Shahzad Siddiqui

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel of record, arguing a disqualifying conflict of interest and that counsel was a likely material witness.

The court found that the counsel had previously acted for the defendant in drafting a trust agreement and had received relevant confidential information regarding an income-splitting arrangement central to the current litigation.

The court also determined that counsel was a necessary witness regarding a key shareholder's knowledge of the income splitting.

The motion was allowed and counsel was removed.

The appellants, a real estate brokerage and its realtor, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for a $650,000 commission from the respondent purchaser after a commercial real estate transaction failed to close.

The motion judge found that the Buyer Representation Agreement, which listed the commission as 'TBD', did not contractually bind the purchaser to pay the commission amount set out in a separate agreement between the brokerage and the seller.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no reviewable error in his contractual interpretation and that his conclusion was open to him based on the highly fact-specific circumstances.

The applicant mother sought a declaration that her adult son held his joint interest in her property on a resulting or constructive trust, alleging she did not intend to gift him the interest and that he exercised undue influence.

The court found the presumption of resulting trust applied but was rebutted, as the evidence showed the mother intended to gift the joint interest to effectuate her testamentary plan.

The court dismissed the claims of undue influence and unjust enrichment, finding the mother acted freely and the gift constituted a juristic reason for the enrichment.

The application was dismissed, and the mother was ordered to pay costs.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, ordering the return of their deposit for an assignment of a property that was never built.

The defendant was not entitled to retain the deposit or deduct expenses, and the real estate agent (Hometown) was required to return its commission, as the underlying transaction did not close due to the builder's bankruptcy.

The decision turned on the interpretation of the relevant agreements and the application of contract law principles.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Garlicky Mediterranean Grill Inc., finding no error in the application judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s email correspondence did not amount to the exercise of an option to renew the lease.

The court held that the findings below were entitled to deference and awarded costs to the respondent.

This decision concerns an application under the Partition Act regarding jointly owned property at 63 Hiscock Blvd., Scarborough, Ontario.

The applicant, Syed Azadar Bukhari, sought an order for sale of the property, which was opposed by the respondent, Nadia Muneeb Bukhari, on the basis of the applicant’s failure to contribute to carrying costs and alleged unjust enrichment.

The court reviewed the history of litigation between the parties, including prior judgments establishing joint ownership and financial obligations.

The court found that the applicant’s failure to pay could be remedied by adjustments on sale and did not amount to malicious or oppressive conduct.

The court ordered the sale of the property under supervision, with an accounting to determine amounts owing, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The Ontario Securities Commission sought approval of a settlement agreement with Edward Gong, who admitted to unregistered trading and securities fraud in connection with a pyramid scheme that raised hundreds of millions of dollars.

Gong's company had previously pled guilty to criminal charges and was fined approximately $1 million.

The Capital Markets Tribunal approved the settlement, permanently banning Gong from trading in securities, acting as a director or officer of most issuers, and acting as a registrant or promoter, finding the terms reasonable and in the public interest.

The defendants Nik Handa and Re/Max Realty Services Inc. brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $650,000 in commission from the plaintiff Nadeem Qureshi, related to an aborted real estate transaction where Re/Max acted as Qureshi's agent.

Qureshi brought a cross-motion to dismiss the counterclaim.

The core dispute involved the interpretation of the "To Be Determined" (TBD) commission clause in the Buyer's Representation Agreement (BRA) and whether subsequent agreements (Commission Agreement and revised Co-op Agreement) incorporated a fixed commission amount binding on Qureshi.

The court found that the commission amount was an essential term not sufficiently determined in any contract signed by Qureshi, and the revised Co-op Agreement did not incorporate the Commission Agreement's terms to bind Qureshi for payment.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and Qureshi's cross-motion was granted.

This appeal arose from a failed commercial real estate transaction where the appellants (buyers) failed to close and alleged fundamental breaches by the respondent (seller).

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment on liability in favour of the seller.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' motion for fresh evidence and their appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the alleged breaches by the seller were not fundamental and that the buyers had breached the agreement by failing to close.

The plaintiff, Namena Corp., brought a motion seeking to strike the statement of defence and counterclaim of Mr. Sivarajah for failing to answer discovery questions, or alternatively, to compel reattendance at discovery and for Rule 30.10 relief for third-party production.

The court denied the motion to strike the pleadings, finding that the defendants' conduct did not warrant such a severe remedy, noting that undertakings had been complied with and some refusals were reasonably defended.

