48 total
Insurer has duty to defend parents against third-party claim for negligent supervision of their child.
The minor plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident.
Her mother sued the driver and owner, who then issued a third-party claim against the plaintiff's parents for negligent supervision.
The parents' homeowners' insurer refused to defend the third-party claim, relying on an exclusion clause for bodily injury to any person residing in the household.
The application judge declared the insurer had a duty to defend.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the exclusion clause must be interpreted narrowly and only applies to direct claims between family members, not indirect third-party claims for contribution and indemnity.
Homeowners insurer must defend parents against third‑party negligence claims despite family exclusion.
The applicants sought a declaration that their homeowners’ insurer owed a duty to defend third party claims for contribution and indemnity brought against them after their child was injured in a motor vehicle accident.
The insurer denied coverage relying on a family member exclusion clause excluding claims for bodily injury to persons residing in the insured’s household.
The court held that the exclusion clause did not clearly extend to indirect claims by third parties because it lacked wording such as “arising out of” or language expressly encompassing indirect claims.
Interpreting coverage provisions broadly and exclusions narrowly, the court concluded the clause excluded only direct claims between household members.
As the third party claims were brought by non-household defendants, the insurer had a duty to defend.
Majority shareholders acted oppressively by leasing corporate property to their own business at below-market rent.
The applicant, a 10% minority shareholder in a landlord corporation, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholders.
The court determined preliminary issues, finding that the majority shareholders acted oppressively by leasing the corporation's property to their own related business at less than fair market value and failing to enforce the lease terms.
The court also found accounting irregularities, including the landlord corporation paying expenses that should have been paid by the tenant, and ordered remedies including the repayment of improper expenses and a buyout of the applicant's shares without a minority discount.
Triable discoverability issue justified adding defendant despite potential limitation period defence.
The plaintiff landlord brought a motion under Rule 5.04 to add a newly incorporated company as a defendant, alleging it received assets, business opportunities, and benefits through fraudulent conveyances after the tenant abandoned leased premises.
The proposed defendant argued that the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The court held that the presumption of discovery under s. 5(2) was rebutted because the proposed defendant corporation did not exist at the time of the underlying events.
Given uncertainty regarding when transfers occurred and when the plaintiff could reasonably have discovered the claim, the court found a triable issue of discoverability.
Leave was therefore granted to add the corporation as a defendant with permission to plead a limitations defence.
Stay of action set aside where defendants attorned to Ontario jurisdiction and employment contract permitted Ontario forum.
The appellant, a former executive and minority shareholder, sued the respondents in Ontario for wrongful dismissal, unpaid wages, and oppression.
The motions judge denied the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the respondents' motion to stay the action based on an exclusive forum selection clause in a Shareholders' Agreement favouring England.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the denial of summary judgment but set aside the stay.
The Court found that the motions judge erred by ignoring a non-exclusive Ontario forum selection clause in the appellant's Service Agreement and by failing to consider that the respondents had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by defending the action on the merits and counterclaiming before invoking the English forum selection clause.
Motion for security for costs of an appeal under the residual category dismissed.
The moving parties brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal and for the costs awarded on a summary judgment motion.
The moving parties relied on the residual 'other good reason' category under rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no compelling reason to order security for the costs of the appeal or to require an advance payment of the summary judgment costs award, which was automatically stayed by the appeal.
Judicial review dismissed; federal Nuclear Liability Act does not oust provincial workers' compensation scheme.
The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision declaring he had no right to sue his employer, Ontario Hydro, for injuries allegedly sustained in a nuclear accident.
The applicant argued that the federal Nuclear Liability Act created a statutory tort that ousted the provincial Workers' Compensation Act.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Nuclear Liability Act does not create a federal statutory tort and that federal jurisdiction over nuclear power does not oust provincial jurisdiction over employees' compensation schemes.
The court confirmed that the applicant must pursue his remedies under the provincial workers' compensation scheme.
Appeal dismissed; no error in refusing viva voce evidence given appellant's history of delay.
The appellant appealed a judgment on the basis that the motion judge erred in refusing to allow viva voce evidence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the exercise of discretion given the history of delays by the appellant, indulgences granted, and prior notice given by a Master.
The court concluded there was no procedural unfairness or denial of natural justice.