COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-91537
DATE: 2024/12/17
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Skylar Brown, Plaintiff (Responding Party)
-and-
Valerie Landriault, Defendant (Moving Party)
COUNSEL: Jeff Saikaley and William Denham, for the Plaintiff
Sydney McIvor and Erin Durant, for the Defendant
HEARD: November 29, 2024
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] The Defendant, Valerie Landriault, moves pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, for a dismissal of this action on the basis that this action is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) and that the public interest of her expressions regarding being abused by the Plaintiff, Mr. Brown, outweighs any harm to him.
[2] Mr. Brown opposes the motion and submits that anti-SLAPP legislation was not enacted to dismiss legitimate claims for the vindication of an individual’s reputation following Ms. Landriault’s false accusation of criminal conduct.
[3] At a s. 137.1 motion, the court is not to engage in a “deep dive into the record and make definitive findings of fact and credibility” which should be left to a summary judgment motion or a trial: see Di Franco v. Bueckert, 2021 ONCA 476, at para. 2.
[4] This motion turns on whether Mr. Brown can satisfy the court that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression.
[5] For the reasons that follow, I dismiss Ms. Landriault’s s. 137.1 motion.
Background
[6] The parties were involved in a short relationship between September 11, 2021, and November 4, 2021. They met on a dating app called “Tinder”.
[7] The parties had a tumultuous separation which involved multiple complaints to the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) and various allegations of sexual abuse against the other.
[8] A brief synopsis follows.
[9] During the relationship, Ms. Landriault advised Mr. Brown that she was pregnant and asked for a commitment.
[10] On November 4, 2021, in a text, Ms. Landriault advised Mr. Brown that she was no longer pregnant. Later she spoke to him on the phone blaming him for her miscarriage and asked him to come to her home.
[11] Mr. Brown attended Ms. Landriault’s home that evening and made an audio recording of the events of that evening as he was worried she would attempt to make a false claim against him. His reason for attending was to bring closure to the relationship.
[12] The audio recording, which is several hours long, commences when he enters her home and ends when he is leaving. The recording has been filed in evidence along with a transcript of the relevant portions.
[13] Ms. Landriault alleges that she was sexually assaulted that night whereas Mr. Brown states that the recording demonstrates that Ms. Landriault attempts to be intimate with Mr. Brown by kissing him and trying to perform oral sex on him.
[14] On November 11, 2021, Mr. Brown texted Ms. Landriault, ending the relationship and alleging that she harassed him. On that day she dropped off his things at his home.
[15] Ms. Landriault alleged that on December 7, 2021, Mr. Brown sexually assaulted her while she was sleeping by rubbing his penis against her thighs.
[16] On December 10, 2021, Mr. Brown contacted the OPS and said he was being harassed by Ms. Landriault.
[17] On December 31, 2021, Ms. Landriault learned that Mr. Brown told people he had obtained a “peace order”.
[18] In January 2022, Ms. Landriault decided that she would join the “Super Smash Bros” (Ottawa Smash) organization of the local gaming community with approximately 1000 members after she was able to confirm that Mr. Brown was no longer a member. They would hold in person tournaments for the video game “Super Smash Bros”. She made allegations regarding Mr. Brown on this platform.
[19] Mr. Brown responded to Ottawa Smash regarding Ms. Landriault’s allegations, on January 9, 2022. The Ottawa Smash organizer advised Ms. Landriault that Mr. Brown had provided satisfactory response and that she was acting in bad faith and on January 11, 2022, she was banned from entering Ottawa Smash events. She made disparaging comments on Twitter about the process and Mr. Brown.
[20] In February 2022, Ms. Landriault made allegations against Mr. Brown regarding sexual assault and child grooming to the Global Ban Database (“GBD”) which is a group that blacklists global gaming community members from participating in events. Most local Smash communities followed it.
[21] Through GBD’s investigation, Ms. Landriault learned that Mr. Brown had recorded the events of November 4, 2021. She reported the assault to the OPS and the investigation took over a year. In June 2023, she was advised that they had no grounds after their interview with Mr. Brown. They said they were not pursuing it as there were conflicting narratives. She filed a complaint against the investigating officer with the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA). On June 4, 2024, the complaint was dismissed, and she brought an application for judicial review.
