Cynthia Barbara Kuehl

The Township of Uxbridge brought a motion to amend the Schedule of Events to allow it to file Statements of Response after the deadline had passed.

Uxbridge argued that administrative challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic and the release of a significant Board decision regarding gravel pit valuation constituted exceptional circumstances.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the motion, finding that Uxbridge had made a conscious decision not to participate initially and that the release of a precedent-setting decision does not amount to an exceptional circumstance justifying an extension.

The Township of Warwick appealed the property assessment of an active private landfill owned by Waste Management of Canada Corporation.

The central issue was whether the valuation of the landfill under section 43.2 of O. Reg. 282/98 should include the market value of its remaining landfilling capacity.

The Assessment Review Board held that section 43.2 requires the exclusion of value attributed to the remaining landfilling capacity, as the regulation mandates valuing the land as if it were vacant industrial land.

The Board set the current value of the property at $6,387,000 for the 2019, 2020, and 2021 taxation years and found no equity adjustment was required.

The Township of Warwick appealed the MPAC assessment of an active private landfill owned by Waste Management of Canada Corporation for the 2019, 2020, and 2021 taxation years.

The central issue was whether section 43.2 of O. Reg. 282/98 requires the valuation of the landfill as 'vacant industrial land' to include the market value of its remaining landfilling capacity.

The Assessment Review Board held that section 43.2 establishes a special valuation regime that ousts the general market value approach under section 19(1) of the Assessment Act.

Consequently, the value of the remaining landfilling capacity must be excluded.

The Board determined the correct current value of the property to be $6,387,000 and found no basis for an equity adjustment.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $2,500.

The appellant, Simplicity Air Ltd., appealed a jury award of punitive damages to the respondent, Daniel Eynon, for workplace injuries.

The jury had awarded general damages and lost wages, reduced by 75% for contributory negligence, and $150,000 in punitive damages.

The appeal addressed whether punitive damages were properly left to the jury, errors in instructions, employer liability for employee conduct, and the quantum of the award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were adequate, the employer was liable for supervisory misconduct, and the punitive damages award was not irrational or inordinately large, especially given the employer's instruction to falsely report the accident.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval of a vesting order, ancillary orders, and a distribution order for the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers Inc. A creditor of a related company in receivership, Banwell Development Corporation, objected to the payment of post-receivership interest to Royal Timbers' creditors, arguing the interest should instead be paid pro rata to Banwell's creditors due to a potential shortfall in the Banwell estate.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the two receivership estates were separate and the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers were entitled to post-receivership interest from the surplus generated by the sale of Royal Timbers' assets.

The County of Wellington appealed the property tax assessments of six licensed gravel pits, arguing that the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) undervalued the properties and incorrectly classified them.

The Assessment Review Board determined the correct interpretation of section 6(2) of O. Reg. 282/98, finding that specific portions of the licensed areas actively used for or in connection with extraction, processing, and related activities fall into the Industrial property class, while the remainder defaults to the Residential or Farm class.

Applying the cost approach, the Board rejected the County's proposed valuation based on general industrial land and MPAC's formula based on marginal farmland, instead relying on a recent sale of a licensed gravel pit to determine a current value of $15,080 per acre for the land portion.

The Board found no evidence to warrant a reduction for equitable assessment.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeals did not meet the three-part test for granting leave.

In accordance with standard practice, no reasons were provided.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Toronto Local Appeal Body (TLAB) dismissing their application for minor variances.

Concurrently, the moving parties sought an internal review of the decision under TLAB's rules, and the TLAB Chair directed that a review of ten of the twelve variances proceed.

The Divisional Court found the motion for leave to appeal premature, as the administrative decision-making process had not ended.

To prevent fragmentation and misallocation of resources, the court adjourned the motion pending the final determination of the TLAB review process.

A case management teleconference was held to schedule a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The court set a timetable for the service and filing of materials, directed that the hearing proceed by Zoom videoconference, and provided instructions for the electronic filing of documents.

Following a successful appeal of a summary judgment order, a dispute arose regarding the settling of the court's order on costs.

The respondents argued that a portion of the motion judge's costs order related to a support motion should remain intact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the motion judge had awarded a global amount for all motions, which were intertwined.

The court clarified that the entire costs award below was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed the property tax assessment of a landfilling site, arguing that a landfill gas to energy facility should be excluded from the land's valuation.

