Jeff G. Saikaley

This is a costs decision following the court's grant of leave to commence a derivative action under s. 246 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The applicant sought to bring proceedings on behalf of two corporations against their directors for breach of fiduciary duties and duties of care relating to excessive compensation.

The applicant sought costs against the respondent directors on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents argued for no costs or significantly reduced costs, citing divided success and adverse findings regarding the applicant's own conduct.

The court reserved costs to the trial judge, finding that the trial judge would be best positioned to assess costs of the entirety of the proceedings and the parties' conduct.

The applicant sought leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of two closely held companies (Cen-Ta Real Estate Ltd. and Plum Financial Group Inc.) against the companies' directors for breach of fiduciary duties and duties of care.

The applicant alleged that the directors awarded themselves and their personal companies unreasonable and unfair compensation despite the companies' declining revenues and financial losses.

The respondent directors opposed the application, arguing the applicant failed to satisfy the mandatory statutory preconditions under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, specifically that the applicant was not acting in good faith and the proposed action was not in the interests of the corporations.

The court granted leave for the derivative action, finding that the applicant satisfied all requirements under the Act, was acting in good faith, and the action was in the interests of the corporations.

The court ordered that the applicant and corporations share legal costs equally.

The plaintiff brought an action for defamation arising from a Facebook post made by his ex-wife, the defendant, approximately two years after the end of their roughly ten-year marriage.

The defendant counterclaimed for defamation and sexual battery.

The parties had lived in Los Angeles and were involved in the online gaming and pornography industries.

Their marriage was polyamorous in nature.

The defendant's Facebook post alleged that the plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her and other women during their marriage.

The court found that while many of the defendant's statements were truthful or constituted fair comment, certain statements regarding sexual assault, physical violence, and lack of consent were defamatory and not supported by the evidence.

The court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for sexual battery, finding insufficient evidence of non-consensual sexual activity.

The plaintiff was awarded general damages for defamation.

La décision porte sur une demande d’annulation d’une sentence arbitrale concernant l’interprétation et l’exécution d’un contrat verbal relatif à la répartition de lots dans le cadre du Projet Oasis.

La Cour conclut que l’arbitre a commis des erreurs de droit en annulant une ordonnance de la Cour supérieure et en liant une société non partie à l’arbitrage, mais que ces erreurs n’affectent pas le résultat.

La Cour confirme que la détention d’une licence Tarion/HCRA est une condition implicite du contrat et que le droit d’acheter les lots appartient à Maisons Lacroix, non à la requérante.

This costs endorsement addresses the entitlement and quantum of costs following the successful anti-SLAPP motion by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network and Bernie Farber.

The court awards full indemnity costs of $49,319.13 to the moving parties, finding no basis to depart from the statutory presumption under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision reviews the relevant factors for costs, including proportionality, complexity, and settlement offers, and finds the amount sought to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

This case concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network (CAHN) and Bernie Farber against multiple plaintiffs who initiated a $44 million action following the Ottawa protests and the invocation of the Emergencies Act.

The plaintiffs alleged defamation and civil conspiracy, claiming CAHN provided false information to government and police, influencing the emergency measures and freezing of assets.

The court dismissed the action against CAHN, finding the plaintiffs failed to particularize their claims, lacked substantial merit, and could not overcome valid defences such as non-compliance with notice periods under the Libel and Slander Act and the Limitations Act.

The court also determined that the public interest in protecting CAHN's expression on a matter of public interest outweighed the harm alleged by the plaintiffs, and declined to award damages to CAHN.

The appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, appealed the dismissal of her defamation, conspiracy, and negligence claims against four defendants (Dr. Angus Maciver, André Picard, Carly Weeks, and Alheli Picazo) under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act), and the associated costs order totaling over $1.1 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the claims were strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

The court affirmed that the "fair comment" defence was prima facie available to Picard, Weeks, and Picazo, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate "serious harm" causally linked to the defendants' expressions, which would outweigh the public interest in protecting free expression.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, distinguishing the case from general guidance due to its complexity and the number of defendants.

The Pointer Group Incorporated brought a motion for security for costs of the appeal and the underlying action and anti-SLAPP motion, pursuant to Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party argued the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, had insufficient assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate that the appeal was both frivolous and vexatious, or that Dr. Gill had insufficient assets.

The court also found no "other good reason" to order security for costs, as the appeal presented arguable errors of law and there was no indication of vexatious conduct or difficulty in collecting costs from Dr. Gill.

Dr. Gill was awarded partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion.

The City of Brockville appealed an application judge's order that set aside three arbitral awards and appointed a new arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by characterizing questions of mixed fact and law as extricable questions of law and by misapplying procedural fairness principles under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court emphasized the narrow basis for setting aside arbitral awards and the caution required in extricating questions of law from contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating the arbitrator's original awards.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal concerning a dispute among investors in a residential subdivision.