[22] On October 11, 2024, the parties agreed to a consent order dismissing the judicial review and re-opening the LECA complaint.
[23] Ms. Landriault’s statements alleged to be defamatory include tweets on X, with third parties, and on the Ottawa Smash gaming platform including serious allegations that he sexually assaulted her, that he was a sexual predator and child groomer, and that he was abusive towards women, children, and animals.
[24] Ms. Landriault tweeted on X where she has 1,660 followers and she also spoke about Mr. Brown in private communications with other individuals in the community.
[25] There are no outstanding charges facing the parties at this time.
Discussion
[26] Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, was established to provide an expedited procedure to dismiss unmeritorious litigation that arises from expressions on matters of public interest.
[27] The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 587, sets out the required comprehensive process.
Was there an expression and does it relate to a matter of public interest?
[28] First, Ms. Landriault has the initial burden of satisfying the Court, on a balance of probabilities, that the proceeding arises from an expression made by Ms. Landriault; and that the expression relates to a matter of public interest.
[29] “Expression” is given an expansive meaning in s. 137.1(2). In Pointes, at para. 24, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that “arises from” is to be given a broad and liberal interpretation and the proceeding need not arise directly from the expression. Therefore, this section can apply to a varied number of proceedings and not just defamation suits.
[30] The parties do not dispute that Ms. Landriault’s statements made on social media and other venues are “expressions” within the meaning of s. 137.1(2), as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pointes.
[31] The court finds that Ms. Landriault’s expressions on X, on the Ottawa Smash gaming platform and to third parties are expressions.
[32] Regarding whether these expressions are of public interest, this is a relatively low hurdle that is generally cleared by the Defendants as they need only show that some segment of the public has a genuine interest in knowing about the expression.
[33] The Supreme Court of Canada in Pointes further expanded on this topic at para. 75 when it indicated that “a statement that contains deliberate falsehoods, [or] gratuitous personal attacks ... may still be an expression that relates to a matter of public interest.”
[34] Ms. Landriault’s statements that she was a victim of sexual abuse and the allegations that Mr. Brown is a sexual predator are certainly a matter of public interest.
[35] In my view, the public has a genuine stake in knowing about matters pertaining to complainants of sexual abuse and possible predators in the community.
Does Mr. Brown’s defamation claim have substantial merit?
[36] The burden now shifts to Mr. Brown to satisfy that that this proceeding has substantial merit.
[37] To prove a claim in defamation, Mr. Brown must establish all of the following on a balance of probabilities:
That the impugned words were defamatory, in that they would tend to lower his reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person;
That the words in fact referred to him; and
That Ms. Landriault published the words in that they communicated the words to another third party or third parties. (See Grant v. Torstar Corp. 209 SCC 61 at para. 28)
[38] Ms. Landriault concedes this point.
[39] The court finds that the statement of claim details the allegations of defamation as against Ms. Landriault and that her statements to the public could cause him to suffer damages.
[40] As stated earlier, she admits to making statements on X, on the Ottawa Smash gaming platform and to third parties claiming that Mr. Brown sexually assaulted her, that he was a sexual predator and a child groomer, and that he was abusive towards women, children, and animals. This meets the criteria necessary to establish defamation.
Has Mr. Brown demonstrated that Ms. Landriault has no valid defence?
[41] Next, Mr. Brown must satisfy the burden that Ms. Landriault has no valid defence.
[42] She pleads only the defence of justification.
[43] To succeed in the defence of justification, the Defendant must adduce evidence showing that the statements were substantially true: see Grant v. Torstar, 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, at para. 33.
[44] The onus is on Mr. Brown to satisfy the court that, looking at the motion record through the reasonableness lens, a trier of fact could conclude that none of the defences advanced would succeed. If that assessment is among those reasonably available on the record, then Mr. Brown has met their onus.
