Andrew MacDonald

The defendant brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to provide greater particulars in response to his demand for particulars in a sexual assault claim.

The plaintiff alleged that she was sexually abused by the defendant between 1993 and 1997/8 when both were minors.

The defendant sought specific dates, locations, and details of each incident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient particulars in her statement of claim to enable the defendant to understand the case he had to meet, that the defendant had already pleaded a defence, and that further details were appropriately left for examination for discovery.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to exercise their gatekeeping function regarding the respondent's expert witness.

The expert admitted during cross-examination that he did not write his entire report, lacked experience with the specific type of insulation installed, and had altered the scene before taking photographs.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to properly scrutinize and exclude the flawed expert evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, appealed the dismissal of her defamation, conspiracy, and negligence claims against four defendants (Dr. Angus Maciver, André Picard, Carly Weeks, and Alheli Picazo) under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act), and the associated costs order totaling over $1.1 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the claims were strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

The court affirmed that the "fair comment" defence was prima facie available to Picard, Weeks, and Picazo, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate "serious harm" causally linked to the defendants' expressions, which would outweigh the public interest in protecting free expression.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, distinguishing the case from general guidance due to its complexity and the number of defendants.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 25, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

At the police station, the appellant expressed confusion about her right to counsel, and the police officer offered her a binary choice of calling a free lawyer immediately or waiting until after she was released.

The appeal court found that this created a trap, as the appellant was not informed she would lose her 'hold-off' protection if she waited.

This constituted a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) and entered an acquittal.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The remaining defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for abuse of process, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with a co-defendant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the settling defendant did not switch sides or alter the adversarial orientation of the parties.

The settlement merely let a minor player out of the lawsuit in exchange for further documentary disclosure, which did not change the litigation landscape entirely.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against SATA Internacional – Azores Airlines for failing to pay compensation under European Union Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004 for delayed flights to and from Canada, framing the claim as a breach of contract.

The defendant moved to strike the claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The Federal Court held that the claim was not founded on Canadian federal law, as required by section 23 of the Federal Courts Act and the Montreal Convention's exclusivity principle.

The court granted the motion to strike without leave to amend and dismissed the certification motion.

The defendant appealed a Master's decision setting aside a Registrar's order that dismissed the plaintiff's defamation action for delay.

The defendant argued the Master erred by not upholding the dismissal after finding the plaintiff deliberately delayed the action, and by reversing the burden of proof regarding prejudice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Master applied the correct contextual approach to the Reid factors and reasonably concluded that the interests of justice favoured deciding the case on its merits, given the lack of significant prejudice to the defendant.

In an action alleging that former employees started a competing business, both parties brought motions regarding the sufficiency of the other's affidavit of documents.

The defendants raised issues with the formatting and metadata of the plaintiffs' e-discovery productions, which were largely resolved by explanations provided at the hearing.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to produce financial statements and mitigation documents.

The court also ordered the corporate defendant to produce financial and business records, but limited the scope to the aspect of its business that competes with the plaintiffs.

A timetable for the remainder of the action was set.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court decision.

The appellant, Bondfield Construction Company Limited, appealed from orders of Justice E.M. Morgan dated March 28, 2018 and May 29, 2018.

The respondents, The Globe and Mail Inc. and associated journalists, had brought a motion.

The Court of Appeal addressed whether CCAA proceedings against Bondfield precluded the court from addressing cost issues relating to the appeal.

The court found no reason to depart from the presumption in section 137.1(8) regarding costs on the motion, resulting in no order as to costs.

However, regarding costs on the appeal, the court awarded costs to Bondfield in the amount of $8,000, inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes, noting that the jurisprudential landscape had shifted significantly between the motion and the appeal.

Bondfield Construction Company Limited appealed the dismissal of its defamation action against The Globe and Mail Inc. under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP provision).

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that Bondfield failed to meet the requirement to show that the defendants had "no valid defence whatsoever." The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge had misinterpreted the statutory threshold.

The correct test requires the plaintiff to show only that a reasonable trier could conclude that the defendant did not have a valid defence, not that the defendant has no defence whatsoever.

The court found that Bondfield met this lower threshold regarding the defences of fair comment and responsible communication.

On the public interest balancing analysis, the court found that the case had none of the hallmarks of a classic SLAPP suit and should proceed to trial on its merits.

Mediamix Interactive Inc. appealed a Master's order that upheld the refusal of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario to produce nine redacted slides from a 24-slide PowerPoint presentation, on the basis of solicitor-client privilege.

Mediamix argued the Master erred in finding privilege and in not finding a waiver of privilege by the disclosure of the other 15 slides.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly determined the redacted slides were protected by solicitor-client privilege and that no waiver occurred, as the disclosed slides were not privileged.

The court affirmed that disclosing non-privileged portions of a document does not waive privilege over genuinely privileged parts.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $125 million defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the successful defendants sought full indemnity costs of over $650,000 pursuant to s. 137.1(7).

The plaintiff argued for no costs or modest partial indemnity costs, noting the claim had substantial merit but was dismissed because the defendants had a potentially valid defence.

Balancing the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs against the close nature of the ruling, the court awarded costs to the defendants on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $500,000.

The appellant, J.P.1, appealed convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal court found that the trial judge committed an error of law by engaging in circular reasoning when assessing credibility, effectively presuming the appellant's guilt before adequately considering the third branch of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence was based on a "common sense" conclusion that required first accepting the complainant's evidence as true.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order quashing notices of examination served on the responding defendants in relation to a Mareva injunction motion.

The responding defendants moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the order was interlocutory because it did not terminate the underlying action or resolve a substantive claim or defence.

The appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action after a seven-day trial, the defendants sought costs of approximately $88,000, arguing for substantial indemnity costs from the date of their Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiff argued no costs should be awarded.

The court found the Rule 49 offer defective as it did not specify costs, rejecting the claim for substantial indemnity.

Applying principles of proportionality, the court awarded the defendants costs fixed at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against a hotel and its night manager arising from statements recorded in an internal “Midnight Log” describing the plaintiff as intoxicated and belligerent during a dispute at the hotel’s front desk.

The court held that the statements were capable of referring to the plaintiff and were defamatory.

However, the court found the substance of the account was substantially true except for the characterization that the plaintiff was intoxicated.

The court further held that the preparation and internal circulation of the log and its use in an employee discipline meeting were made on occasions of qualified privilege, and there was no proof of malice.

As a result, the defamation claim failed, although the court indicated that damages would have been assessed at $25,000 if liability had been established.

The appellant appealed a six‑month custodial sentence imposed after guilty pleas to assault and possession of marihuana.

The sentencing judge had imposed the maximum available sentence for the assault, believing the Crown had proceeded by indictment rather than summarily, and inferred continuing fear by the victim from the absence of a victim impact statement.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that drawing adverse inferences from the absence of a victim impact statement was improper and that the sentencing court failed to properly consider mitigating factors including the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, and guilty plea.

Because the Crown had proceeded summarily, the maximum six‑month sentence without discount for mitigating factors rendered the sentence demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence for assault was reduced.