Joanna Opalinski

The prosecution brought an application invoking the rule in Browne v. Dunn, alleging that the defendant breached the rule by introducing evidence of a vehicle identification number label/sticker during his testimony without first putting this evidence to the prosecution witness, Officer Brown, during cross-examination.

The defendant was unrepresented at the time he began giving evidence.

The court found that while the defendant's conduct may not have constituted a deliberate ambush, the rule had been met and the appropriate remedy was to permit the officer to be recalled for re-examination on the evidence adduced by the defendant regarding the label/sticker.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with driving a hand-held communication device contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and calculated the net delay at 16 months and 19 days, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Provincial Court matters.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable and that he had not taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The motion was dismissed and the applicant was ordered to proceed to trial.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution alleged that the officer observed the defendant holding a black Samsung cell phone while driving northbound on Jane Street at Finch Avenue West on December 14, 2016.

The defendant claimed she was holding a pack of Dentyne gum that was fluorescent and capable of being illuminated by ambient light.

The court applied the W.D. test for credibility and found that the officer's evidence was reliable and consistent.

The court rejected the defendant's explanation as implausible and found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with disobeying a stop sign contrary to the Highway Traffic Act under Part 1 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The charge was laid on November 12, 2014, and the anticipated trial date was May 18, 2017, representing a delay of approximately 30 months and 6 days.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Jordan, the court calculated a net delay of 21 months and 18 days, which exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Provincial Court matters.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The defendant brought a preliminary motion objecting to the officer's reliance on his notes to refresh his memory, arguing that the notes were created from a template in advance of the incident and could have been altered.

The court considered whether the officer met the three conditions precedent for using notes to refresh memory: (1) notes made at or shortly after the incident; (2) no changes, additions, alterations, or deletions since creation; and (3) independent recollection with need to refresh memory.

The court found that the officer satisfied all three conditions and permitted the use of the notes as an aid to refresh memory, while clarifying that the notes themselves are not evidence and that contemporaneity now goes to weight rather than admissibility.

The defendant brought a motion under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The central issue was whether service of the motion record on the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario via a third-party electronic faxing service ("Got Free Fax") constituted proper service in accordance with the rules of procedure.

The court found that electronic facsimile service through a third-party server does constitute proper service by facsimile, particularly where confirmation receipts demonstrate successful transmission and the service was effected within the required 15-day timeframe.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act for an incident on October 2, 2014, at a crosswalk on Howard Park Avenue in Toronto.

The Crown alleged the defendant struck a pedestrian's dog while accelerating away from a stopped position at a crosswalk.

The defendant testified he had stopped for the pedestrian crossing and honked to alert the pedestrian that her unleashed dog had entered the roadway.

The court found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and contained internal inconsistencies regarding the nature and extent of contact.

The defendant was acquitted as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway.

The defendant was charged with permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Crown alleged that by giving the keys to the vehicle to a friend, the defendant permitted the vehicle to be driven while uninsured.

The defendant testified that he explicitly instructed the friend not to drive the vehicle, giving him the keys only to allow prospective buyers to view the interior.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant permitted the operation of the vehicle, as the defendant's instructions were clear and unequivocal.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with speeding 62 kilometers per hour in a 40 kilometer zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the prosecution proved that the laser speed-measuring device was tested before and after the officer's shift, and whether the absence of specific testing times in the officer's notes invalidated the viva voce evidence provided at trial.

The court found that the officer's oral testimony regarding the testing of the device at the beginning and end of his shift (12 noon and 9 pm) was sufficient to establish the accuracy and reliability of the device, despite the lack of written notation of these times.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act and failing to surrender a motor vehicle permit contrary to section 7(5)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The incident occurred at a four-way stop intersection on August 9, 2012.

The Crown presented evidence from two civilian witnesses and a police officer establishing that the defendant entered the intersection at high speed and struck the victim's vehicle on the passenger side.

The defendant claimed the victim was travelling in a different direction and failed to stop.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence as inconsistent and implausible, finding it contradicted by independent witness testimony and physical evidence including tire scuff marks.

The court convicted the defendant on both counts, finding the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove without due care and attention and failed to produce her vehicle permit.

The defendant brought a preliminary motion to quash the Certificate of Offence for speeding under the Highway Traffic Act on the grounds that the inclusion of 'R79' in the code box on the certificate was prejudicial and violated the presumption of innocence.

The court found that the code notation did not deface the charging document, did not prejudice the defendant's ability to make full answer and defence, and did not violate the presumption of innocence.

The application to quash was denied.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant stopped at a red light holding a black BlackBerry device in his right hand with his thumb moving in a texting motion, while holding a dog in his left hand.

The officer continued to observe the defendant driving southbound while holding and using the device.

The defendant's agent argued that the prosecution failed to prove the device was a wireless device capable of texting.

The court found the defendant guilty, holding that the prosecution proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the device was a hand-held wireless communication device capable of receiving or transmitting communications.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant holding a black cell phone with both hands while texting on a highway.

The defendant was convicted after trial.

The court analyzed the statutory elements of the offence and determined that the prosecution must prove: (1) the person was driving a motor vehicle on a highway; (2) while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device; and (3) that the device was capable of receiving or transmitting telephone communications, electronic data, mail or text messages.

The court found that momentary handling does not constitute "holding" but that the defendant's sustained holding and texting motion satisfied the statutory requirements.

The defendant was charged with speeding 95 kilometers per hour in a 60 kilometer zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The court heard evidence only from the police officer who conducted the speed enforcement.

The key issues were whether the officer tested the laser device at the end of his shift and whether the officer was qualified to operate the device.

The court found that the officer's viva voce evidence established that the device was tested at the end of his shift and that the officer was trained and qualified to use the device.

The court convicted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with pedestrian fail to use crosswalk contrary to section 144(22) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant crossed Eglinton Avenue West in Toronto mid-block, approximately 50 meters from a designated crosswalk, and was struck by a vehicle.

The court determined that section 144(22) constitutes an absolute liability offence and that pedestrians have no legal right to cross a roadway mid-block unless using a marked crosswalk.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Crown alleged that the defendant permitted his son to drive an uninsured BMW on September 5, 2011.

The defendant testified that he did not give his son permission to drive the vehicle and was unaware that his son had taken it until police informed him five weeks later.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant permitted the vehicle to be operated, accepting the defendant's credible and uncontradicted evidence that no permission was granted.