[45] There remains an “evidentiary burden” on Mr. Brown to put a defence “in play” by filing material that is “sufficiently detailed to allow the motion judge to clearly identify the legal and factual components of the defences advanced”. As stated by Justice Côté in Pointes, there must be “a basis in the record and the law – taking into account the stage of litigation at which s. 137.1 motion is brought – for finding that the underlying proceeding has substantial merit and that there is no valid defence”: see para. 39. That is, the Plaintiffs are only “required to show that there is a basis in the record and the law — taking into account the stage of the proceeding — to support a finding that the defences … do not tend to weigh more in [the defendant’s] favour”: see Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 645, at para. 103.
[46] Ms. Landriault concedes that Mr. Brown has demonstrated grounds that would defeat this defence. It will come down to credibility of the parties. If this motion does not succeed, a motion to amend the statement of defence to include fair comment and qualified privilege will be made.
[47] As justification is the only defence before the court and if this action proceeds, counsel indicate that they will be moving to amend to include the defences of fair comment and qualified privilege. However, for the purposes of this motion, Mr. Brown only has to show that he has some grounds that he could defeat her defence of justification which is the only defence before the court.
[48] Therefore, Mr. Brown has met his burden to show there is no valid defence for the purposes of this motion.
Has Mr. Brown satisfied the Court that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression?
No hallmarks of a SLAPP
[49] In the weighing test, the court should consider whether the litigation “smells of a genuine controversy”, in which case it should be tried on its merits, or whether the litigation has the characteristics of “SLAPP suits which reek of the Plaintiff’s improper motives, claims of phantom harm, and bullying tactics”: Bondfield Construction Company Limited v. The Globe and Mail Inc., 2019 ONCA 166, at para. 28.
[50] The final weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b) is the fundamental crux of the analysis. Section 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on in the particular case before them.
[51] In this weighing exercise, the court must consider whether this lawsuit has
the hallmarks of a SLAPP, that is, is it the type of action that s. 137.1 was designed to curtail.
Platnick: para. 98. The classic hallmarks of strategic lawsuit against public participation
are as follows: (Platnick: para. 99)
• The Plaintiff has a history of using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics;
• The difference between the parties’ resources, both financial and otherwise, give rise to a power imbalance favouring the Plaintiff;
• By bringing the claim, the Plaintiff seeks to punish or obtain revenge against the defendant; and
• The Plaintiff has suffered minimal or nominal damages as a result of the defendant’s conduct.
[52] Mr. Brown’s lawsuit against Ms. Landriault does not have these hallmarks. There is no
evidence that he has previously engaged in litigation or threats of litigation.
[53] Ms. Landriault alleges that Mr. Brown is attempting to continue his emotional manipulation and abuse against her and trying to intimidate her in this litigation. He knows she has limited funds to defend herself and is trying to intimidate her into silence. He alleges that she had an abortion and refers to her employment.
[54] In the face of serious allegations of sexual and criminal violence, it is within his right to
bring an action to vindicate his reputation and clear his name. There is no evidence that he is
bringing this action as a punitive or retaliatory purpose as he alleges serious reputational damages
and mental health harm resulting from these statements.
[55] Nor do I find that there is a “pattern or attempting to use the legal system to serve his own
means”. Mr. Brown did not state that she was facing criminal charges but rather used the term that
he had a “peace order” and then corrected the terminology. He did not attend the police station to
harass her or silence her but rather to protect himself from what he says was harassment from her.
[56] There is no power imbalance nor does Mr. Brown benefit from any financial or power imbalance.
[57] A one-year delay in instituting a claim does not translate to a claim that is punitive or retaliatory.
Damages
[58] Justice Côté in Pointes stated that the weighing exercise was not simply an inquiry into the hallmarks of a SLAPP. The Court is to focus on the harm suffered or potentially suffered by the Plaintiffs, and to consider both the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue and the public interest in protecting the expressions at issue.
