these grounds are weak.
[38] More recently, in Yan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1290, the Divisional Court expressly confirmed that leave to extend the time to commence an application for judicial review may be denied on the sole basis of a lack of “apparent grounds for relief,” regardless of whether the delay caused any substantial hardship or prejudice. In Yan, Schabas J. further confirmed that at the second stage of the test, prejudice is presumed to flow from delay.
[39] Courts have also held that the “apparent grounds for relief” condition in the FLA permits a review of the evidentiary record to assess the merits of the claim. In Hevey v. Hevey, 2021 ONCA 740, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently described this condition as authorizing a “limited inquiry into the merits of the proposed claim.” Similarly, in both Scherer v. Mihalcin, 59 O.R. (3d) 393, the Court of Appeal concluded the evidence in the record (or lack thereof) did not provide sufficient support for the underlying claim for relief. See also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 50 R.F.L. (5th) 344.
[40] The “apparent grounds for relief” condition is also a more demanding standard than the test for striking or amending a pleading. In Werth v. Werth, 2004 ONCJ 43, the Court likened the “apparent grounds for relief” criterion to its predecessor in the FLA, which required the party seeking relief to demonstrate a prima facie case. I agree with the Commissioner that the applicable standard is not, as the applicant appears to assume in his factum, analogous to the test on a pleadings motion, which requires only that the claim or defence be “tenable” at law to be allowed to proceed.
[41] While these decisions concern the interpretation of a different statute, they interpret the same words included in the JRPA – “apparent grounds for relief” – as a mandatory statutory precondition in a similar context: whether to grant leave to extend the time provided for in the statute to commence an application. These decisions provide helpful guidance, consistent with the Divisional Court’s decision in Unifor, that the “apparent grounds for relief” criterion should be interpreted in accordance with the following principles:
- The party seeking leave to commence a claim after the expiry of the 30-day limitation period bears the onus of satisfying the Court that there are “apparent grounds for relief”;
- The Court must engage in at least a limited inquiry of the merits of the claim to determine whether the moving party has satisfied its onus; and
- The Court may consider the evidentiary record in support of the underlying claim in conducting this inquiry.
A. The applicant must show “apparent grounds for relief to obtain leave”
[42] The appropriate standard of review with respect to the substantive grounds for relief is reasonableness. A decision is reasonable and attracts judicial deference when it is “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decisionmaker.” The procedural fairness grounds pleaded in the proposed application are reviewable according to the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
[43] Where one seeks to add a party after the expiration of a limitation period, a court will consider whether there are special circumstances justifying the exercise of its discretion to allow such an amendment. In a frequently quoted passage from the case of Deaville v. Boegeman, the Ontario Court of Appeal set out the approach to be taken as follows:
[18] A number of courts have made rather heavy weather out of the meaning of "special circumstances" and have sought to establish conditions or detailed guidelines for the granting of relief after the expiry of the limitation period. This is a discretionary matter where the facts of the individual case are the most important consideration in the exercise of that discretion. While it is true that the discretion is not one that is to be exercised at the will or caprice of the court, it is possible to outline only general guidelines to cover the myriad of factual situations that may arise.
[44] The applicant submits that a number of the above mentioned special circumstances are present in this case. In part, the applicant says that in his September 17, 2022 email to the Township, Jonker made it clear that he continued to maintain his position, that he was consulting with counsel, and was considering the option of legally challenging the Report. The applicant argues that it is reasonable to infer that the Commissioner would have likely been made aware of this email. That appears to be conjecture. The applicant also submits that there is no bright line between the office of the Commissioner and the municipality that appointed it. As an example, a Commissioner can bring an application on its own authority, yet in the name of the municipality which it serves. With respect, I am not persuaded by the applicant’s arguments.
[45] With respect to Commissioner, the 30-day limitation period set out in s. 5(1) of the JRPA has clearly expired. Not by mere days, but by months. Accordingly, to add the Commissioner as a party to this proceeding, the applicant must satisfy the tests under Rule 5.04 and s. 5(2) of the JRPA. Specifically, the applicant requires evidence as to an explanation of the delay to displace the presumption of prejudice that arises as a result of the expiration of the 30-day limitation period and demonstration that there are apparent grounds for the relief sought with respect to the Commissioner’s investigation and Report.
