Malerie Rose

The applicant sought to continue an ex parte order granting her a restraining order, sole decision-making, primary residence for children, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent moved to set aside the ex parte order, alleging the applicant made material omissions in her initial motion materials.

The court found that the applicant failed to fully and frankly disclose material facts, including details about the respondent's mental health treatment, her own mental health, police involvement, financial access, and the circumstances of the respondent's job termination.

Crucially, the applicant left the children in the respondent's sole care despite claiming he posed a significant risk of harm.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion and set aside the ex parte order, emphasizing the strict duty of full disclosure in ex parte proceedings and the lack of sufficient evidence to justify continuing the order.

The appellant, a novice driver, appealed a 30-day driver's license suspension incurred after pre-paying a speeding ticket.

He argued he was unaware of the suspension as a direct consequence of the plea.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that such a suspension for a novice driver is a direct penalty, not a collateral consequence requiring a *Wong* analysis.

The decision emphasized the heightened duty of novice drivers to inform themselves of driving regulations and consequences, noting readily available information sources.

The applicant mother brought a motion for interim child support against both the biological father and the step-father who stood in the place of a parent.

The biological father agreed to pay a monthly amount based on his reported income.

The step-father argued the motion should be adjourned until the biological father's true income could be determined, alleging intentional underemployment.

The court refused to adjourn the motion, finding it contrary to the child's best interests.

The court ordered the step-father to pay $1,609 per month in interim child support, calculating his obligation using a 'top-up' method based on the parents' combined incomes.

The court also granted in part the step-father's cross-motion for financial disclosure from the biological father, ordering production of tax returns and investment statements but finding requests for corporate valuations and tracing to be disproportionate.

Following a successful motion by the applicant father for a Section 30 parenting assessment, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The applicant sought full recovery of $13,704.08 based on an offer to settle, while the respondent argued for no costs or a maximum of $5,000.

The court found the applicant's offer to settle was as favourable as the final order and that the respondent's conduct in opposing the motion was unreasonable.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $11,017.50 inclusive of HST.

The moving party wife sought temporary retroactive and prospective child support, as well as a cash payment for her share of the responding party husband's pension.

The husband brought a cross-motion to sever the divorce and argued that retroactive support should be deferred to trial due to conflicting evidence regarding his rental income.

The court granted temporary retroactive and prospective child support based solely on the husband's employment income, deferring the determination of his rental income to trial.

The court also severed the divorce and deferred the pension issue to trial, as the separation agreement did not explicitly require a cash payment.

Following a family law trial, both parties sought costs.

The applicant father sought full indemnity costs of $103,581.45 based on an offer to settle, while the respondent mother sought no order as to costs due to mixed success.

The court found that the father was substantially successful on custody and child support, but the mother was substantially successful on access, relocation, spousal support, and equalization.

Given the divided success, the unreasonable conduct of both parties, and the father's lack of financial disclosure, the court declined to award costs to either party.

This family law proceeding under the Divorce Act addressed decision-making authority, parenting time, child support, and equalization of net family property.

The court found both parents capable but noted significant conflict, particularly regarding children's non-school activities.

Joint decision-making was ordered, with a mechanism for resolving disputes over extracurriculars.

Equal parenting time was granted, conditional on the Father relocating to the children's school district by a specified date.

Child support was ordered on a set-off basis.

The court made specific rulings on equalization claims, including rejecting the Mother's claim for household contents, accepting her loans from siblings, valuing Fern Property appliances at zero, and rejecting the Father's alleged loans to relatives and vehicle gifts.

Post-separation adjustments for the Fern Property were to be recalculated by the parties.

The Respondent husband brought a motion to vary a temporary spousal support order and to seek child support from the Applicant wife.

The court dismissed the motion to vary spousal support, finding that the issue was res judicata as the arguments had been previously considered by Justice Trimble, and in any event, no material change in circumstances had been established.

The court emphasized the high onus required to vary interim orders.

The Applicant wife agreed to pay child support for the two children of the marriage, and an order was issued for $266 per month, without prejudice to future adjustments at trial.

The applicant sought to vary an interim consent order for child access to establish equal parenting time and suspend child support, arguing it was in the children's best interests and consistent with an OCL report.

The respondent opposed, asserting the stringent test to vary an interim order had not been met.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no urgent problem or new development to justify changing the existing access schedule, and emphasized that an OCL report should be tested at trial before being relied upon to change a status quo.

Aysha Muzaffar (Respondent mother) brought a motion to vary an interim parenting schedule and to order a s. 30 assessment under the Children's Law Reform Act.

Aftab Sheikh (Applicant father) opposed the motion, arguing no material change in circumstances was required for variation of the initial "temporary temporary without prejudice" order, and that the assessment was unnecessary.

The court found that the existing schedule was in the children's best interests and that a s. 30 assessment was not warranted due to a lack of cogent evidence for disruption or clinical issues.

Aysha's motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with driving a hand-held communication device contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and calculated the net delay at 16 months and 19 days, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Provincial Court matters.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable and that he had not taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The motion was dismissed and the applicant was ordered to proceed to trial.

The father brought a motion under the Hague Convention for the return of the parties' two children to Tennessee after the mother unilaterally removed them to Ontario.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing the children had no habitual residence and raising an Article 13(b) defence based on allegations of domestic violence.

The court found that the children's habitual residence was Tennessee, as the family had a settled intention to live there.

The court dismissed the mother's Article 13(b) defence, finding she failed to establish a grave risk of harm or that Tennessee authorities were incapable of protecting the children.

The motion for the return of the children was granted.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion by Mr. Khan for increased access to the children, on which he was substantially successful.

Both parties sought costs.

Ms. Khan sought $16,941.36, and Mr. Khan sought $22,363.63.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and Rule 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, noting Mr. Khan's substantial success on the underlying motion and Ms. Khan's inflexibility regarding access.

Despite questioning the time spent by Mr. Khan's counsel given the issues' simplicity, the court fixed costs at $15,000 inclusive, to be paid by Ms. Khan to Mr. Khan within 90 days.

This costs endorsement followed a motion where the applicants' initial application was converted to an action, which they subsequently did not pursue.

The respondents sought costs for the motion.

The court determined that the applicants were not public interest litigants, as their claims were personal and pecuniary.

Consequently, the applicants were ordered to pay partial costs to the various respondents, reflecting the respondents' ultimate success in concluding the litigation, albeit not on the exact grounds initially pleaded.

In a family law proceeding, the applicant brought a motion seeking urgent relief and exemption from the requirement for a case conference prior to bringing a motion.

The court determined that the motion lacked urgency and directed that the matter proceed through a case conference, reserving the issue of costs to be determined on written submissions.

During the costs process, the applicant sent an unsolicited letter to the judge alleging that opposing counsel had withheld information and misled the court regarding urgency.

The court held that correspondence to a judge about a pending matter is inappropriate and declined to entertain the allegations through such means.

The court directed that if the applicant wished to pursue the issue he must do so through proper procedural channels before the court determines costs.

Following two competing family law motions involving interim support, parenting access, and related corollary relief issues, the court determined costs.

The applicant had been more successful overall, obtaining spousal and child support, although she did not receive the interim disbursement requested and did not meet or exceed the terms of her settlement offer.

The court also noted that issues of conduct and bad faith were difficult to determine at the interim stage and did not affect the analysis.

Applying a partial indemnity approach and recognizing divided success, the court awarded costs to the applicant.