[59] In Pointes, Justice Côté outlined the factors the Court should consider in this analysis at para. 78:
[78] I outline below some further factors that may bear on the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b). I note that in Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 687, 426 D.L.R. (4th) 60, at para. 99, Doherty J.A. made reference to recognized “indicia of a SLAPP suit” (emphasis omitted). He recognized four indicia in particular: (1) “a history of the plaintiff using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics”; (2) “a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff”; (3) “a punitive or retributory purpose animating the plaintiff’s bringing of the claim”; and (4) “minimal or nominal damages suffered by the plaintiff” (para. 99). Doherty J.A. found that where these indicia are present, the weighing exercise favours granting the s. 137.1 motion and dismissing the underlying proceeding. The Court of Appeal for Ontario has since applied these indicia in a number of cases (see, e.g., Lascaris v. B’nai Brith Canada, 2019 ONCA 163, 144 O.R. (3d) 211).
[60] As further elaborated below, the court finds that Mr. Brown’s damages are more than
nominal as damages caused by defamation can include loss of opportunity and loss of reputation
as a result of the statements made by Ms. Landriault.
Has Mr. Brown established the existence of harm (monetary or non-monetary)?
[61] Ms. Landriault submits that he has not outlined his damages and that it is not clear if he has been banned from eSports as a competitor as there is no evidence, nor has he established harm or that this has affected his employment. She says he has not shown reputational damages as he has a new partner, is still working and she assumes he is a member of Ottawa Smash but he told her that he no longer wanted to be involved with Ottawa Smash. GBD no longer exists.
[62] At this preliminary stage, Mr. Brown is not expected to present a complete damages brief.
[63] At para. 71 of Pointes, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the Plaintiff does not have
to establish actual harm but must provide an evidentiary foundation that would enable the Court
to infer the existence of harm and the causal link.
[64] If the Court finds that the harm that has been suffered or is likely to be suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a result of the Defendants’ impugned expressions, is outweighed by the public interest in protecting the expression, then the Court should dismiss the action.
[65] In Subway Franchise Systems of Canada, Inc. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2021 ONCA 26, Justice Thorburn stated:
[85] Neither reputational harm nor monetary harm is more important than the other. Nor is harm synonymous with the damages alleged. The text of the provision does not depend on a particular kind of harm, but expressly refers only to harm in general: Pointes, at paras. 11-13.
[86] A plaintiff must simply “provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of the harm and the relevant causal link”: Pointes, at para. 71.
[66] Further at para. 55, she stated:
[55] Given the early stage of the proceeding, that damage assessment can be an ongoing process, and that such motions are meant to weed out clearly defective claims, there is only a limited assessment of the evidence from the motion judge’s inferences to be drawn from competing primary facts, the motion judge must avoid taking a “deep dive” into the ultimate merits and instead, engage in a much more limited analysis: Pointes (CA), at para. 78.
[67] He has also suffered humiliation and embarrassment that has impacted his overall general
mental health causing him anxiety and depression. Mr. Brown has outlined the damages he has suffered from the statements made by Ms. Landriault including mental and physical illness, sense of guilt, therapy expenses (even though some predate these expressions) and loss of reputation due to loss of business opportunities. Mr. Landriault has met his burden of the existence of harm.
The strength of the damages claims
[68] The “kind of case that should be removed from the litigation process through s. 137.1(4)(b) “is one where the plaintiff may have a ‘technically valid cause of action’, but suffers ‘insignificant harm’”: Pointes, at para. 98.
[69] Here Mr. Brown has set out damages with respect to therapy costs.
[70] The reputational harm suffered by Mr. Brown can be substantial. The expressions accused him of being a “child groomer”, “sexual predator” and alleged that he sexually assaulted Ms. Landriault and abuses women, children, and animals.
The evidence of financial damages and the evidence of general damages for harm to Mr. Brown’s reputation
[71] There is evidence of therapeutic costs incurred and claimed in this action.
[72] Not only must the monetary harm pleaded by the Plaintiff be considered in determining whether the harm is sufficiently serious, but so too must the harm to the Plaintiff’s professional reputation, even if it is not quantifiable at this stage: Pointes, at para. 71.
[73] General damages are presumed from the publication of libel, even in the absence of any proof of actual loss: see Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 1995 CanLII 59 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 1130, at para. 164.
