Cynthia Barbara Kuehl

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal by 100 Bloor Street West Corporation regarding the calculation of realty taxes and a substantial indemnity costs award in a commercial lease dispute with Barry’s Bootcamp Canada Inc. The court upheld the motion judge’s decision requiring the landlord to use a single, consistent method for calculating realty taxes attributable to both the leased premises and the building’s parking garage, rejecting the landlord’s attempt to “mix-and-match” calculation methods.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, finding the original award excessive and reducing it to $300,000 plus disbursements.

The decision clarifies the contractual interpretation of lease provisions granting discretion to landlords and the principles governing costs in complex commercial litigation.

The applicants sought leave to appeal decisions of the Assessment Review Board that applied issue estoppel to dismiss their property tax assessment appeals.

The applicants attempted to re-open the 2016 valuation of their land based on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their profitability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, holding that subsequent market changes to business results do not constitute a change in the 'state and condition' of the land and are not a valid basis to re-open an assessment.

The appellants, a family, sued a hospital and medical professionals for medical malpractice after their son suffered a severe brain injury at birth.

The trial judge discharged the jury mid-trial and then dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for discharging the jury, which is a fundamental right.

The reasons were conclusory, did not explain which comments were prejudicial, or why corrective instructions would be insufficient.

The appellate court could not meaningfully review the decision.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant municipality brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff former city councillor's statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The plaintiff had sued for constructive dismissal, alleging she was forced to resign due to workplace harassment by another councillor.

The court found that under municipal law and the statutory framework, an elected city councillor is not an employee of the municipality.

Consequently, the employment-based claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action and were struck, with leave granted to amend the pleadings.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax classification of lands used for gravel pit operations.

The Board had classified more of the licensed land as 'industrial' rather than 'residential', interpreting the relevant regulation to include lands used for activities integral to extraction, such as processing, stockpiling, and movement of machinery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly interpreted the legislation in a manner consistent with the operational realities of mining and properly applied the statutory classification day based on the land's function.

The applicants abandoned their motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Toronto Local Appeal Body regarding minor variances.

The self-represented respondents sought costs for the abandoned motion under Rule 37.09(3).

The court recognized that self-represented parties may be entitled to costs for work that would ordinarily be done by a lawyer, but found the respondents' claims of $10,000 and $2,000 to be overstated.

The court awarded costs of $2,000 to one respondent and $400 to the other, representing a proportionate amount for their efforts.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision and interim decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal in respect to the questions of law identified in the moving parties' factum.

Consistent with the court's usual practice, no reasons were provided for the leave decision.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which determined that the current value assessment of a landfill site should exclude the value of a facility used to generate electricity from landfill gas.

The appellants argued the facility was a commercial activity, not used exclusively for landfilling activities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the generation of electricity from landfill gas is an environmental control activity required by the site's environmental compliance approval, and thus falls within the definition of landfilling activities under O. Reg. 282/98.

The applicant, a community development corporation, brought an application for a declaration that it is a 'local board' under the Municipal Affairs Act and therefore exempt from municipal property taxation under s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act.

The court applied principles of statutory interpretation, including ejusdem generis, and found that the applicant did not meet the definition of a local board.

The application was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $2,500.

The appellant, Simplicity Air Ltd., appealed a jury award of punitive damages to the respondent, Daniel Eynon, for workplace injuries.

The jury had awarded general damages and lost wages, reduced by 75% for contributory negligence, and $150,000 in punitive damages.

The appeal addressed whether punitive damages were properly left to the jury, errors in instructions, employer liability for employee conduct, and the quantum of the award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were adequate, the employer was liable for supervisory misconduct, and the punitive damages award was not irrational or inordinately large, especially given the employer's instruction to falsely report the accident.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval of a vesting order, ancillary orders, and a distribution order for the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers Inc. A creditor of a related company in receivership, Banwell Development Corporation, objected to the payment of post-receivership interest to Royal Timbers' creditors, arguing the interest should instead be paid pro rata to Banwell's creditors due to a potential shortfall in the Banwell estate.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the two receivership estates were separate and the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers were entitled to post-receivership interest from the surplus generated by the sale of Royal Timbers' assets.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeals did not meet the three-part test for granting leave.

In accordance with standard practice, no reasons were provided.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Toronto Local Appeal Body (TLAB) dismissing their application for minor variances.

Concurrently, the moving parties sought an internal review of the decision under TLAB's rules, and the TLAB Chair directed that a review of ten of the twelve variances proceed.

The Divisional Court found the motion for leave to appeal premature, as the administrative decision-making process had not ended.

To prevent fragmentation and misallocation of resources, the court adjourned the motion pending the final determination of the TLAB review process.

A case management teleconference was held to schedule a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The court set a timetable for the service and filing of materials, directed that the hearing proceed by Zoom videoconference, and provided instructions for the electronic filing of documents.

Following a successful appeal of a summary judgment order, a dispute arose regarding the settling of the court's order on costs.

The respondents argued that a portion of the motion judge's costs order related to a support motion should remain intact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the motion judge had awarded a global amount for all motions, which were intertwined.

The court clarified that the entire costs award below was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

Case management endorsement setting out procedural directions for two motions for leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeals Tribunal.

The court scheduled the motions to proceed by videoconference and provided detailed instructions for the electronic filing of materials, including factums, compendiums, and authorities.

The appellant wife sought damages for conspiracy against her husband and his family, alleging they diverted business proceeds to reduce her support payments.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing the conspiracy claim and awarded substantial costs against the wife.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by improperly bifurcating issues, misapplying the tort of conspiracy in the family law context, and making palpable factual errors regarding critical evidence.

The Court emphasized that the tort of conspiracy is a valuable tool to deter non-disclosure and ensure collectibility of judgments in family law.

The appeal was allowed, the partial summary judgment and associated costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

This decision addresses the costs arising from two applications brought by the Town of Oakville that were struck out by the court.

Clublink, the successful party, sought $137,903.70 in partial indemnity costs, while the Town argued for no costs or, alternatively, $30,000.

The court rejected the Town's arguments for denying costs, noting that the Town's counter-applications created an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

While acknowledging the extensive litigation context and the involvement of multiple senior counsel, the court found Clublink's requested costs excessive for a relatively straightforward motion to strike.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $65,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.