Sheila R. Gibb

In this uncontested family law trial, the court granted the applicant sole decision-making authority and primary residence of the child, a final restraining order against the respondent, retroactive and prospective child support with imputed income, section 7 expense contributions, occupation rent, defamation damages, and restrictions on future proceedings.

The respondent's pleadings had been struck due to his pattern of non-compliance with court orders, abusive and threatening behaviour toward the applicant and child, and abuse of the court process.

The respondent engaged in domestic violence, property destruction, harassment through social media, and defamatory posts.

The court found the respondent's conduct reprehensible and relentless, warranting comprehensive protective orders and financial remedies.

The court granted the applicant's motion to strike the respondent's pleadings under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules due to repeated breaches of court orders, failure to pay costs, and ongoing inappropriate conduct.

The respondent was precluded from participating further in the proceedings, and the matter was set down for an uncontested trial.

The court found the respondent's allegations of judicial bias to be without merit and determined that all lesser remedies had been exhausted.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order granting the respondent interim sole decision-making authority over their child.

The applicant was two weeks late in filing his materials, citing confusion over timelines and a brief period of incarceration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while the delay was short and explained, the proposed appeal lacked merit, would cause prejudice to the respondent and the child, and was not in the interests of justice given the high-conflict nature of the family litigation.

The applicant sought an interim 2-2-3 parenting schedule for their five-year-old daughter, N., following the parents' separation and the applicant's gender transition.

The respondent opposed, requesting a longer 'step-up' schedule.

The court considered N.'s best interests, noting her anxiety due to significant life changes and the respondent's role as primary caregiver.

The court ordered a phased 'step-up' parenting schedule, culminating in the applicant having parenting time 5 out of every 14 days, conditional on securing a suitable residence near the matrimonial home.

The court emphasized minimizing adverse impact on the child's well-being.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal and child support, section 7 expenses, and a preservation order.

The parties cohabited for a short period and had one child.

The applicant argued the respondent's declared income of $140,400 did not match his lavish lifestyle, which included luxury cars, designer clothing, and expensive watches.

The court imputed an income of $400,000 to the respondent based on a lifestyle analysis and unexplained cash expenditures.

The court also imputed $50,000 to the applicant.

The court ordered interim spousal support of $8,553 per month, table child support of $3,099 per month, and granted a preservation order over the respondent's condominium and investment accounts due to a real risk of dissipation.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 4, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support and interim disbursements following the breakdown of a 13-year relationship.

The parties enjoyed a lavish lifestyle, and the applicant was financially dependent on the respondent.

The court awarded interim spousal support of $72,000 per month, finding the applicant established a reasonable case based on the respondent's significant wealth and the parties' standard of living.

The court also awarded $200,000 in interim disbursements to level the playing field in the high-conflict litigation, noting the funds were necessary to pay legal and expert professionals.

Following a successful appeal of a summary judgment order, a dispute arose regarding the settling of the court's order on costs.

The respondents argued that a portion of the motion judge's costs order related to a support motion should remain intact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the motion judge had awarded a global amount for all motions, which were intertwined.

The court clarified that the entire costs award below was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

Jennifer Leitch sought an order to immediately list and sell the matrimonial home (the "Farm") without Anthony Novac's consent and to retain the net proceeds.

Anthony opposed, seeking to participate in the sale and have proceeds held in trust, with certain amounts paid to him for costs and chattels.

The court found Anthony unreasonably withheld consent by imposing conditions.

The court authorized Jennifer to sell the Farm with sole authority over negotiations and closing, subject to agreed-upon terms for listing and a minimum price.

The net proceeds, after payment of a $5,000 Divisional Court costs order, are to be released to Jennifer, rejecting Anthony's request to hold them in trust or for immediate payment of other claimed amounts, to ensure Jennifer's access to justice for ongoing complex litigation.

The appellant wife sought damages for conspiracy against her husband and his family, alleging they diverted business proceeds to reduce her support payments.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing the conspiracy claim and awarded substantial costs against the wife.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by improperly bifurcating issues, misapplying the tort of conspiracy in the family law context, and making palpable factual errors regarding critical evidence.

The Court emphasized that the tort of conspiracy is a valuable tool to deter non-disclosure and ensure collectibility of judgments in family law.

The appeal was allowed, the partial summary judgment and associated costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

Following a motion for temporary spousal support, both parties sought costs.

The court determined that the applicant was the successful party, as the motion primarily concerned the quantum of support rather than entitlement, and the final order was closer to the applicant's offer to settle.

The applicant was awarded costs fixed at $4,149.36 on a partial recovery basis.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a temporary spousal and child support order, arguing the motions judge failed to apply a shared parenting offset.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that even if a factual error occurred, the issue did not meet the test for leave to appeal.