The Assessment Review Board found that the facility, which generates electricity from methane gas, is an environmental control activity used exclusively for landfilling activities.

The Board also determined the facility qualifies as a 'gas collection system' under O. Reg. 282/98.

Consequently, the facility was excluded from the valuation, and the property's current value was set at $1,105,000.

Case management endorsement setting out procedural directions for two motions for leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeals Tribunal.

The court scheduled the motions to proceed by videoconference and provided detailed instructions for the electronic filing of materials, including factums, compendiums, and authorities.

The appellant wife sought damages for conspiracy against her husband and his family, alleging they diverted business proceeds to reduce her support payments.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing the conspiracy claim and awarded substantial costs against the wife.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by improperly bifurcating issues, misapplying the tort of conspiracy in the family law context, and making palpable factual errors regarding critical evidence.

The Court emphasized that the tort of conspiracy is a valuable tool to deter non-disclosure and ensure collectibility of judgments in family law.

The appeal was allowed, the partial summary judgment and associated costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

This decision addresses the costs arising from two applications brought by the Town of Oakville that were struck out by the court.

Clublink, the successful party, sought $137,903.70 in partial indemnity costs, while the Town argued for no costs or, alternatively, $30,000.

The court rejected the Town's arguments for denying costs, noting that the Town's counter-applications created an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

While acknowledging the extensive litigation context and the involvement of multiple senior counsel, the court found Clublink's requested costs excessive for a relatively straightforward motion to strike.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $65,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against several physicians following the death of a 47-year-old woman who died in hospital from an unknown cause, potentially a pulmonary embolism, acute coronary syndrome, or complications from sepsis.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant doctors failed to diagnose and treat a pulmonary embolism with full-dose anticoagulation.

The court found that the defendant internal medicine specialists and cardiologists met the standard of care, as their differential diagnoses and treatments were reasonable given the patient's complex presentation.

The court also found the plaintiffs failed to prove causation on a balance of probabilities.

The action was dismissed.

The Town of Oakville sought to designate Glen Abbey golf course as a cultural heritage property.

Clublink, the owner, applied under section 34 of the Ontario Heritage Act to demolish and remove the golf course.

The Town argued the application should proceed under section 33, which provides different procedural protections and appeal routes.

The central issue was whether a golf course constitutes a "structure" within the meaning of section 34.

The Court of Appeal held that Glen Abbey, being a product of significant construction and engineering comprising constituent parts intended to remain permanently on the property, was a structure within section 34.

The purposive and contextual interpretation of the statute, considering its legislative history and the evolution of municipal heritage planning beyond a "building-centric" paradigm, supported this conclusion.

The applicant, Clublink, owned the Glen Abbey Golf Course in Oakville and sought to redevelop it into a residential and mixed-use community.

The Town designated Glen Abbey as a cultural heritage property and passed five related by-laws, including a Cultural Heritage Landscape Conservation Plan By-law, authorizing the preparation of a conservation plan that required Clublink to seek Town approval for alterations to the golf course.

The application judge quashed all five by-laws and the conservation plan, finding them ultra vires, passed in bad faith, and void for vagueness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, upholding the validity of the five by-laws but quashing the conservation plan resolution on the basis that it effectively compelled Clublink to continue operating the golf course as a service, contrary to section 11(8)5 of the Municipal Act.

The moving party sought either to have the Court of Appeal reconstitute itself as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear his appeal immediately after the appellant's appeal, or to be granted leave to intervene as a party in the appellant's appeal.

Both the moving party and the appellant were injured in motor vehicle accidents and had their statutory accident benefits claims denied.

The moving party argued that both appeals raised the same or similar issues regarding the application of the two-year limitation period for disputing the refusal of statutory accident benefits.

The court dismissed both requests, finding that allowing the moving party to bypass the Divisional Court would be improper absent compelling reasons, and that efficiency alone was insufficient justification for such an extraordinary step.

An appeal concerning the constitutionality of security screening measures implemented at police headquarters.

The chief of police instituted a security protocol requiring all persons entering the building to pass through metal detection and bag screening.

A resident who regularly attended public meetings of the police services board refused to submit to screening and was denied entry.

The application judge found the security protocol violated freedom of expression rights and was not prescribed by law.

The appellate court reversed, holding that while the protocol limited freedom of expression, it was prescribed by law through the occupier's common law powers and the statutory duty to ensure safety under the Occupiers' Liability Act, and was justified as a reasonable limit under the Charter.