Alastair James McNish

The receiver moved to determine appellate entitlement from receivership-related orders under the BIA.

The court held no appeal as of right under ss. 193(a) or (c), denied leave, and granted the receiver’s motion.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagor for alleged mortgage default.

The defendant disputed the renewal fee amount, claiming the parties had agreed to reduce it from 6% to 4% and that she had paid the reduced amount in cash.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence as uncorroborated and lacking credibility.

The court also addressed procedural issues regarding the timing of the Statement of Claim relative to the Notice of Sale under the Mortgages Act, and rejected the defendant's argument that the Farm Debt Mediation Act applied.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff.

Cary Kaplan, a defendant, brought a motion to dismiss the oppression claim against him by OZ Merchandising Inc. The court granted the motion, finding that the alleged oppressive conduct had been rectified by the Canadian Soccer League Inc.'s admission of successor liability for the Canadian Professional Soccer League Inc.'s liabilities.

Furthermore, the court determined that punitive damages were not an appropriate remedy for rectification in this context and that the claim against Mr. Kaplan was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as it was brought more than five years after the alleged conduct and his addition to the action.

This endorsement from a case conference addresses the plaintiff's repeated attempts to delay the hearing of defendant Kaplan's motion to dismiss and to link it with other potential motions for default judgment or summary judgment.

The court denied the plaintiff's requests for further deferral and linking, emphasizing that Kaplan's motion had been delayed long enough.

The court also clarified that motions are not heard by a jury, particularly for equitable remedies like oppression claims under the OBCA.

Finally, the court ordered the plaintiff to forthwith pay outstanding costs previously awarded to Kaplan.

The Applicants, Molly Margaret Anne Patterson and Lawrence Boucher, sought an order enjoining the Respondent, Dianne Bhual, from trespassing and harassing them.

The application settled without a hearing, leaving only the issue of costs.

The Applicants sought approximately $60,000 in full costs, while the Respondent offered $5,000.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, determined that partial indemnity costs were appropriate, rejecting the Applicants' claim for full recovery due to a lack of "reprehensible conduct" by the Respondent.

The court awarded the Applicants $36,000 in costs, noting that the Respondent's late participation and unsubstantiated allegation of racial bias were factors, but not sufficient for full indemnity.

The defendant Garda World Canada Security Corporation brought a motion to strike the amended statement of claim against it, arguing that the plaintiff failed to plead a reasonable cause of action and that it was plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

Garda contended that as a new shareholder, it was not liable for the alleged breach of contract or negligence of the Primary Response Defendants.

The plaintiff argued that Garda was liable due to a share acquisition and/or amalgamation, citing section 179(b) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, which transfers all liabilities to an amalgamated corporation.

The court dismissed Garda's motion, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim against Garda could not succeed, and granted the plaintiff liberty to amend the statement of claim if necessary.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

Melissa Hrvoic brought a motion seeking to compel Aaron Franks to answer 53 questions refused on grounds of solicitor-client and litigation privilege during a Rule 39.03 examination.

The motion also faced dismissal due to Melissa Hrvoic's non-compliance with a prior interlocutory order to return $500,000.

The court found the questions relevant and the privileges properly asserted.

It determined that Mr. Hrvoic had not waived privilege by including an explanatory letter from his lawyer in the record, as this did not constitute using legal advice as a material fact in his claim or defence, nor was it equivalent to filing an affidavit.

The court also dismissed the motion due to Melissa Hrvoic's non-compliance with Justice Dow's order.

This endorsement addresses a procedural case conference concerning ongoing litigation between separated spouses.

The applicant, Mr. Hrvoic, initiated an application for Ms. Hrvoic to sell her shares in a family business.

Following Mr. Hrvoic's termination of Ms. Hrvoic's employment, Ms. Hrvoic "borrowed" $600,000 from a line of credit.

Dow J. subsequently ordered Ms. Hrvoic to repay $500,000 of this amount.

Ms. Hrvoic now seeks leave to appeal this term and an urgent stay pending appeal.

The court noted the parties' contentious approach and set a schedule for the motion for a stay pending appeal, declining to grant an interim stay.

The respondent moved for a stay pending leave to appeal an adjournment order by Dow J., which required her to repay $500,000 of $600,000 drawn on a line of credit.

The court expressed concerns about the meta-motions, the connection to family law proceedings, the likelihood of obtaining leave to appeal a discretionary order, and the potential for the respondent to consume the funds.

The court decided to convene a case conference to discuss process issues for the urgent application, inviting family law counsel, and noted that a judge might be designated to ensure efficient handling.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion for an interlocutory injunction by Product Pro Industrial Supplies Inc. against Sheam Yee Wang and KTS Consulting (the "Wang Defendants").