[46] In my view, the applicant has failed to provide any cogent explanation for the delay in adding the Commissioner as a party to the proceeding. Accordingly, he has not displaced the presumption of prejudice that arises as a result of the expiry
[47] Further, I agree with the Commissioner that a review of the record demonstrates there is no merit to any of these grounds for relief and that they cannot satisfy the statutory requirement to grant leave to extend the limitation period. It is not lost on me that the moving party asserts, inter alia, that it desires to add the Commissioner to the application “out of an abundance of precaution”, as if an after-thought, well beyond the statutorily imposed deadline found in the JRPA. Each of the paragraphs of the proposed application encapsulates essentially the same assertion: the demonstration was lawful, and the Commissioner’s Report is unreasonable because it improperly concluded that the demonstration was unlawful.
[48] I accept the respondent’s position that it was not legally open to the Commissioner to conclude the protest remained lawful after February 14, 2022. The Commissioner is bound by statute to issue its Report based on the state of the law as it existed at the relevant time under its limited scope of review.
[49] The Commissioner reasonably determined that the demonstration had become unlawful by the time the Government of Canada invoked the Emergencies Act on February 14, 2022. Further, the Commissioner concluded that the applicant breached the Code of Conduct by his continued participation in the demonstration after it was declared unlawful. The Commissioner did not make a determination as to whether the applicant breached the Code of Conduct for his participation in the demonstration prior to the date the Emergencies Act was invoked.
[50] In this case, the Commissioner did not have the option to conclude that the Government of Canada’s decision to invoke the Emergencies Act was wrong. That conclusion – questioning the appropriateness of a Cabinet decision from a different level of government concerning a matter wholly outside the scope of the Integrity Commissioner’s mandate and enabling statute and bylaw – would have been plainly ultra vires the Commissioner. In that context, it was the only reasonable conclusion open to the Commissioner at the time.
[51] As the Commissioner stated to Council and the applicant at the meeting on July 18, 2022, should a court ultimately deem the demonstration to have been lawful even after the invocation of the Emergencies Act, it would then be open to Council to reverse, revoke, or amend its decision to impose penalties and remedial measures on the applicant.
[52] Second, it was not open to the Commissioner to consider whether the Government of Canada’s invocation of the Emergencies Act, and the related designation of the protest as unlawful, limited the applicant’s Charter rights. At its highest, the applicant’s argument appears to be that his Charter rights prohibited the Government of Canada from declaring the demonstration unlawful by invoking the Emergencies Act, and that the Commissioner’s Report is unreasonable to the extent it accepted the constitutionality of the legislation. As mentioned, given the Commissioner’s limited role or scope of review, it would have been ultra vires the Integrity Commissioner to conclude that a Cabinet decision – from a different level of government regarding a matter outside the scope of the Integrity Commissioner’s mandate and enabling statute – was unconstitutional.
[53] Indeed, it is left for another day and forum wherein a court of competent jurisdiction will be in a position to decide whether the Government of Canada’s decision to invoke the Emergencies Act was legal or appropriate and at what point the demonstration ceased being lawful.
[54] The applicant also alleges that the Commissioner’s finding that the applicant refused to answer questions was unreasonable. Yet, the Commissioner gave the applicant the opportunity to explain his public statements that he received support in the form of fuel and food during the demonstration. The Commissioner’s Report noted that “[w]e received no response to our request for information and to our offer that [the applicant] could voluntarily disclose any benefits that he may have received.”
[55] At the Council meeting on July 18, 2022, the Commissioner further explained that because the applicant had previously responded to its emails sent to his work email address, when the applicant ceased responding to multiple emails to his work email address, the Commissioner reasonably concluded that the applicant “was ignoring the Integrity Commissioner”. The applicant himself acknowledged at the Council meeting that “there is no excuse” for “missing” the Commissioner’s emails. In any case, the Commissioner expressly noted in its Report that it was not recommending any sanctions for the failure to respond to questions, despite the applicant’s obligation to do so under the Code of Conduct.
