Roger Rowe

This decision addresses the imputation of income for child support purposes where the father ceased working due to claimed mental health issues but failed to provide sufficient medical evidence or comply with court orders.

The court found the father deliberately under-employed without a valid medical excuse, imputed an annual income of $70,000 based on his prior earnings, and ordered child support accordingly.

The father’s failure to participate fully in the trial and produce medical witnesses led to adverse inferences and a costs award in favor of the mother.

The defendant, charged under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a lost evidence application under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He alleged that police improperly handled and stored his dashcam and memory card, leading to the loss of crucial video evidence that would have supported his defence.

The Crown argued that the defendant failed to prove a Charter breach, specifically that no evidence was lost or that police acted negligently.

The court dismissed the application, finding no violation of the defendant's Charter rights, as there was no evidence that footage existed or was lost due to police negligence.

This judgment concerns a trial for a Highway Traffic Act offence where the defendant was charged with making a right turn not in safety, resulting in a pedestrian fatality.

The court heard testimony from civilian and expert police witnesses.

The defence challenged witness credibility, identity, and the correctness of the HTA section under which the defendant was charged.

The court found the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in making the turn, striking and killing a pedestrian who was properly crossing.

The defence of due diligence was rejected, and a conviction was entered against the defendant under section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in a Highway Traffic Act charge involving a fatality.

The total elapsed time from information laid to trial completion was 62 months, significantly exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

However, the court meticulously analyzed the chronology, deducting periods attributable to defence delay (e.g., failure to retain counsel, changing resolution intentions, non-attendance), joint delay, and exceptional circumstances (pandemic shutdown, mistrial due to counsel conduct, illnesses).

After these deductions, the net delay attributable to the Crown or institutional factors was found to be 7.6 months (232.5 days), or at most 14 months under an alternative calculation.

As the net delay remained below the 18-month ceiling, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The respondent father sought an adjournment of his child support trial, arguing inability to work due to severe anxiety and depression, and his psychiatrist's unavailability for cross-examination.

The applicant mother opposed.

The court, balancing the need for finality in family proceedings with the father's diligent efforts and the psychiatrist's health issues, granted one final adjournment.

The order set strict conditions for the father to obtain and produce medical evidence, including potentially a new psychiatrist, and made the next trial date peremptory.

The defendant was charged with assault, assault with a weapon (knife), assault by strangling, and threatening to cause death, stemming from two incidents in August and December 2020.

The case involved conflicting testimony between the complainant and the defendant's daughter, as well as inconsistencies between the complainant's testimony and medical records.

Applying the principles of R. v. W(D), the court found the complainant's testimony lacked confidence and the defence evidence raised reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

The applicant father brought a contempt motion against the respondent mother for alleged breaches of a December 2021 final order, specifically regarding facilitation of parenting time, provision of government documents (birth certificate, passport), and a list of medical professionals.

The court found the mother was in willful breach of the order concerning parenting time and document provision, but declined to make a formal finding of contempt.

The court emphasized that contempt is a remedy of last resort, and alternative enforcement measures, such as temporary consent orders already in place, had rectified the non-compliance and were in the child's best interests.

The motion for contempt was dismissed.

This case concerns a child protection application regarding two children apprehended from their mother's care due to neglect.

The Children's Aid Society and the mother sought a supervision order for the children to return to the mother's care, while the father and paternal grandmother sought a permanent custody order in favour of the grandmother.

The court found that the mother had significantly addressed the initial protection concerns, engaged consistently with support services, and demonstrated improved parenting capacity and stable housing.

Conversely, the father and grandmother exhibited a lack of insight into risks posed by the father's criminal history and displayed persistent negative attitudes towards the mother, which could hinder the children's relationship with her.

The court ultimately determined that it was in the children's best interests to return to the mother's care under a six-month supervision order, with specified terms for access by the father and grandmother.

This child protection case involved an interim motion by the respondent mother to vary a temporary access order for her 8-year-old child, A., who resides with his maternal aunt and uncle.

The mother sought to lift supervision and expand parenting time, including weekend visits.

The court denied the mother's request for expanded unsupervised access, citing concerns about the child's diagnosed special needs, the mother's mental health, her inconsistent attendance at visits, and the aunt's rigid stance threatening to place the child in care if weekend access was ordered.

The court ordered the continuation of supervised and therapeutic access, emphasizing the need for all parties to cooperate and implement professional recommendations for the child's best interests and long-term stability.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a final custody order for the child to her father, S.J., under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The mother, A.P., opposed the motion, seeking the child's return to her care or more expansive unsupervised parenting time, arguing that genuine issues required a trial.

The father and the child's counsel (OCL) consented to the CCAS's proposed order.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered the child to remain in the father's primary care with sole decision-making authority, and specified supervised parenting time for the mother.

The respondent wife brought a motion for interim spousal support, both retroactive and prospective.

