Cory Giordano

The Crown appealed from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's decision acquitting the respondent of refusing to comply with a breath demand.

Police had entered a private driveway to investigate an impaired driving complaint, found the accused asleep in a running truck, knocked on the window without response, then opened the truck door and detected a strong odour of alcohol.

The majority held that police had an implied licence to enter the driveway and knock on the truck window, but exceeded that licence by opening the door, constituting an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) given society's strong interest in prosecuting the serious offence.

Four justices dissented, finding that the police exceeded the implied licence from the moment they entered the property with the intent to gather evidence, and that the evidence should be excluded.

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitral award under section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and moved for leave to introduce fresh evidence.

The court found that the fresh evidence was not relevant to the issues before the arbitrator and would not have affected the outcome.

The application was dismissed as an impermissible appeal of the merits of the arbitration, as the parties had excluded any right of appeal in their agreement.

The court confirmed that section 46 provides only limited grounds for setting aside an award and is not a substitute for an appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a school board trustee, appealed the dismissal of his judicial review application challenging sanctions imposed by the Toronto Catholic District School Board for breaching its code of conduct.

The trustee had made inflammatory remarks equating LGBTQ+ individuals with criminals during a public meeting.

The appeal court upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the Board had the authority to reconsider its initial decision (which had not found a breach), that re-litigation doctrines did not apply to the administrative process, and that the Board's decisions reasonably balanced the trustee's Charter rights with its statutory mandate to promote an inclusive school climate.

The appellant mother appealed orders from a motion to change, challenging findings on material change in parenting time, child and spousal support variations due to income changes, and credit for matrimonial home expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings, emphasizing deference to factual conclusions and proper application of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant, a lawyer, sought declarations and mandamus to compel the production of aggregated civil trial data from the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) for research purposes, after his initial requests were denied by MAG and the Chief Justice of the Superior Court.

The application judge denied the requests, finding that declaratory relief would serve no practical purpose and that the open court principle did not extend to requiring the aggregation of bulk data.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's discretionary decision to deny the declarations on the basis that they would serve no practical purpose.

The court emphasized that control over judicial information rests with the judiciary, not MAG, rendering declarations against MAG ineffective.

The Attorney General of Canada was initially named as a respondent but the application against it was abandoned.

The applicant was convicted of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit and received a 15-month driving prohibition and a $3,000 fine.

After his conviction was restored by the Court of Appeal, he sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and moved for a stay of his driving prohibition and fine pending the leave application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that under s. 320.25 of the Criminal Code, it lacks jurisdiction to stay a driving prohibition unless leave to appeal has already been granted.

Furthermore, the court found that even if it had jurisdiction, the applicant failed to meet the test for a stay on the merits.

In a negligence appeal concerning injuries suffered after minors stole an unlocked vehicle from a commercial garage, the Court addressed whether the garage owner owed a duty of care to the injured passenger.

The majority held that while theft risk was foreseeable, the record did not establish reasonable foreseeability of personal injury from unsafe operation of the stolen vehicle in the specific circumstances.

Applying Anns/Cooper, the majority found the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie duty of care and dismissed the claim against the garage owner.

The dissent would have upheld the existing duty category for foreseeable physical injury and maintained liability findings.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a fee-sharing agreement between two law firms.

The appellants raised three issues: (1) the calculation of net fees under the agreement; (2) the imposition of liability on the corporate appellant based on a constructive trust; and (3) the costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings on all three issues, dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

On appeal from a damages award of $532,000 in a trespass and nuisance case, the appellants challenged the trial judge's quantification of damages, arguing the respondents failed to establish a reasonable and reliable basis for the award and should receive only nominal damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in her approach to damages assessment despite imperfect record-keeping by the respondent.

The trial judge properly considered gaps in evidence, the impact of the recession, and made reasonable inferences about lost productivity caused by the appellants' conduct.

The appellant, J.P.1, appealed convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal court found that the trial judge committed an error of law by engaging in circular reasoning when assessing credibility, effectively presuming the appellant's guilt before adequately considering the third branch of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence was based on a "common sense" conclusion that required first accepting the complainant's evidence as true.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.