James A. Manson

The respondent, having been successful in the main application for judicial review, sought partial indemnity costs of $45,000.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded due to the public interest exception, or alternatively, that the amount claimed was excessive.

The Divisional Court rejected the public interest argument, noting the applicant had a personal financial motivation for the proceeding.

However, the court agreed the claimed amount was excessive for a half-day hearing on a narrow issue, and fixed costs at $10,000 all-inclusive.

This costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario addresses the allocation and quantum of costs following the respondents' success in opposing the appeal.

The court fixes costs at $20,000, apportioned 90% to the group represented by Manson and Fleury, and 10% to the group represented by Overwater, to be paid within 30 days.

The appellants, defendants in a proposed class action arising from the 2022 Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa, appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reversible error in his conclusions that there were grounds to believe the plaintiffs' claims for private and public nuisance had substantial merit, that the defendants had no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of an Ontario Civilian Police Commission decision upholding a finding of discreditable conduct and a penalty of 80 hours' forfeited pay.

The misconduct stemmed from a $50 anonymous donation the applicant made to the 'Freedom Convoy' protests while on unpaid leave.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable for the Commission to conclude the protests were illegal and that the limitation on the applicant's freedom of expression was proportionate to the statutory objectives of maintaining effective policing.

The court also upheld the Commission's refusal to hear a new abuse of process argument on appeal.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a municipal council decision reprimanding him and suspending his pay for 30 days due to his participation in the Freedom Convoy protest.

The applicant argued the council failed to consider his section 2 Charter rights when imposing the penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the council was bound by the Integrity Commissioner's finding of misconduct, and any Charter arguments were relevant only to the Commissioner's finding, not the council's subsequent discretionary penalty decision.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding him guilty of discreditable conduct and ordering a forfeiture of 80 hours.

The misconduct stemmed from a $50 donation the appellant made to the Freedom Convoy while off-duty and on an unpaid leave of absence.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the finding of misconduct, concluding there was clear and convincing evidence that the protests were illegal at the time of the donation.

The Commission declined to hear an abuse of process argument raised for the first time on appeal.

Although the Hearing Officer erred by failing to conduct a Doré analysis to balance the appellant's section 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression against the statutory objectives of the Police Services Act, the Commission conducted the analysis and found the disciplinary action was a proportionate limit on the right.

The penalty of 80 hours forfeiture was affirmed as reasonable.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to halt a proposed class proceeding by downtown Ottawa residents and businesses against "Freedom Convoy" protestors, organizers, and funders.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated grounds to believe their claims had substantial merit and that no valid defence was likely to prevail, and that the public interest in allowing the litigation to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms (JCCF) appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to pay $156,461.99 in costs following an unsuccessful interlocutory injunction motion brought by students against Seneca College's COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Court of Appeal found the costs order fundamentally flawed because the motion judge failed to determine if the litigation was public interest litigation and did not apply the correct legal tests for awarding costs against a non-party (the "person of straw" test or abuse of process).

The Court clarified that fundraising or promoting a case on a website does not constitute abuse of process.

The Court also stated that JCCF's refusal to disclose whether it was indemnifying the students was a relevant consideration for costs.

The appeal was allowed, the costs order set aside, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for a fresh determination.

This is a case management order in a class action concerning the scheduling of an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, seeking to stay or dismiss the action for unduly limiting freedom of expression.

The court set a timetable for the anti-SLAPP motion, making it returnable on October 11, 2023, and ordered that no further steps in the proceeding could be taken until this motion was resolved, in accordance with the Act.

A potential motion for change of venue was also noted but deferred.

This endorsement addresses costs submissions following a decision on competing pleading motions in a class action.

The plaintiffs were substantially successful in their motion to amend pleadings, while the defendants' parallel motion to strike was largely unsuccessful.

Despite the plaintiffs' success, the court declined to award costs to either party, citing the public importance of the litigation, which involves exploring the boundaries of constitutionally protected protest rights versus the rights of individual citizens to seek compensation for disruption.

This motion addressed the form of the Statement of Claim in a proposed class proceeding related to the "Freedom Convoy" protest in Ottawa.

The plaintiffs sought to amend their claim, while a group of defendants moved to strike it.

The court found that the proposed Statement of Claim disclosed plausible causes of action for private and public nuisance, and joint liability, including for punitive damages.

The court largely allowed the plaintiffs' motion to amend, granting leave to issue a further fresh as amended statement of claim and to add new defendants, but ordered the removal of certain paragraphs deemed extraneous, inflammatory, or evidentiary.

The defendants' motion to strike was largely dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Regional Senior Justice MacLeod dated December 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 12, 2022.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to set aside a conviction against Becker Bros.

Trucking Inc. for operating a commercial motor vehicle in an unsafe condition, contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal judge had ruled that certified Ministry records and copies of documents produced by the driver were inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred in both conclusions, holding that the Ministry's certified documents were admissible as "statements" under s. 210(7) of the HTA, and that the documents produced by the driver were admissible under s. 216.1(5) of the HTA or as an exception to the hearsay rule (admissions by documents in possession).

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, reinstating the conviction and sentence.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 3, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the plaintiff in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The plaintiff sought costs following its successful resistance of the defendants' summary judgment motion and its successful motion for leave to deliver late affidavit evidence.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $42,085.84 for the summary judgment motion, reducing the claimed amount due to over-lawyering and deferring the costs of expert reports to trial.

The court also awarded $2,500 for the evidentiary leave motion, reducing the claimed amount because the motion was necessitated by the plaintiff's breach of the Rules.

The defendant insurer brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for insurance coverage after fish were contaminated by oil from an ice-making machine during processing.

The insurer relied on the 'Process Clause' and 'Fault in Preparation' exclusions in the all-risk policy.

The court dismissed the insurer's motion and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, finding that the accidental contamination was a fortuitous event not intended as part of the processing or preparation, and therefore the exclusions did not apply.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a Provincial Offences Act decision.

The respondent argued that the motion for leave to appeal should be heard in writing, relying on the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court, acting as a case management judge, determined that motions for leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act are presumed to be heard orally, consistent with the settled practice of the Court of Appeal.

The court found that while the Rules of the Court of Appeal in Appeals Under the Provincial Offences Act (POA Rules) did not explicitly state an oral hearing for represented parties, the language used in Rule 3 and Form 1 implied an oral hearing.

The court also clarified that Rule 61.03.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies to fill the gap regarding the exchange of facta.

The Plaintiff sought summary judgment for $322,343.30 for unpaid invoices.

The Defendant argued the motion was premature, citing contentious accounting and factual issues requiring further discovery and evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the evidentiary record inadequate and that genuine issues of fact and credibility, particularly concerning invoicing practices, payment offsets, and product rebates, necessitated a trial.

The court also declined to grant leave to amend the Statement of Claim due to the absence of a proper supporting record and the need for the claim to be clearly defined within the pleadings.

The plaintiff moved for a status hearing, seeking a timetable and an extension to set the matter down for trial.

The court found the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation for delay, including settlement discussions and other motions, and that the defendant would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

A timetable was imposed, extending the deadline to set the action down for trial.

However, the court also ordered the plaintiff to pay two substantial outstanding costs orders totaling approximately $55,000 by a specified date, failing which the defendant could seek an order dismissing the action without notice.

No costs were awarded for the current motion.