The court emphasized that temporary support orders are designed to maintain a reasonable state of affairs pending trial, and errors are better addressed at trial rather than through costly interlocutory appeals.

The court issued reasons specifically to discourage the family law bar from bringing unmeritorious motions for leave to appeal temporary support orders.

The respondent Anthony Novac and third-party respondents (collectively "Novac/Sonco") brought motions for a preservation order and security for costs, respectively, against the applicant Jennifer Ann Leitch.

These motions followed a prior judgment where Leitch was ordered to pay significant costs.

Anthony sought a preservation order for Leitch's assets, including the Caledon farm property, and alternatively, its transfer to him based on a trust claim.

Novac/Sonco sought security for costs and preservation of the farm and artwork.

Leitch opposed, wishing to sell the farm and arguing against priority for creditors and lack of grounds for a Mareva injunction.

The court dismissed Anthony's request for the farm's transfer but granted the preservation orders for the farm and artwork in Leitch's possession, finding that Leitch's financial circumstances and prior unreasonable conduct justified securing the substantial costs awards.

The applicant, Jennifer Ann Leitch, brought a motion for a declaration of conspiracy and damages, while the respondent, Anthony James Charles Novac, brought a cross-motion for a decrease in child and spousal support.

The applicant's motion was dismissed, and the respondent's motion was granted.

This ruling addresses the significant costs sought by the successful respondent and third-party respondents (Novac/Sonco) against the applicant.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle, the complexity of the issues, the applicant's unreasonable litigation strategy, and the proportionality of the costs.

The court rejected the applicant's arguments for reducing costs based on the respondent's alleged misrepresentation of income or her limited means, emphasizing that the applicant, a litigation lawyer, understood the risks.

The applicant wife alleged that her former husband and his family (the third-party respondents) engaged in a complex civil conspiracy to hide his income and assets through corporate restructuring and family trusts, thereby defeating her claims for child and spousal support.

The third-party respondents brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the conspiracy claims, while the applicant brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

The husband also brought a motion to retroactively reduce his interim support obligations, arguing his income had materially decreased.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the third-party respondents' motion, dismissing the conspiracy claims, finding that the corporate transactions were undertaken for legitimate tax and estate planning purposes, not to harm the applicant.

The court also granted the husband's motion to vary support, significantly reducing his child and spousal support obligations retroactively to January 1, 2017, based on a material change in his income.

The mother sought a stay of an order requiring the return of two young children to their habitual residence in Tennessee, United States, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The mother had removed the children from Tennessee to Ontario without the father's consent.

The application judge found the children's habitual residence was Tennessee and that return would not expose them to grave harm.

The mother could not return to the United States due to immigration restrictions, while the father had a criminal record preventing entry to Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious question to be tried on appeal, no irreparable harm to the children, and that the balance of convenience favoured prompt return to the jurisdiction of habitual residence.

The father brought a motion under the Hague Convention for the return of the parties' two children to Tennessee after the mother unilaterally removed them to Ontario.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing the children had no habitual residence and raising an Article 13(b) defence based on allegations of domestic violence.

The court found that the children's habitual residence was Tennessee, as the family had a settled intention to live there.

The court dismissed the mother's Article 13(b) defence, finding she failed to establish a grave risk of harm or that Tennessee authorities were incapable of protecting the children.

The motion for the return of the children was granted.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the applicant wife brought a motion to compel further production of documents and answers to undertakings from the respondent husband and his father, alleging they conspired to conceal the husband's income and assets.

The court dismissed the request for pre-2012 documents as irrelevant to the conspiracy claim.

However, the court ordered the mass production of post-2012 emails, finding the respondents' search terms too limited, and ordered the production of certain solicitor-client files, finding the father had waived privilege by relying on a specific privileged communication to defend against the conspiracy claim.

The respondent, having successfully stayed a custody application due to lack of jurisdiction and secured the child's return, sought costs.

The applicant opposed, citing inability to pay and challenging the Family Responsibility Office's enforcement jurisdiction.

The court denied FRO enforcement for custody-related costs but awarded $100,000 in costs to the respondent, citing the applicant's egregious conduct, bad faith, and unreasonableness, and the importance of the issues, while considering the applicant's ability to pay.

In an international custody dispute, the mother sought custody in Ontario after removing the child from Egypt without the father’s consent, while the father moved to stay the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held the child was habitually resident in Egypt and that Ontario could assume jurisdiction only if the child would suffer serious harm if returned.

Applying the serious-harm approach equated with Hague Convention article 13(b) jurisprudence, the court found the sexual-abuse allegations were not credible, found no evidentiary basis for other alleged risks, and held nothing displaced the presumption that the Egyptian court would protect the child’s welfare.

The Ontario court therefore declined jurisdiction over permanent custody and ordered the child returned to Egypt under temporary CLRA relief.