Bryce Dillon

The City of Brockville appealed an application judge's order that set aside three arbitral awards and appointed a new arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by characterizing questions of mixed fact and law as extricable questions of law and by misapplying procedural fairness principles under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court emphasized the narrow basis for setting aside arbitral awards and the caution required in extricating questions of law from contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating the arbitrator's original awards.

In this consolidated action, George W. Drummond Limited sought judgment against 595831 Ontario Inc. for soil remediation work. 595831 Ontario Inc. denied an enforceable contract and claimed indemnity from its geotechnical engineer, Paterson Group Inc., alleging negligence.

Paterson Group Inc. denied liability and counterclaimed for unpaid engineering services.

The court found an enforceable contract existed between Drummond and 595831 Ontario Inc., dismissed 595831 Ontario Inc.'s claim against Paterson Group Inc., and granted Paterson Group Inc.'s counterclaim, finding that Paterson met the standard of care.

This appeal concerned the application of a limitation period to an arbitration agreement.

The parties, cousins and business partners, had a dispute over EOREI expenses that was to be referred to arbitration if negotiations failed.

The appellants (original respondents) argued the arbitration was time-barred, either by a 90-day agreement or the two-year limitation period from the Limitations Act, 2002, starting from the signing of the settlement agreement in September 2016.

The application judge found no 90-day agreement and held the two-year limitation period started when it became clear negotiations were impossible (January 31, 2018), making the arbitration timely.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the arbitration clause as requiring an attempt at informal resolution before the limitation period began to run for arbitration.

Following summary judgment motions where the Bank successfully enforced a personal guarantee against one defendant (Kechichian) but faced triable issues against another (Jarada), the court determined costs.

The Bank was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $23,459.52 against Kechichian based on the terms of the guarantee.

Jarada, who succeeded on her crossclaim for indemnity against Kechichian, sought substantial indemnity costs but was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $7,500.

The court also commented on the inappropriate practice of filing voluminous compendia for routine costs submissions.

The plaintiff contractor sought leave under section 67(2) of the Construction Act to bring a motion for partial summary judgment for allegedly undisputed certified draws totaling up to $1,256,400.

The defendant landlords opposed, citing a supplementary condition in the contract that required delaying dispute resolution pending the outcome of a concurrent dispute with the federal government tenant.

The court granted leave, finding the motion was necessary to clarify the contractual condition that could otherwise halt the entire proceeding, and that resolving the issue of the undisputed monies would expedite the resolution of the broader dispute.

The plaintiff Bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce personal guarantees given by the defendants in respect of a corporate borrower's obligations.

The defendant guarantor did not dispute the default but argued the Bank failed to mitigate its damages by properly protecting its security.

The court rejected this defence, noting the Bank had taken steps to protect its security in related insolvency proceedings, and granted summary judgment against the guarantor for the principal amounts owing plus contractual interest.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce personal guarantees signed by the defendant for corporate loans.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing non est factum and undue influence by the third party, who controlled the corporations and assured her she would face no personal liability.

The court dismissed the bank's motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the defendant's carelessness and the lack of independent legal advice.

The court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant on her third-party claim for indemnity against the third party.

The applicants sought an order referring a dispute to arbitration based on an arbitration clause in a release.

The respondents contended the application was time-barred, arguing for a 90-day deadline for arbitration or a two-year limitation period from the settlement date.

The court found no 90-day deadline and determined that the arbitration clause required parties to attempt informal resolution first.

The two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, began when it became clear informal resolution was impossible, which was January 31, 2018.

As the arbitration request was made within two years of this date, it was not time-barred.

The respondents' motion to dismiss was dismissed, and the applicants' request for arbitration was granted.

The plaintiff commenced a construction lien action.

Both parties consented to refer the matter for trial before a Master.

The court granted the referral, directing the action to proceed to trial before a Master in Toronto.

The applicant appealed three arbitral awards dismissing its claims against the respondent municipality for remediation costs, additional construction costs, and interest related to a waterfront development project.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the arbitrator made reversible errors of law and breached procedural fairness in all three awards by relying on legal theories and defences—such as an implied 'time is of the essence' term, implied fiduciary-like duties for a construction manager, and equitable estoppel—that were never pleaded or argued by the parties.

The court held that these errors were not trivial and tainted the outcomes, directing the parties to schedule a case management conference to determine the appropriate remedy.

The plaintiff, San Remo Lighting, moved for summary judgment against the defendants, Am-Tech Electrical Inc. and others, alleging breach of trust obligations under the Construction Lien Act (CLA) for unpaid invoices.

Am-Tech admitted to not segregating trust monies as required by the CLA but later placed the claimed amount in its counsel's trust account.

The court, adopting reasoning from a Manitoba case, found that while a breach of trust had occurred, the subsequent reconstitution of the fund raised a genuine issue requiring a trial to fully evaluate the ramifications of the breach and the defendants' right to set-off.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the funds were ordered to be paid into court.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for a declaration of a right of way over the respondents' property.

They argued that the original grant met all four requirements to establish an easement by grant and that the trial judge erred in considering post-grant evidence and in finding the grant ambiguous.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the grant was ambiguous and lacked sufficient metes and bounds descriptions.

The trial judge correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the nature and location of the servient tenement over which the right of way was granted as it existed at the date of the grant, which was fatal to the claim.

The separated parents disagreed on which school their two young sons should attend.

The mother wanted them to attend a local public school offering early French immersion, while the father wanted them to attend a private school founded by his mother.

The court applied the best interests of the child test, considering factors such as class size, individual attention, continuity, and the children's specific needs.

The court ordered that both children attend the private school, noting the smaller class sizes and the father's parents' offer to pay tuition.

The applicant franchisor sought an interlocutory injunction to compel respondent franchisees to pay withheld royalty and advertising fees.

The franchisees had commenced a 'royalty strike' to gain leverage in contract negotiations following the franchisor's acquisition of the franchise system out of bankruptcy.

The court found a serious issue to be tried but dismissed the injunction motion because the franchisor failed to prove irreparable harm and failed to provide an adequate undertaking as to damages.

The court granted the franchisees' cross-motion to appoint an arbitrator and stay the action pursuant to the arbitration clause in the franchise agreements.