Jennifer Lynn Chapman

The applicant sought payment for a psychological services treatment plan and an award for unreasonable delay under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule following a 2016 motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found the psychological services were not reasonable and necessary, relying on an insurer's examination that concluded the applicant did not meet the diagnostic threshold for a psychological disorder.

However, the Tribunal granted a 20% award under section 10 of Regulation 664, finding the respondent unreasonably delayed approval of a previously submitted occupational therapy treatment plan for nearly two years without explanation.

The appellant, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury in a 1999 motor vehicle accident, appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision regarding his entitlement to attendant care benefits.

The LAT had awarded a minimal monthly amount, focusing on the care actually provided by his family rather than his need for supervisory care due to his inability to respond to emergencies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and granted the judicial review, finding that the adjudicator erred in law by failing to apply the correct legal test under the 1996 SABS and that the decision was unreasonable.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The applicant, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury, sought quantification of attendant care benefits and interest owed following a previous Tribunal decision.

The respondent had paid a lesser amount, unilaterally deducting alleged overpayments without proper notice or explanation.

The respondent argued the application was barred by res judicata and abuse of process due to a previously dismissed motion for clarification.

The Tribunal found it had jurisdiction and that res judicata did not apply as the quantification dispute was a new issue.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the differential calculated by the applicant's accountant, less an agreed top-up.

Furthermore, the Tribunal granted a 15% special award under s. 10 of Reg. 664, finding the respondent's failure to communicate its rationale for the deductions was unreasonable and inflexible.

The applicant, an uninsured pedestrian injured in a hit-and-run, sought accident benefits from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF).

MVACF denied a $1,950 in-home occupational therapy assessment and requested an insurer's examination (IE) by an occupational therapist, who deferred on causation.

MVACF then requested a second IE, which the applicant refused to attend.

The Tribunal found the proposed assessment was reasonable and necessary to address accident-related exacerbations of pre-existing injuries.

The Tribunal held the applicant was not barred from proceeding because MVACF's request for a second IE was not reasonably necessary, as the first IE improperly asked an occupational therapist to opine on medical causation.

The Tribunal also ordered a 40% special award against MVACF under O. Reg. 664, finding its conduct in adjusting the claim and maintaining the denial was unyielding and unreasonable given the applicant's vulnerability.

This decision addresses costs following a settlement approval for a severely injured plaintiff, Joshua Johnson, from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF).

The court considered whether the Fund, on behalf of Cody Crouse, was liable for the plaintiffs' costs throughout the entire action, including appeals, and whether a Sanderson or Bullock order should be made for the Fund to pay the successful defendant Rankin's Garage's costs.

The court found that the plaintiffs were compelled by the MVACA to pursue all potential tortfeasors, including Rankin's, through all appeals to access the Fund.

It ruled that the court had the authority to award costs for all stages of litigation, including appeals, and that a Sanderson order was appropriate given the circumstances and the Fund's ability to pay, to prevent injustice to the plaintiff.

The applicant, a cyclist injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) after the respondent insurer terminated them.

The adjudicator reviewed the medical evidence, including multiple Insurer's Examinations, which concluded the applicant could perform the essential tasks of his pre-accident employment as a prep cook/dishwasher.

The applicant failed to provide contradictory medical evidence to meet his burden of proof.

The application for both pre-104 week and post-104 week IRBs was dismissed.

In a negligence appeal concerning injuries suffered after minors stole an unlocked vehicle from a commercial garage, the Court addressed whether the garage owner owed a duty of care to the injured passenger.

The majority held that while theft risk was foreseeable, the record did not establish reasonable foreseeability of personal injury from unsafe operation of the stolen vehicle in the specific circumstances.

Applying Anns/Cooper, the majority found the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie duty of care and dismissed the claim against the garage owner.

The dissent would have upheld the existing duty category for foreseeable physical injury and maintained liability findings.

The appellant commercial garage owner appealed a jury verdict finding him 37% liable for catastrophic injuries suffered by a minor who, along with a friend, stole an unlocked car with the keys left inside from the garage lot.

The Court of Appeal conducted an Anns-Cooper analysis and upheld the finding that the garage owner owed a duty of care to the minors, as the risk of theft and joyriding by minors was reasonably foreseeable and the garage owner had a responsibility to secure the vehicles.

The court found no residual policy considerations to negate the duty, noting that the minor's illegal conduct was properly addressed through contributory negligence rather than denying a duty of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought accident benefits from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The parties reached a settlement on all substantive issues prior to arbitration, but the insurer failed to pay the agreed settlement amount of $476,037.97, arguing it could not be separated from the unresolved issue of costs.

The arbitrator found the insurer's conduct caused unnecessary and unfair delay, ordering the settlement amount and disbursements to be paid forthwith.

The arbitrator also assessed the applicant's legal fees, awarding $46,100.40 plus HST based on a reasonable allocation of hours for the complex file.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend the statement of claim to add a declaration that she was a victim of crime under the Victims’ Bill of Rights, 1995 and to obtain substantial indemnity costs against the defendant who had pleaded guilty to dangerous driving.

The motion also sought summary judgment declaring the plaintiff a victim of crime and fixing costs payable by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The court held that the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action advanced 13 years after the accident and after the limitation period had expired, creating presumed non‑compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court further found the evidentiary record insufficient to justify enhanced costs under the Victims’ Bill of Rights and inadequate to support the requested cost award.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.

His insurer denied uninsured automobile coverage because the plaintiff was driving with a suspended licence.

The Minister of Finance, administering the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, brought a cross-claim on behalf of the uninsured defendant seeking a declaration of coverage.

The insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and cross-claim, arguing the cross-claim was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory condition regarding authorized driving did not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly provided in the policy, which it was not.

While the cross-claim was out of time under the Limitations Act, the court stayed the limitation defence in the interest of judicial economy.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle insured by the moving party, despite having a suspended driver's licence.

The other vehicle involved was uninsured.

The plaintiff sued the other driver and claimed uninsured automobile coverage from the moving party.

The moving party brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and a cross-claim brought by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, arguing the plaintiff breached a statutory condition by driving while suspended.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that under the Insurance Act, statutory conditions do not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly stated in the contract, which was not the case here.

The court also held the cross-claim was not statute-barred.