[74] See Lyncaster v. Metro Vancouver Kink Society, 2019 BCSC 2207, at paras. 57-62 where the allegation was that the Plaintiff’s social circle had been negatively impacted as he had been labelled “an abuser and a dangerous predator”. He also provided affidavit evidence that he had mental and physical health issues and the British Columbia Supreme Court stated it was not surprising that at these initial stages of the litigation that he had not provided medical evidence. The court found there that he had demonstrated that he had suffered some financial, physical, psychological, and social harm and that there was a causal connection between the allegations and the harm suffered.
[75] At para. 62, the British Columbia Supreme Court stated:
[62] It should be remembered that not all expressions on matters of public interest serve the values underlying freedom of expression. In assessing the public interest favouring the defendants’ freedom of expression, a judge must assess the public interest in protecting the actual expression that is the subject of the lawsuit. The relevant expressions in this case concern the allegations criminal misconduct. In my view, there is reduced public interest in the publication of uncorroborated allegations of criminal misconduct to an excessively broad field. On the record before me, there appears to be a serious question of whether there is evidence corroborating the allegations made against Mr. Lyncaster. I am not satisfied that the public interest in ensuring the safety and health of members of the Vancouver kink community could not have been served by reporting the allegations of criminal misconduct to the police.
[76] In Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., 2023 ONCA 129, at para. 48:
[48] In assessing whether harm is sufficiently serious such that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression, this court held, in Lascaris v. B’nai Brith Canada, 2019 ONCA 163, 144 O.R. (3d) 211, at para. 41, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 147, that some statements are so likely to cause serious harm to a person’s reputation that the likelihood of harm being caused can be inferred.
[77] At para. 146, Justice Côté stated in Bent “reputation is one of the most valuable assets a person or a business can possess”.
[78] In the present case, there is evidence that Mr. Brown has community connections not only as an electrician at his father’s electrical company but with the gaming organization, Ottawa Smash as an administrator and moderator. This involves a multitude of individuals who belong to this gaming community.
[79] Mr. Brown is not expected, at this preliminary stage, to present a fully developed damages brief. Assuming the claim meets the merits-based analysis that precedes the weighing exercise, “a common sense reading of the claim, supported by sufficient evidence to draw a causal connection between the challenged expression and damages that are more than nominal will often suffice”; see Montour v. Beacon Publishing, 2019 ONCA 246, at para. 30, citing 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, at para. 90
Causation
[80] Mr. Brown need not prove harm or causation but must simply provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood with respect to the existence of the harm and the relevant causal link.
[81] In his affidavit, Mr. Brown has led evidence of business and reputational loss that, if connected in whole or in part to any of the allegedly defamatory statements, would result in a significant damage award in their favour.
[82] I find that Mr. Brown have established a temporal connection and have provided potentially credible evidence that the impugned expressions caused reputational harm.
The strength of the public interest in Defendants’ expressions
[83] Ms. Landriault alleges that she was a victim of abuse and that Mr. Brown has dangerous past behaviour. She alleges that he made statements against her with Ottawa Smash and that she needed to defend herself in the gaming community, which is male dominated.
[84] Ms. Landriault states that the public interest is high as intimate partner violence is prevalent in our society and that sexual abuse survivors needs to speak about their experiences. She states she needs to put it out there what she has experienced and let the community know what she has suffered.
[85] If this claim is allowed to proceed, there would be a chilling effect on survivors coming forward. She should be able to speak about what has happened to her.
[86] See Bullard v. Rogers Media Inc., 2020 ONSC 3084 at para. 103 where the court states that gender-based violence is a problem. Ms. Landriault submits that these types of defamation claims should not be a barrier for victims of sexual violence, and they should not be silenced. It is a “serious social problem in our society”.
[87] In Marcellin v. LPS, 2022 ONSC 5886, at para. 193, Justice Nicholson noted that there is a very strong public interest in public conversations about intimate partner violence. At para. 192 the court states that “victims and their advocates, need to be able to recount their stories without undue fear of reprisal”.
[88] However, in this case, the statements made about Mr. Brown are offensive and degrading. For example, examples of Ms. Landriault’s statements on X (Twitter) include:
January 22, 2022” …”I love how many fucking predators hang out in smash, even our local team has a child groomer on staff, just amazing this whole culture”.