The parties separated 6.5 years prior, during which time the applicant husband paid all carrying costs for the matrimonial home where the respondent resided.

The court declined to determine retroactive support on an interim motion due to complexity.

For prospective interim spousal support, the court imputed a full-time minimum wage income to the respondent and ordered the applicant to continue paying the carrying costs of the home as the status quo until its sale, after which he must pay $4,840 per month in accordance with the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The prosecution brought an application invoking the rule in Browne v. Dunn, alleging that the defendant breached the rule by introducing evidence of a vehicle identification number label/sticker during his testimony without first putting this evidence to the prosecution witness, Officer Brown, during cross-examination.

The defendant was unrepresented at the time he began giving evidence.

The court found that while the defendant's conduct may not have constituted a deliberate ambush, the rule had been met and the appropriate remedy was to permit the officer to be recalled for re-examination on the evidence adduced by the defendant regarding the label/sticker.

The court awarded costs to the mother following a successful motion for temporary child support.

The mother sought $7,500 in costs for the motion and two case conferences.

The court found the mother was the more successful party, having obtained child support of $346 monthly starting June 1, 2016, a contribution to 2016 daycare expenses of $1,130, and fixed arrears of $5,974 payable at $125 monthly.

The father's late settlement offer and unreasonable conduct were considered, but did not rise to the level of bad faith.

The court awarded costs of $3,600 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, payable at $150 monthly starting September 1, 2017.

The appellant, a father in child protection proceedings, appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order varying his access to children from unsupervised to supervised pending trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the Superior Court order was interlocutory in nature, dealing with interim access pending trial, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court declined to transfer the matter to the Divisional Court, finding that section 19(4) of the Courts of Justice Act precluded such an appeal.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a costs endorsement following a two-day family law trial in which the applicant (mother) was granted sole custody of a one-year-old child, permission to relocate to Japan, and the respondent (father) was ordered to pay child support based on imputed income.

The mother sought costs of $4,258.71 while the father requested no costs award.

The court awarded costs to the successful party (the mother) in the amount of $3,600 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, payable in monthly instalments of $100 commencing April 1, 2015.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change a joint custody order dated October 25, 2013, claiming a material change in circumstances had occurred.

The primary change cited was the death of the applicant father's parents and brother in a carbon monoxide poisoning incident on March 16, 2014.

The mother argued this loss of emotional and financial support, combined with the father's alleged breaches of the joint custody order (including unilateral daycare enrollment and failure to communicate), constituted a material change affecting the child's best interests.

The court found that while a change in circumstances had occurred, it did not materially affect the care of the young child, who had adapted well to daycare and whose father had demonstrated resilience and good judgment in managing the tragedy.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the father.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion under section 65(1)(a) of the Child and Family Services Act to vary an order placing a child in the care of his mother and instead place the child in the temporary care and custody of his paternal grandparents.

The motion was brought following an Early Status Review Application due to concerns about the mother's ongoing alcohol abuse, her inability to meet the child's needs, and the child's emotional distress.

The court found that the society had met its onus to demonstrate a material change in circumstances warranting a change in placement in the child's best interests.

The order was varied to place the child with his paternal grandparents, with access to the mother at the discretion of the society.

The accused sought an extension of time to bring an application to quash his committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry on a charge of aggravated assault.

The request was brought approximately ten months after the committal order and was based on an alleged conflict of interest arising from one counsel representing multiple accused at the preliminary inquiry.

The court held that the evidence at the preliminary inquiry, including the complainant’s direct identification of the accused as the assailant, made committal inevitable.

The issue of conflict had not been raised before the preliminary inquiry judge, and the accused had acquiesced to continuing with the same counsel despite being advised of the potential conflict.

The court concluded that the interests of justice did not warrant extending the time to challenge the committal.

This is a costs decision following a one-day family law trial involving custody, access, and child support.

The respondent (mother) was successful in obtaining sole custody and child support.

The court found that the applicant (father) acted in bad faith by failing to comply with financial disclosure orders, providing inconsistent financial information, and stopping child support payments despite having the ability to pay.

The court awarded costs on a full indemnity basis for support issues and partial indemnity basis for parenting issues, fixing costs at $2,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST.

The court also ordered that the father could not initiate further proceedings without proof of payment of the costs order.

The father sought joint custody and 50% parenting time (or at minimum 40%) with his eight-year-old son.

The mother sought sole custody, day access for the father, retroactive child support from January 1, 2011 based on imputed income of $70,000, and designation of the child as a beneficiary on the father's health plans.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother, maintained the existing access schedule with minor modifications, imputed income to the father for the period of intentional unemployment, and ordered retroactive child support from July 1, 2011.

The father's poor communication with the mother, inconsistent parenting, failure to comply with court orders, and lack of respect for the mother's role as primary caregiver were determinative factors against joint custody.