Rochelle Fern Cantor

This decision concerns a motion under section 79 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, regarding the capacity of Carol Jacqueline Black.

The Court orders that Ms. Black undergo a capacity assessment, with her medical records and related materials to be released to all parties and the assessor.

The Court addresses the history of the parties' disputes, the involvement of various professionals, and the need for independent legal representation for Ms. Black.

The ruling balances the privacy interests of Ms. Black with the need for a fair process and the protection of vulnerable persons.

The applicant father brought a contempt motion against the respondent mother for alleged breaches of a December 2021 final order, specifically regarding facilitation of parenting time, provision of government documents (birth certificate, passport), and a list of medical professionals.

The court found the mother was in willful breach of the order concerning parenting time and document provision, but declined to make a formal finding of contempt.

The court emphasized that contempt is a remedy of last resort, and alternative enforcement measures, such as temporary consent orders already in place, had rectified the non-compliance and were in the child's best interests.

The motion for contempt was dismissed.

The applicant father brought a Motion to Change a 2017 final order that left his parenting time entirely at the respondent mother's discretion.

The mother conceded a material change in circumstances but sought to maintain highly restrictive, supervised-style access.

The court found the mother lacked insight, unjustifiably restricted the father's access, and failed to foster the child's relationship with him.

Relying on the Office of the Children's Lawyer report and the father's consistent commitment, the court significantly expanded the father's parenting time to include regular overnights and shared holidays, finding it in the child's best interests.

The moving party mother brought a motion to change seeking over $540,000 in retroactive child support and section 7 expenses for the parties' two adult children, primarily for the son's dental school expenses in the United States.

The responding party father argued that his support obligations had terminated under their separation agreement and that both children had unilaterally terminated their relationships with him.

The court found that both children remained dependants while pursuing their post-secondary degrees and that retroactive support was appropriate effective January 1, 2009.

However, the court declined to order the father to contribute to the son's dental school expenses or the daughter's section 7 expenses, finding that both children had unjustifiably and unilaterally terminated their relationships with their father.

The father was ordered to pay $129,000 in table amount child support arrears.

The applicant mother brought a motion to dispense with the respondent father's consent for international travel to New Zealand with their children for a funeral.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion seeking conditions for the travel and an order for their eldest child to continue at Mildenhall Montessori School, with tuition costs to be considered a section 7 expense.

The court granted the mother's motion to dispense with consent without conditions, dismissing the father's requested terms.

The court ordered the eldest child to continue at Mildenhall for the 2019/20 academic year, with the father solely responsible for the tuition, and adjourned the determination of whether tuition is a section 7 expense to trial.

The case was designated for case management by Justice Gilmore due to high conflict.

This case addresses a dispute between separated parents over the choice of school for their two daughters.

The applicant father sought to keep the children in their current school, St. Elizabeth Seton, which they had attended since Junior Kindergarten.

The respondent mother wished to transfer them to St. Edmund, a school closer to her parents' home, citing a shorter commute and higher Fraser Institute rankings.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" principle, found no compelling reason to change schools.

It prioritized the children's established friendships, stable environment, and relationship with the father over the mother's preferences and the academic rankings.

The court also critiqued the reliance on Fraser Institute rankings without expert evidence and noted the diminished weight of the OCL report due to lack of cross-examination.

The father's position was upheld, and the mother was ordered to pay costs.

The court addressed an application for advice and direction regarding the interpretation of "issue" in a 1977 will, specifically whether a child born outside marriage was entitled to inherit.

The court regretfully concluded that, due to the explicit temporal limitation in section 1(4) of the Succession Law Reform Act (which applied its new presumption of inclusion only to wills made on or after March 31, 1978), the common law presumption (excluding children born outside marriage) applied to the will in question.

Consequently, the grandson born outside marriage was not entitled to a share of the estate.

The parties separated and resolved property and spousal support issues, leaving custody, access, and child support for trial.

The applicant father sought joint custody and expanded overnight access, while the respondent mother sought sole custody and maintenance of the status quo.

The court found the parties to be in high conflict with poor communication, largely due to the applicant's conduct, including persistent lateness and uncooperative behaviour.

Consequently, the court awarded sole custody to the respondent.

However, finding that maximum contact was in the children's best interests, the court granted the applicant's request for expanded overnight access on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and alternate weekends.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining the sale price, distribution of proceeds, and interest following an application for partition and sale of a jointly owned property.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings regarding the initial purchase contribution and the respondent's entitlement to occupation rent due to ouster.

However, the court found palpable and overriding errors in the calculation of carrying costs, the allocation of real estate commission, and the award of pre-judgment interest on funds already paid into court or held in trust.

The appeal was allowed in part to correct these financial calculations.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's dismissal of his motion to vary spousal support, terminate daycare expenses, and reapportion section 7 child support expenses.

The appellant argued that the respondent mother's transition from a student to full-time employment constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the mother's employment was foreseeable and necessary given the father's continuous failure to meet his support obligations.

The court also upheld the motion judge's temporary apportionment of section 7 expenses based on the parties' 2006 tax returns, noting the father's failure to make full and frank financial disclosure.

The appellant appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside a contempt order against the respondent.

The respondent had been found in contempt for failing to secure his support obligations with an irrevocable letter of credit and to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal had held that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction under Rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure because the orders were for the 'payment of money'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting appellate judge that neither security order amounted to an order for the payment of money, and reinstated the contempt order.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its earlier reasons to address the disposition of monies paid as security for costs and the costs of earlier motions.

The Court directed that monies held in the respondent's solicitor's trust account be released to the Family Responsibility Office to credit the appellant's child support obligations.

Monies paid to the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice were ordered paid out to the appellant's counsel in trust.

The Court also ordered no costs for the appellant's motion for an extension of time or the respondent's motion for security for costs.

The appellant appealed an order granting a divorce judgment, arguing that the respondent was improperly served.

The appellant had served the respondent's solicitor's clerk with the divorce petition, but the respondent did not file an acceptance or admission of service.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no proper service under Rule 6(3)(b) of the Family Law Rules, as service of the application initiated a new case and there was no lawyer 'in the case' yet.

The appeal was allowed, the divorce judgment was set aside, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant, who had moved to the Bahamas and failed to comply with interim child and spousal support orders, was ordered to provide an irrevocable letter of credit to secure his support obligations and to pay security for costs.

When he failed to do so, he was found in contempt of court and sentenced to 45 days in jail.

He appealed the contempt order.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the appeal due to the appellant's wilful disregard of court orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the preliminary motion, holding that the court should hear the appeal because it challenged the jurisdiction to make the contempt order.

On the merits, the majority allowed the appeal, concluding that the orders to provide a letter of credit and security for costs were orders for the 'payment of money' under rule 60.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore could not be enforced by contempt.