May 11, 2022: “I was sexually assaulted by a staff member in my scene & was banned locally for proving he lied about me. Yet, our scene continued to harass me over this and support him. He was banned globally. I can’t write about this every time they do something new.”
[89] For the reasons set out above, the evidence establishes that Mr. Brown could succeed on their claims for financial and reputational harm and he has led evidence of “sufficiently serious” harm.
[90] The quality of the expression or motivation of the speaker are relevant factors in measuring the extent to which there is a public interest in protecting that expression. A statement that contains deliberate falsehoods, gratuitous personal attacks, or vulgar and offensive language may still be an expression that relates to a matter of public interest. However, the public interest in protecting that speech will be less than would have been the case had the same message been delivered without the lies, vitriol, and obscenities: Pointes, at para. 75.
[91] The purpose of anti-SLAPP legislation is not to dismiss legitimate claims for the vindication of Mr. Brown’s reputation after a former partner, Ms. Landriault, made defamatory remarks about him.
[92] For the reasons set out below, I conclude that Mr. Brown has met his onus under the last step set out in s. 137.1(4) (b) of the Courts of Justice Act. The harm that has been suffered by him as a result of the above-noted expressions is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting this action to proceed to a hearing on the merits outweighs the public interest in protecting the Ms. Landriault’s expressions.
[93] I conclude that the public interest weighs in favour of allowing the action to proceed to a determination on its merits.
[94] Accordingly, the Defendant’s s. 137.1 motion is dismissed.
Costs
[95] The parties have filed outlines of costs. Both parties claim costs on a partial indemnity basis in the approximate amount of $11,000.
[96] Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act deals with directions to the court regarding costs:
(7) If a judge dismisses a proceeding under this section, the moving party is entitled to costs on the motion and in the proceeding on a full indemnity basis, unless the judge determines that such an award is not appropriate in the circumstances. 2015, c. 23, s. 3.
(8) If a judge does not dismiss a proceeding under this section, the responding party is not entitled to costs on the motion, unless the judge determines that such an award is appropriate in the circumstances. 2015, c. 23, s. 3.
[97] In other words, the Plaintiff is not presumptively entitled to costs despite achieving success of the motion. The legislature does not wish to discourage s. 137.1 motions as they deal with the public interest and expressions and wish to encourage the public to be able to comment and make statements that are of public interest.
[98] The jurisprudence has followed the principle set out at para. 20 of the Anti-SLAPP Advisory Panel Report to the Attorney General that costs awards against unsuccessful defendants are intended to act as “costs sanctions against parties who bring frivolous motions for protection”: Ontario: Ministry of the Attorney General, October 28, 2010.
[99] In Thompson v. Cohodes, 2017 ONSC 2590, at para. 42 Justice Arrell declined to order costs as he was not persuaded that there was any inappropriate behavior on either side that would affect the exercise of his discretion on costs under s.137.1(8).
[100] In Canadian Standards Association v. Knight et al., 2019 ONSC 5630, Justice C. J. Brown found that the plaintiffs had rebutted the presumption that no costs should be awarded to them. The court found that there were none of the indicia of a SLAPP proceeding and there was no public interest in protecting the impugned expression. The court also found that a denial of costs to the plaintiffs could be viewed as encouraging meritless s. 137.1 motions.
[101] In this case, I do not see any reason to depart from that presumption.
[102] The s. 137.1 motion was not frivolous. Intimate partner violence is a serious matter, and this motion had some basis.
[103] It is a case of two individuals who had a tumultuous relationship and then embarked in a tumultuous separation.
[104] The record is replete with allegations by both parties regarding statements made against them. At some point, credibility will need to be determined.
[105] At this early stage, the court has only determined that this is not a SLAPP action.
[106] Accordingly, the court finds that this is not an appropriate case to order costs.
Justice A. Doyle
Date: December 17, 2024
COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-91537
DATE: 2024/12/17
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Skylar Brown, Plaintiff
-and-
Valerie Landriault, Defendant
COUNSEL: Jeff Saikaley and William Denham, for the Plaintiff
Sydney McIvor and Erin Durant, for the Defendant
REASONS FOR DECISION
Doyle J.
Released: December 17, 2024