Ian J. Klaiman

The applicant bank sought to appoint a receiver over two residential properties in Burlington owned by the respondent corporations, which had defaulted on a loan agreement.

The respondents challenged the venue, arguing the application should be transferred from Hamilton to the Central West Region where the properties and respondents were located.

The court addressed procedural issues regarding venue transfer motions under the Rules of Civil Procedure and Practice Directions, finding that the parties had improperly circumvented the prescribed transfer process.

On the merits, the court appointed a receiver, finding that the respondents were in material default, had failed to cure defaults despite multiple opportunities, and that appointment was just and convenient under the applicable statutory framework.

A motion for default judgment brought by a financial institution against a corporate borrower and personal guarantor who obtained a $250,000 loan under a fund designed to support Black business owners and entrepreneurs.

The defendants represented that the loan proceeds would be used to purchase a Freightliner truck but instead misappropriated the funds for personal use.

The court found the defendants liable for fraud, awarded punitive damages, granted a non-dissipation order and tracing order, and ordered full indemnity costs.

A commercial loan dispute involving a bus company's default on a $559,250 equipment financing agreement.

The lender sought judgment for the full remaining balance plus interest and enforcement costs after the borrower ceased payments, failed to maintain insurance, and secretly sold the financed bus without notice.

The court determined that the acceleration clause, not the prepayment clause, applied following the borrower's multiple defaults.

The court rejected the borrower's arguments that section 17 of the Mortgages Act or section 8 of the Interest Act capped the lender's recovery, finding these provisions inapplicable to commercial loan agreements.

The court awarded judgment to the lender for the net amount owing after crediting the bus sale proceeds and security deposit.

The moving party sought to set aside a judgment obtained by the trustee in bankruptcy declaring a transfer of funds at undervalue under section 96(1)(b)(i) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The moving party argued he did not receive adequate notice of the motion and was unaware it was proceeding.

The court found that the moving party received multiple attempts at service via email, regular mail, process servers, and postings on his door, and that he deliberately evaded service and ignored the notices.

The court held that the first prerequisite for setting aside the judgment—proof of accident, mistake, or insufficient notice—was not met, and dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Shahin Songhorigakien from a summary judgment ordering her to pay $500,000 plus interest and costs to the Bank of Montreal under a personal guarantee for a corporate overdraft facility.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring trial, that the bank owed no special duty to Songhorigakien, and that her non est factum defence had no air of reality.

The court also rejected arguments of procedural unfairness.

The applicant, Metropolitan Partners Group Administration, LLC, sought an order appointing a receiver over the property of the respondent, International Credit Experts Inc., due to the respondent's defaults on a financing agreement.

The respondent opposed the appointment and requested a third adjournment, arguing for a private sale of its loan portfolio.

The court denied the adjournment, finding the matter urgent given the procedural history and the respondent's conduct, including a disputed guarantee and asset transfer.

The court determined it was just and convenient to appoint a receiver, emphasizing the respondent's continued defaults, lack of financial transparency, and the need for a court-supervised sale process to maximize stakeholder recovery.

A sealing order for commercially sensitive information was also granted.

The appellant seller appealed from a Court of Appeal decision that held exclusion clauses in a contract for the sale of topsoil were insufficient to oust the implied condition under s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act that goods must correspond with their description.

The buyer had waived its right to test the topsoil before shipment, and the contract contained clauses providing that the seller would not be responsible for the quality of the material if the buyer waived those rights.

The Supreme Court held that the exclusion clauses constituted an express agreement under s. 53 of the Sale of Goods Act, applying modern contractual interpretation principles from Sattva and Tercon.

The majority restored the trial judge's judgment, finding the objective intention of the parties was for the buyer to accept the risk that the topsoil would not meet the previously supplied specifications if it failed to test the soil.

Côté J. dissented, concluding the word 'quality' in the exclusion clauses could not be expanded to cover defects in description or identity.

This appeal concerned the distribution of proceeds from a property sale, specifically regarding the priority of a third mortgage, an alleged equitable fourth mortgage, and a writ of execution.

The appellants, lenders, sought recognition of an equitable fourth mortgage and a specific interest calculation for their third mortgage.

The respondents, execution creditors, challenged the third mortgage's interest rate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, declaring the existence of an equitable fourth mortgage, but dismissed the appellants' claim for interest to run until full payout.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding the third mortgage interest rate was dismissed.

The appellant debtor appealed a motion judge's declaration that his debt to the respondent mortgagee was not released by his discharge from bankruptcy due to fraud, pursuant to s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant argued that fraud was not sufficiently pleaded in the original statement of claim and that consenting to judgment did not constitute an admission of fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that specific reference to s. 178 or particularized pleading of fraud is not required for a debt to survive bankruptcy.

The court found that the motion judge correctly determined the nature of the debt by examining the pleadings, which clearly suggested fraudulent conduct, and that the consent judgment was broad enough to encompass fraud.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, appealed a bankruptcy judge's order interpreting a trust.

The Royal Bank of Canada, as an assignee of the Trustee in Bankruptcy's rights, sought to recover proceeds from the sale of a property held in trust for the appellant.

