P. Martin

An appeal of a destruction order imposed on a dog under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The appellants conceded that their dog attacked two individuals but argued that a control order, rather than destruction, was appropriate.

The trial judge found the dog unpredictable and dangerous based on the severity of the attack and the owners' perceived lack of vigilance.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge made several errors in law and fact, including improperly rejecting uncontradicted evidence about the dog's prior good behaviour, relying on facts not in evidence (neutering's effect on aggression), and drawing unsupported inferences about future escapes.

The appellate court vacated the destruction order and imposed a strict control order instead.

The plaintiffs in a certified price-fixing class action moved to amend the class definition to shorten the class period and exclude indirect purchasers of products containing hydrogen peroxide.

The remaining defendants did not oppose the amendment but argued it constituted a dismissal or discontinuance entitling them to costs, and requested the appointment of a new representative plaintiff.

The court granted the amendment, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada's trilogy on indirect purchasers justified the change.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments for costs, holding that the amendment fell under section 28(1)(b) of the Class Proceedings Act and was not an adjudication on the merits.

The representative plaintiff in a proposed class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the Canadian aftermarket oil and air filter market sought court approval of a settlement resolving the litigation.

The settlement provided for payment of $350,000, subject to an opt-out threshold, with a distribution protocol requiring significant purchase thresholds for direct recovery and a cy-près allocation to a consumer organization for remaining funds.

The court considered the risks of continuing litigation, including evidentiary issues, uncertainty regarding proof of conspiracy and price impact, and the pending Supreme Court of Canada decision concerning indirect purchaser rights.

Concluding that the settlement represented a fair, reasonable, and pragmatic resolution given the litigation risks, the court approved both the settlement and the reduced contingency fee arrangement.

The defendants moved to set aside default judgments entered against them in a construction-related debt collection and breach of trust action.

While the plaintiffs consented to setting aside portions of the judgments against certain defendants and specific claims, they opposed setting aside the remaining portions against the corporate defendants.

The court found that the defendants’ evidence of a defence on the merits was weak and inadequately supported, relying on an affidavit from corporate counsel lacking personal knowledge and providing minimal particulars.

However, considering the timing of service during the holiday period, inconsistent positions taken by the plaintiffs, and potential prejudice, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the remaining default judgment provisions on condition that the corporate defendants pay $300,000 into court as security.

The action was also ordered transferred from the Commercial List to the Toronto Region Civil List.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant holding a black cell phone with both hands while texting on a highway.

The defendant was convicted after trial.

The court analyzed the statutory elements of the offence and determined that the prosecution must prove: (1) the person was driving a motor vehicle on a highway; (2) while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device; and (3) that the device was capable of receiving or transmitting telephone communications, electronic data, mail or text messages.

The court found that momentary handling does not constitute "holding" but that the defendant's sustained holding and texting motion satisfied the statutory requirements.