The appeal, brought by 1750714 Ontario Inc. et al., was dismissed.

The court determined the quantum of costs payable by the appellants to the respondent, 1750738 Ontario Inc., on a partial indemnity basis, considering factors such as complexity, importance of issues, and party conduct.

The court awarded a global amount of $32,000 to the respondent.

The defendants, a national broadcaster and its employees, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff, a student travel company, alleged that the defendants' reporting on the death of a student during a trip was defamatory.

The court found that the expression related to a matter of public interest and that the plaintiff failed to show there was no valid defence, specifically the defence of fair comment.

The court also found the balance of harms favoured protecting the expression, and dismissed the action.

This is an appeal concerning a dispute over access to a landlocked property ("the triangle property").

The appellants claimed a right to use a private road ("the red track") across the respondents' property based on two grounds: a prescriptive easement acquired by lost modern grant before 1999, or as an access road under the Road Access Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, dismissing both claims.

The court found no prescriptive easement was established due to insufficient continuous use and lack of agency, and that the red track was not a contemporary "access road" under the Act due to disuse and overgrowth.

This is a defamation action where the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against the defendants for negative remarks published on social media.

The court granted summary judgment on liability, finding that the defendants' statements were defamatory and that their pleaded defenses of truth and fair comment could not succeed.

Damages were assessed in a modest amount for the corporate and individual plaintiffs, and a request for a permanent injunction was denied.

The applicant brought a motion to compel his 87-year-old mother to complete her cross-examination in the usual manner or to strike her affidavit.

The mother had become emotionally overwhelmed during the initial cross-examination, and medical evidence indicated that continuing in the usual manner posed a risk of harm.

The court had previously ordered an accommodated procedure, which the mother agreed to but the applicant refused.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the accommodated procedure was a reasonable alternative and the medical evidence justified the adaptation.

The applicant's request for an adjournment was also denied due to his failure to act with reasonable diligence.

The applicant, 1750738 Ontario Inc., sought specific performance of a verbal contract against the respondent corporations.

The verbal contract stipulated that Hervé Lacroix would invest in a real estate development project (Oasis) on the condition that his son's company, Maisons Lacroix Homes Inc., would construct 25% of the lots.

The respondents later terminated this arrangement.

The court found that the verbal contract existed, was ratified by 1750739 Ontario Inc. despite preceding its incorporation, was sufficiently certain, and was not precluded by the Statute of Frauds due to part performance.

Furthermore, a "whole agreement" clause in a subsequent shareholders' agreement did not terminate the verbal contract, given the circumstances of its signing and the lack of independent legal advice for Lacroix.

The court also found no convincing evidence of serious misconduct by Maisons Lacroix Homes Inc. that would justify termination.

The court granted specific performance, annulling the termination decision and ordering the allocation of 25% of lots to Maisons Lacroix Homes Inc.

This endorsement from a trial management conference addresses ongoing issues in consolidated actions, including delays in expert report completion by Welch LLP and concerns regarding the capacity of individual litigants, John McMurtry and Mildred McMurtry, to testify.

The court ordered Welch LLP to attend a continuation of the conference to provide a status update and set new deadlines, and noted a motion for a litigation guardian for John McMurtry was scheduled.

This endorsement from a trial management conference addresses ongoing issues in consolidated actions, including delays in expert report completion by Welch LLP and concerns regarding the capacity of individual litigants, John McMurtry and Mildred McMurtry, to testify.

The court ordered Welch LLP to attend a continuation of the conference to provide a status update and set new deadlines, and noted a motion for a litigation guardian for John McMurtry was scheduled.

The plaintiffs, a real estate agent and her brokerage, sued the defendant for defamation and unjust enrichment.

The defamation claim arose from a letter the defendant sent to the brokerage and others, complaining about the agent's conduct and invoicing after a real estate transaction fell through due to a dispute over a buyer representation agreement.

The unjust enrichment claim was for services rendered by the agent.

The court found that while some statements in the defendant's letter were defamatory and made with malice, the defence of qualified privilege applied because malice was not the dominant purpose of the communication.

The defence of fair comment also failed due to untrue factual statements.

However, the court found that the plaintiff's own conduct disentitled her to damages for defamation.

The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed as the defendant was not enriched, and there was a juristic reason for any perceived enrichment.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendant appealed the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion and sought leave to appeal a costs order.

The defendant had posted tweets alleging that the plaintiff's fundraising campaign for Fort McMurray forest fire victims was fraudulent.

The motion judge dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the tweets related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff had established grounds to believe the defendant had no valid defences and that the harm was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the anti-SLAPP motion but varied the costs award due to procedural unfairness and the defendant's delay in bringing the motion.