Jennifer Lynn Chapman

The appellant, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury in a 1999 motor vehicle accident, appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision regarding his entitlement to attendant care benefits.

The LAT had awarded a minimal monthly amount, focusing on the care actually provided by his family rather than his need for supervisory care due to his inability to respond to emergencies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and granted the judicial review, finding that the adjudicator erred in law by failing to apply the correct legal test under the 1996 SABS and that the decision was unreasonable.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

This decision addresses costs following a settlement approval for a severely injured plaintiff, Joshua Johnson, from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF).

The court considered whether the Fund, on behalf of Cody Crouse, was liable for the plaintiffs' costs throughout the entire action, including appeals, and whether a Sanderson or Bullock order should be made for the Fund to pay the successful defendant Rankin's Garage's costs.

The court found that the plaintiffs were compelled by the MVACA to pursue all potential tortfeasors, including Rankin's, through all appeals to access the Fund.

It ruled that the court had the authority to award costs for all stages of litigation, including appeals, and that a Sanderson order was appropriate given the circumstances and the Fund's ability to pay, to prevent injustice to the plaintiff.

In a negligence appeal concerning injuries suffered after minors stole an unlocked vehicle from a commercial garage, the Court addressed whether the garage owner owed a duty of care to the injured passenger.

The majority held that while theft risk was foreseeable, the record did not establish reasonable foreseeability of personal injury from unsafe operation of the stolen vehicle in the specific circumstances.

Applying Anns/Cooper, the majority found the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie duty of care and dismissed the claim against the garage owner.

The dissent would have upheld the existing duty category for foreseeable physical injury and maintained liability findings.

The appellant commercial garage owner appealed a jury verdict finding him 37% liable for catastrophic injuries suffered by a minor who, along with a friend, stole an unlocked car with the keys left inside from the garage lot.

The Court of Appeal conducted an Anns-Cooper analysis and upheld the finding that the garage owner owed a duty of care to the minors, as the risk of theft and joyriding by minors was reasonably foreseeable and the garage owner had a responsibility to secure the vehicles.

The court found no residual policy considerations to negate the duty, noting that the minor's illegal conduct was properly addressed through contributory negligence rather than denying a duty of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend the statement of claim to add a declaration that she was a victim of crime under the Victims’ Bill of Rights, 1995 and to obtain substantial indemnity costs against the defendant who had pleaded guilty to dangerous driving.

The motion also sought summary judgment declaring the plaintiff a victim of crime and fixing costs payable by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The court held that the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action advanced 13 years after the accident and after the limitation period had expired, creating presumed non‑compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court further found the evidentiary record insufficient to justify enhanced costs under the Victims’ Bill of Rights and inadequate to support the requested cost award.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.

His insurer denied uninsured automobile coverage because the plaintiff was driving with a suspended licence.

The Minister of Finance, administering the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, brought a cross-claim on behalf of the uninsured defendant seeking a declaration of coverage.

The insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and cross-claim, arguing the cross-claim was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory condition regarding authorized driving did not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly provided in the policy, which it was not.

While the cross-claim was out of time under the Limitations Act, the court stayed the limitation defence in the interest of judicial economy.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle insured by the moving party, despite having a suspended driver's licence.

The other vehicle involved was uninsured.

The plaintiff sued the other driver and claimed uninsured automobile coverage from the moving party.

The moving party brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and a cross-claim brought by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, arguing the plaintiff breached a statutory condition by driving while suspended.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that under the Insurance Act, statutory conditions do not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly stated in the contract, which was not the case here.

The court also held the cross-claim was not statute-barred.