[56] The applicant alleges that the Commissioner’s conclusion that he received gifts and benefits in contravention of the Code of Conduct was unreasonable. While this part of the analysis may be the subject of some question, the Commissioner concluded that the applicant had received gifts and benefits during the demonstration based, in part, on the applicant’s own statements that he had received “fuel” and “food” along with the widely reported $1 million released by a GoFundMe campaign. The Commissioner also found that Jonker’s participation in the demonstration was at least indirectly tied to his role as a Councilor, including based on the applicant’s own statement that he participated in the demonstration “as a representative” and as a “leader[] in the community.”
[57] When given the opportunity to respond to these concerns, the applicant did not. The Commissioner could draw an adverse inference from the applicant’s silence, given that the applicant had previously responded to emails sent to the same email account and the applicant had an obligation or duty to cooperate with the Commissioner’s investigation.
[58] Moreover, the applicant also alleges that the Commissioner breached the duty of procedural fairness and demonstrated bias against him. Again, I find that there is no merit to this allegation. The Commissioner discharged its duty of procedural fairness in compliance with the relevant factors by ensuring the applicant knew the case he had to meet and providing him with ample opportunity to be heard. The applicant provided the Commissioner with submissions as part of the investigation, which the Commissioner considered and summarized in its Report. The Commissioner also provided a draft Report to the applicant on July 4, 2022 and offered him an opportunity to make final submissions on the findings. The applicant chose not to respond to some of the Commissioner’s questions during its investigation and to the draft Report. The applicant was present and spoke at the Council meeting at which the Report was presented. There, he acknowledged that there was “no excuse” for his failure to respond to the Commissioner’s invitations to provide further responses and submissions before the Report was complete. There is neither foundation in the record for any allegation that the Commissioner displayed bias nor are there circumstances that give rise to any credible concern of procedural unfairness.
[59] In any case, I am not inclined to grant leave to commence the proposed application after the clear expiry of the limitation period. This is because the applicant has neither rebutted the presumption of prejudice nor provided a satisfactory explanation for the lengthy delay. As noted in Yan, prejudice is presumed to flow from a delay in commencing an application for judicial review.
[60] Further, even where both components of the statutory test are otherwise satisfied, I may nevertheless decline to exercise my residual discretion to grant leave under s. 5(2) of the JRPA. Here, like in Unifor, the applicant has provided no explanation for the delay in moving to add the Commissioner as a party, especially after announcing its initial intention to do so more than two months earlier.[^2]
Conclusion:
[61] The applicant has failed to satisfy his onus and the test in s. 5 of the JRPA to grant leave to extend the applicable limitation period in respect of the proposed respondent Commissioner. The motion is dismissed.
[62] The Township’s request to have the entire proceeding dismissed by virtue of a missed limitation period of one day is denied, without prejudice.
Costs:
[63] If the parties cannot agree on the issue of costs, I will consider brief written submissions. The cost materials shall not exceed three pages in length, (not including any Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle). The Commissioner and the Township shall file their respective costs submissions within 15 days of today’s date. The applicant shall file his costs submissions within 15 days of the receipt of the plaintiff’s materials. The Commissioner may file a brief reply within five days thereafter. If submissions are not received by May 8, 2023, the file will be closed and the issue of costs considered settled.
A.J. Goodman J.
Released: March 27, 2023
CITATION: Jonker v. Township of West Lincoln, 2023 ONSC 1948
COURT FILE NO.: DC-22-144JR
DATE: 2023/03/27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
HAROLD JONKER
Applicant
- and -
THE TOWNSHIP OF WEST LINCOLN AND THE INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER FOR THE TOWNSHIP OF WEST LINCOLN
Respondents
RULING ON MOTION
A.J. Goodman J.
DATED: March 27, 2023
[^1]: It is trite to state that regulations and rules are subordinate to statute. [^2]: I am grateful to counsel for the Commissioner for their detailed and instructive factum.