The appellant argued his interest was suspended during bankruptcy under a specific trust provision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the bankruptcy judge's finding that a mandatory distribution provision overrode the suspension clause, concluding the property vested in the appellant at the "Time of Division" and thus formed part of his bankrupt estate, available to creditors.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed a motion judge's decision that a debt arising from misappropriation of trade secrets would survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The motion judge erred by interpreting "false pretences" too broadly, including lying during discovery and generally morally objectionable conduct, rather than requiring a deceitful statement by which the debtor obtained property or services.

The Court clarified that s. 178(1)(e) requires a direct causal link between a deceitful statement and the obtaining of property/services.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the declaration regarding s. 178(1)(e) and varying the stay of proceedings to allow quantification of claims for bankruptcy purposes and enforcement of injunctive relief, but not monetary judgments outside of bankruptcy.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a lower court order that declared his debts would survive bankruptcy and lifted a stay of proceedings.

The respondent opposed the extension, arguing there was no right to appeal without leave and that the appeal lacked merit.

The respondent also brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding that the appellant had a right to appeal under sections 193(c) and 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and that the proposed appeal had arguable merit.

The court dismissed the respondent's cross-motion for security for costs, concluding that the "other good reason" test under Rule 61.06(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure was not met, given the appellant's impecuniosity and the arguable merit of the appeal.

This motion concerned whether a debt arising from a consent judgment, obtained by M.O.S. MortgageOne Solutions Ltd. (MOS) against William Heidary, would survive Heidary's discharge from bankruptcy under sections 178(1)(d) and (e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and whether the bankruptcy stay should be lifted.

MOS argued that the underlying amended statement of claim pleaded fraud and invoked BIA s. 178(1)(d), and that Heidary's consent to judgment merged these issues into the judgment, making it a debt not released by bankruptcy.

Heidary contended that fraud was not proven and the judgment made no explicit reference to its survival post-bankruptcy.

The court found that the underlying pleadings, which clearly raised fraud and the applicability of s. 178(1)(d), were sufficient for the debt to survive bankruptcy, even without explicit mention in the consent judgment.

The court granted the declarations sought by MOS.

The Debtor appealed a Master's order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), which had arisen upon the Debtor's filing of a proposal.

The Master found that the Respondent creditor would be materially prejudiced by the continued stay and that it was equitable to lift it, allowing the Respondent's $1 million claim to be quantified in a civil action rather than through the summary procedure under s. 135 of the BIA.

The appeal court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error in concluding that the Respondent had established some chance of success in its civil action and that the civil action was the appropriate forum for determining the complex, credibility-dependent claim against both the Debtor and a co-defendant, thereby avoiding inconsistent findings and prejudice.

The City of Toronto prosecuted a home comfort equipment retailer and lessor for carrying on the business of a plumbing contractor without a licence, contrary to Chapter 545 of the Toronto Municipal Code.

The defendant hired independent plumbing companies to install and remove a carbon water filter that it leased to a consumer.

The court found that the defendant did not carry on the business of a plumbing contractor within the meaning of the regulatory scheme.

The court distinguished between the business of leasing chattels and the actual performance of plumbing work, which was conducted by licensed independent plumbers.

The court dismissed the charge, finding that a broad interpretation of "plumbing contractor" would lead to absurdity and would require property management companies, building superintendents, and hardware stores to maintain exclusive master plumbers on staff.

The defendant George Pappas moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff Lucy Romero, arguing irregularity in the judgment and offering an explanation for default.

The court found a clear irregularity as the judgment ordered Pappas to pay a sum not requested in the statement of claim against him.

The court also considered the test for setting aside default judgment, finding Pappas's explanation plausible and an arguable defence, with no prejudice to the plaintiff.

The motion to set aside the default judgment against Pappas was granted, and all enforcement proceedings against him were stayed.

The creditor sought to lift a stay of proceedings under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to allow a civil action for loans and punitive damages to proceed to judgment.

The creditor argued material prejudice and that the debt should survive discharge under s. 178(1)(e) due to fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court found no causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations and the creation of the debt, and that the pleadings lacked particularity for fraud.

The court also determined that the prejudice was subjective, not objective, and that lifting the stay would imperil the approved consumer proposal, which was more favourable to creditors than bankruptcy.

The motion was denied.

The defendants, Alfonso and Helen Fulchini, moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered on Helen's property, Elizabeth Grove, which was obtained ex parte by the Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS).

The BNS's claim to an interest in the land was based on an alleged fraudulent conveyance by Alfonso to Helen of proceeds from the sale of another property, Easy Street, which were then traced into Elizabeth Grove.

The court found that the BNS had a reasonable claim to an interest in Elizabeth Grove, citing several "badges of fraud" in the transfer of funds between the spouses and the lack of credible evidence of consideration.

The court also rejected the defendants' arguments that damages were an adequate alternative remedy and that the CPL should be discharged due to non-disclosure by the BNS at the ex parte motion.

The motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed, though the court allowed for the CPL to be discharged if the defendants posted cash security.