The court ordered Mr. Sivarajah to reattend discovery to answer specific questions regarding bank statements and the identity of a company that performed NPN registrations, but not to recreate master manufacturing documents or disclose tax returns.

The Rule 30.10 motion for third-party production was granted for Health Canada, Omega, and Reva, with a conditional order for Quality.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff, reflecting divided success and delays caused by both parties.

The plaintiffs accepted the defendants' offer to purchase their residential property for $1,200,000, which required a $40,000 deposit upon acceptance.

The defendants failed to pay the deposit and advised they could not complete the purchase.

The plaintiffs accepted the repudiation and sold the property to another buyer for $1,130,000.

The plaintiffs sued for the $70,000 difference in purchase price.

The court held that the deposit was not a condition precedent to the contract, the defendants breached the agreement, and the plaintiffs reasonably mitigated their damages by selling to the other buyer without re-listing the property.

Judgment was awarded to the plaintiffs for $70,000.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion to set aside an undefended trial decision and the granting of the Law Society's request to transfer an action, the court determined costs.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that costs could not be awarded without formal motion records.

The court declined to award costs personally against the respondent's counsel to avoid further delay.

However, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs against the respondent, finding his conduct constituted an abuse of process designed to complicate and delay the proceedings.

Costs were fixed at $3,987.77 for the Law Society and $12,500.00 for the applicant.

In a long-running family and related civil litigation, the court refused to permit the respondent to advance a Rule 59.06 motion alleging fraud in relation to inheritance, business funds, property contributions, and assault allegations.

The court held the proposed motion was abusive relitigation because those issues had already been raised and rejected, the respondent's contempt sentence had barred participation in the undefended trial, and the alleged new evidence was not new and could not satisfy the reopening threshold.

The court also addressed a separate action commenced in Toronto against the Law Society of Ontario arising from the same broader dispute and held that the overlap in facts, witnesses, credibility issues, and risk of inconsistent outcomes justified transfer to Brampton and case management by the same judge.

Costs were left to written submissions if not agreed.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for breaching an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The defendant failed to close the transaction after the real estate market declined and she was unable to secure sufficient financing.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, rejecting the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's agent misrepresented the property's value.

Summary judgment was granted, the $60,000 deposit was forfeited, and the plaintiff was awarded $98,936.56 in damages for loss of bargain and carrying costs.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase a newly built home from the defendant.

After discovering the home would not have a garage door access as expected, the plaintiff sent an angry email threatening litigation.

The defendant treated this as an anticipatory breach, refused to close the transaction, and sold the property to a related charity.

The court found that the plaintiff's email was an idle threat and did not amount to repudiation or a breach of the duty of good faith.

The defendant's refusal to close constituted a repudiation of the contract.

The plaintiff was awarded damages assessed as of the date of breach.

The appellant, Elahe Vahed, appealed a summary judgment decision that found her in breach of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a condominium unit.

The motion judge had ordered the return of deposits to the buyer (Mohmmad Danesh), damages payable by Vahed, and dismissed Vahed's counterclaims against Danesh, her lawyer (Michael Bury), and the realtor (Remax Crossroads Realty Inc.).

Vahed argued that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the authenticity of a letter extending the closing date and whether her lawyer followed instructions.

She also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed the costs award in favour of Re/Max.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagors following a default on a mortgage.

The defendants admitted the default but disputed the plaintiff's calculation of the amount owing, pointing to a double-counted fee.

The court granted summary judgment on the issue of default, finding no genuine issue for trial, but referred the determination of the exact amount owing to a Master pursuant to Rule 20.04(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The parties disagreed over the form of the formal Judgment arising from previous decisions.

The applicants sought to include specific recitals of all materials filed, while the respondent argued that Form 59B does not require particulars of evidence for applications.

The court approved the applicants' draft Judgment, finding no harm and potential benefit in providing specificity, especially given the context of an ongoing arbitration.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against two properties, claiming a beneficial interest through a resulting trust.

The properties had been registered in the names of her family members.

The court found that the claim regarding one property was statute-barred by the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

For the other property, although there was a triable issue, the court declined to grant the equitable remedy of a CPL because the plaintiff admitted she originally registered the properties in her family members' names to shield them from her husband's equalization claims, thereby violating the clean hands doctrine.

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's rulings in an ongoing shareholder valuation dispute pursuant to s. 46(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The applicants argued the arbitrator failed to provide adequate reasons for the valuation date, acted unfairly regarding instructions to the valuator, improperly allowed the use of hindsight evidence, and erred in admitting evidence from the respondent's expert.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decisions were reasonable, adequately explained, and did not result in procedural unfairness.