Product Pro sought costs on a partial indemnity scale, or alternatively, substantial indemnity.

The court found that while Product Pro did not achieve all requested relief, it was substantially successful, warranting costs.

The court rejected the Wang Defendants' arguments against costs, including allegations of fraud and improper conduct by Product Pro's principal, finding these did not disqualify Product Pro from receiving costs.

The court fixed costs at $26,869.20 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid by the Wang Defendants within 30 days.

The plaintiff, Product Pro Industrial Supplies Inc., moved for an interlocutory injunction against the defendants, Sheam Yee Wang and KTS Consulting, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties and unfair competition.

The court found a strong prima facie case that Wang owed fiduciary duties to Product Pro, noting his role as "Director of Operations" and contractual obligations.

Irreparable harm in the form of loss of goodwill and market share was established.

The court also found the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, rejecting the "unclean hands" defense.

An interlocutory injunction was granted for 12 months, restraining the Wang Defendants from soliciting Product Pro's customers or potential customers contacted before March 21, 2019.

The law firm Chitiz Pathak LLP appealed a Master's decision that found "special circumstances" existed to allow Bee Vectoring Technology Inc. to have two sets of legal accounts assessed under the Solicitors Act, despite being outside the statutory time limits or having been paid.

The Master had found special circumstances for the first and second qualifying transactions but not for general corporate matters.

The law firm argued the Master erred in principle by accepting the client's reasons for delay (being too busy and fear of jeopardizing the relationship) as special circumstances.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the Master's fact-specific inquiry into special circumstances.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful summary judgment motion where the defendants' action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing for a reduction based on the defendants' limited success on all grounds of the summary judgment motion and alleged conduct that lengthened the proceeding.

The court found no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event, rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments regarding distributive costs and alleged conduct.

The court fixed costs of the action at $156,599.20, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants.

The plaintiffs, Michael and Solbyung Coveley, brought a professional negligence action against their former law firm, Thorsteinssons LLP, and several lawyers, alleging negligent advice regarding tax appeals.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of their claim by October 27, 2010, when they received advice that fundamentally contradicted earlier assurances about the strength of their tax appeals.

As the action was commenced on November 2, 2012, more than two years after discovery, the claim was statute-barred.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a motion and cross-motion in a dispute concerning the sale of properties under the Partition Act.

The parties, estate trustees and a brother of the deceased, had failed to cooperate in the sale process, necessitating further court intervention to revise the sale protocol.

Both sides sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court determined that success on the motion and cross-motion was divided, and neither party deserved a costs award due to their persistent failure to cooperate in resolving the family dispute.

Consequently, the court made no order as to costs, requiring each side to bear their own expenses.

The applicants, estate trustees of Frank Mammone, brought a motion to vary a previous court order for the sale of two properties under the Partition Act, due to the respondents' persistent non-cooperation.

The respondents, Emilio Mammone and Density Garden Enterprises Inc., brought a cross-motion seeking to purchase the estate's interest in the properties.

The court found that the original order was not working and required revision.

It granted the applicants' motion, modifying the sale process to give them unilateral control over retaining a real estate agent and listing the properties, with any offer acceptance subject to court approval.

The respondents' cross-motion was implicitly dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment granting an application for the sale of two jointly-owned properties.

The appellants contended that the deceased had agreed to sell his interest to the surviving brother for $110,000 prior to his death.

The application judge rejected this claim, finding no direct evidence of agreement and no part performance satisfying the Statute of Frauds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's careful analysis of the facts against the governing legal principles.

The applicant, an auditing firm, sought judgment against the respondents for unpaid invoices via an application.

The respondents disputed the fees, alleging a promised discount and challenging the contractual interest rate.

The court considered whether the matter could be resolved by application or required conversion to an action.

Finding material facts in dispute regarding the alleged discount and the need for pleadings to clarify legal positions, the court concluded that the application was not a "clearest of cases" suitable for resolution on a paper record.

The application was therefore converted into an action, and a trial was directed, with a timetable for the exchange of pleadings.

The applicant sought an interim order for the recovery of personal property (tobacco kilns and bins) from the respondent, his former business partner's spouse, located on a Six Nations Reserve.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to establish "substantial grounds" for ownership or unlawful detention of the property, and that granting the order would effectively nullify the respondent's potential rights before trial, contrary to the mandatory security provisions of Rule 44.04(1).

The plaintiffs, stock promoters from Ontario, sued a British Columbia-based stock promoter and a Colorado-based stock transfer agent for breach of contract related to stock promotion services.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Ontario courts did not have a real and substantial connection to the dispute.

The court found that the contract was formed in British Columbia, not Ontario, and that the defendants did not carry on business in Ontario.

Consequently, Ontario lacked jurisdiction, and the action was dismissed.