Joanna H. Weiss

This decision concerns a motion under section 79 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, regarding the capacity of Carol Jacqueline Black.

The Court orders that Ms. Black undergo a capacity assessment, with her medical records and related materials to be released to all parties and the assessor.

The Court addresses the history of the parties' disputes, the involvement of various professionals, and the need for independent legal representation for Ms. Black.

The ruling balances the privacy interests of Ms. Black with the need for a fair process and the protection of vulnerable persons.

The appellant, Omar Kanama, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Ian Weinroth.

The CTO was issued after Mr. Kanama's previous CTO lapsed due to administrative error, and he was subsequently assessed for capacity without proper advance notice or full disclosure of his rights.

The Board's majority found no prejudice despite procedural failures, while the dissenting member argued the process was unfair and violated Charter values.

The Superior Court found the assessment process to be procedurally unfair due to multiple failures by the healthcare team, including lack of proper notice, misleading communication through the mother, and delayed provision of mandatory forms.

The court emphasized the importance of procedural fairness, especially for vulnerable individuals, and held that the Board erred in treating procedural fairness as a discretionary matter.

The appeal was allowed, and the CTO was set aside.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), seeking a conditional discharge.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's continued alcohol consumption, which increased his risk of violence and non-compliance with medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly considered alcohol use as relevant to public safety and that its decision was reasonable, given the need for safeguards to manage the appellant's risk in the community.

An individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in respect of sexual offences, and subsequently granted an absolute discharge by the provincial review board, challenged the provincial sex offender registry regime on equality grounds.

The majority held that the regime drew discriminatory distinctions on the basis of mental disability by denying those found not criminally responsible any opportunity for exemption or removal from the registry, in contrast to mechanisms available to those found guilty, and that the infringement was not justified under section 1.

The Court affirmed a tailored declaration of invalidity limited to those found not criminally responsible who had received an absolute discharge, suspended for twelve months, with the respondent granted an individual exemption from the suspension.

The concurring reasons of Rowe J. would have reaffirmed the Schachter framework for suspended declarations as grounded in rule-of-law considerations rather than adopting the majority's principled-discretion approach.

The partial dissent of Côté and Brown JJ. agreed on the section 15(1) breach and the suspension but would have grounded the suspension solely in the rule of law and declined to grant an individual exemption, which in their view exceeded the institutional competence of the Court and raised horizontal unfairness concerns.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a finding of his incapacity to make decisions regarding treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board misinterpreted the capacity test under s. 4 of the Health Care Consent Act, failed to consider a breakdown in the patient-physician relationship, and misapprehended evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on ample evidence, and correctly applied the legal test for capacity, including the requirement for corroboration of the physician's evidence.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the proper interpretation of section 23 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 regarding "necessary and ancillary treatment." The appellants, both found incapable of consenting to primary psychiatric treatment, challenged both their incapacity findings and the Board's practice of making separate findings of incapacity for ancillary treatments.

The Court of Appeal clarified that once a person is found incapable of consenting to primary treatment, section 23 automatically authorizes ancillary treatment without requiring a separate incapacity finding, even if the person is capable of consenting to the ancillary treatment.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated February 16, 2017, regarding an application under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, an involuntary patient at Brampton Civic Hospital, wished to attend the hearing of his appeal.

The respondent did not oppose the adjournment request.

The court granted the adjournment to a date to be fixed.

Justin Mitchell appealed the Consent and Capacity Board's decision that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Banik's finding of treatment incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of reasonableness, focusing on the appellant's ability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof, as per *Starson v. Swayze*.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, noting the appellant's contradictory evidence and disordered thinking, which precluded him from weighing risks and benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Board's finding of incapacity was confirmed for both anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The appellant, Z. (Z.), appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one confirming treatment incapacity for anti-psychotic and side-effect medications, and another dismissing a preliminary motion to void the incapacity finding due to alleged unlawful detention under the Mental Health Act.

The court rejected the "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument, affirming that breaches of the Mental Health Act's detention requirements do not automatically void capacity findings made under the Health Care Consent Act.

The court upheld the Board's finding of incapacity for anti-psychotic medications, finding it reasonable.

However, the court found the Board's decision regarding incapacity for side-effect medications unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that such treatment was proposed or discussed with the patient.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the finding of incapacity for side-effect medications, while upholding the finding for anti-psychotic medications and the dismissal of the preliminary motion.

Mr. Paspalovski appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Agrawal.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the Board erred in applying the test for incapacity, whether it misapprehended the evidence, and whether the CTO was invalid due to the 72-hour rule for Community Treatment Plans (CTPs).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the test for capacity, did not make a palpable and overriding error in assessing evidence, and that the 72-hour rule in the Mental Health Act does not require all parties to sign the CTP within that timeframe, only that the physician be satisfied the criteria are met and treatment is available.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding her incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication and a community treatment plan (CTP).

The appeal raised three grounds: the CTP's reference to a prospective referral to CMHA-Peel, the alleged withdrawal of the substitute decision-maker, and the Board's brevity in assessing the appellant's capacity.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable on all grounds.

L.W. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to insufficient medical evidence regarding L.W.'s capacity at the time of the hearing and the Board's failure to address the corroboration requirement for the physician's opinion.

While the court upheld the Board's discretionary decision to refuse an adjournment, it ultimately set aside the Board's finding of incapacity and ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted panel based on an updated record.

The appellant, J.S., appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) dated November 11, 2015, and another confirming her lack of capacity to consent to treatment prescribed under her Community Treatment Plan.

The Superior Court reviewed the Board's findings on the validity of the CTO, the reasonableness of its confirmation, and the finding of incapacity.

The court dismissed both appeals, upholding the Board's decisions, finding that a technical error on the CTO form was not fatal, the Board reasonably concluded that without the CTO, the appellant was likely to suffer substantial mental deterioration, and the finding of incapacity was reasonable given the appellant's inability to appreciate her mental illness due to the disorder itself.