Joanna H. Weiss

The applicants, grandchildren of the deceased, brought an application challenging the validity of two wills executed by the deceased in 2019 and 2020, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by the respondent.

The applicants sought production of financial, medical, and solicitor's records.

The respondent argued the application should be dismissed as the applicants failed to meet the minimal evidentiary threshold to require the wills be proven.

The court found the applicants met the threshold by adducing evidence of the deceased's vulnerability, sudden departure from long-standing testamentary intentions, and suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the challenged wills.

The court ordered the production of the requested records.

The applicant son brought an urgent motion to suspend the 2024 powers of attorney appointing the respondent daughter as the attorney for property and personal care for their incapable mother.

The applicant alleged elder abuse and neglect by the respondent.

The court found the applicant's evidence of misconduct unreliable and often contradicted by medical and functional assessments.

Applying the test for terminating a power of attorney, the court held the applicant failed to show strong and compelling evidence of misconduct or neglect.

The motion was dismissed on an interim interim basis, the 2024 powers of attorney remained in force, and the mother was permitted to return to the respondent's care.

The respondent was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $45,000.

This decision concerns a motion under section 79 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, regarding the capacity of Carol Jacqueline Black.

The Court orders that Ms. Black undergo a capacity assessment, with her medical records and related materials to be released to all parties and the assessor.

The Court addresses the history of the parties' disputes, the involvement of various professionals, and the need for independent legal representation for Ms. Black.

The ruling balances the privacy interests of Ms. Black with the need for a fair process and the protection of vulnerable persons.

The appellant, Omar Kanama, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Ian Weinroth.

The CTO was issued after Mr. Kanama's previous CTO lapsed due to administrative error, and he was subsequently assessed for capacity without proper advance notice or full disclosure of his rights.

The Board's majority found no prejudice despite procedural failures, while the dissenting member argued the process was unfair and violated Charter values.

The Superior Court found the assessment process to be procedurally unfair due to multiple failures by the healthcare team, including lack of proper notice, misleading communication through the mother, and delayed provision of mandatory forms.

The court emphasized the importance of procedural fairness, especially for vulnerable individuals, and held that the Board erred in treating procedural fairness as a discretionary matter.

The appeal was allowed, and the CTO was set aside.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), seeking a conditional discharge.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's continued alcohol consumption, which increased his risk of violence and non-compliance with medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly considered alcohol use as relevant to public safety and that its decision was reasonable, given the need for safeguards to manage the appellant's risk in the community.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her incapacity to consent to a Community Treatment Plan and upholding the issuance of a Community Treatment Order.

The court first determined that although the CTO had expired, the appeal was only partially moot and should be heard on the merits.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard of review, the court found no error in the Board's dismissal of preliminary motions regarding the procedural requirements of the CTO.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment, as she was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

An individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in respect of sexual offences, and subsequently granted an absolute discharge by the provincial review board, challenged the provincial sex offender registry regime on equality grounds.

The majority held that the regime drew discriminatory distinctions on the basis of mental disability by denying those found not criminally responsible any opportunity for exemption or removal from the registry, in contrast to mechanisms available to those found guilty, and that the infringement was not justified under section 1.

The Court affirmed a tailored declaration of invalidity limited to those found not criminally responsible who had received an absolute discharge, suspended for twelve months, with the respondent granted an individual exemption from the suspension.

The concurring reasons of Rowe J. would have reaffirmed the Schachter framework for suspended declarations as grounded in rule-of-law considerations rather than adopting the majority's principled-discretion approach.

The partial dissent of Côté and Brown JJ. agreed on the section 15(1) breach and the suspension but would have grounded the suspension solely in the rule of law and declined to grant an individual exemption, which in their view exceeded the institutional competence of the Court and raised horizontal unfairness concerns.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a finding of his incapacity to make decisions regarding treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board misinterpreted the capacity test under s. 4 of the Health Care Consent Act, failed to consider a breakdown in the patient-physician relationship, and misapprehended evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on ample evidence, and correctly applied the legal test for capacity, including the requirement for corroboration of the physician's evidence.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the proper interpretation of section 23 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 regarding "necessary and ancillary treatment." The appellants, both found incapable of consenting to primary psychiatric treatment, challenged both their incapacity findings and the Board's practice of making separate findings of incapacity for ancillary treatments.

The Court of Appeal clarified that once a person is found incapable of consenting to primary treatment, section 23 automatically authorizes ancillary treatment without requiring a separate incapacity finding, even if the person is capable of consenting to the ancillary treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board erred in applying the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the legal principles from Starson v. Swayze and reasonably concluded the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decision.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated February 16, 2017, regarding an application under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, an involuntary patient at Brampton Civic Hospital, wished to attend the hearing of his appeal.

The respondent did not oppose the adjournment request.

The court granted the adjournment to a date to be fixed.

The respondent physician brought a motion to dismiss the appellant patient's appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision on the basis of mootness and delay.

The Board had upheld a finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant had since been discharged but was later readmitted and found incapable by a different physician.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the appeal was not moot because a successful appeal would establish a prior capable wish that could protect the appellant from unwanted treatment.

The court also found no inordinate or inexcusable delay.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a physician's finding of incapacity to consent to treatment and confirming the renewal of a community treatment order.

The appellant argued the order was procedurally invalid because not all parties signed the treatment plan within 72 hours of the physician's examination.

The court held that the Mental Health Act does not require other participants to execute the plan within 72 hours of the physician's examination.

The court also found the Board's decisions regarding the appellant's incapacity and the likelihood of substantial mental deterioration were reasonable.

The appeals were dismissed.

Justin Mitchell appealed the Consent and Capacity Board's decision that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Banik's finding of treatment incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of reasonableness, focusing on the appellant's ability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof, as per *Starson v. Swayze*.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, noting the appellant's contradictory evidence and disordered thinking, which precluded him from weighing risks and benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Board's finding of incapacity was confirmed for both anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and a finding of incapacity regarding antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the appeal was moot due to the CTO's expiration, but the court found an ongoing dispute because the CTO had been renewed.

The court held that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant would likely suffer substantial deterioration without the CTO and that she lacked the capacity to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions due to her schizoaffective disorder.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication and upholding a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its capacity finding and that the criteria for the order were not met, specifically alleging a failure to provide prompt rights advice.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the correctness standard to questions of law and reasonableness to mixed fact and law, ultimately finding no error in the Board's determinations.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and ancillary medications.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the test for capacity and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably applied the statutory test and Supreme Court jurisprudence in concluding the appellant's mental disorder prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that she was incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant argued that her symptoms were caused by physical ailments rather than a mental condition, and that the Board misapplied the test for capacity from Starson v. Swayze.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test and reasonably concluded that the appellant was unable to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment because she could not recognize the possibility that she was affected by a mental condition.

The appellant, Z. (Z.), appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one confirming treatment incapacity for anti-psychotic and side-effect medications, and another dismissing a preliminary motion to void the incapacity finding due to alleged unlawful detention under the Mental Health Act.

The court rejected the "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument, affirming that breaches of the Mental Health Act's detention requirements do not automatically void capacity findings made under the Health Care Consent Act.

The court upheld the Board's finding of incapacity for anti-psychotic medications, finding it reasonable.

However, the court found the Board's decision regarding incapacity for side-effect medications unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that such treatment was proposed or discussed with the patient.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the finding of incapacity for side-effect medications, while upholding the finding for anti-psychotic medications and the dismissal of the preliminary motion.