Sarah M. Latimer

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The appellant challenged a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication treatment.

The appellant and amicus curiae argued that the appellant was denied statutory rights advice and that the evidence did not support the incapacity finding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant received proper rights advice as required by statute, that no additional rights advice obligation arose when the appellant later expressed intent to apply to the Board, and that the Board's finding of incapacity was supported by evidence and involved no palpable and overriding error.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment in a civil action arising from a criminal prosecution for fraud against Anthony Falasca.

The plaintiffs alleged malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance, failure to withdraw the charge, and abuse of process.

The court found that the claims relating to the criminal prosecution, including abuse of process, were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the action was commenced after the expiry of the limitation period.

The court declined to consider the separate abuse of process claim relating to a bankruptcy proceeding, as it was not properly before the court on this motion.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of discoverability and the application of limitation periods in prosecutorial torts.

This is an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) decision that found the appellant, P.P., incapable of managing her property.

P.P. argued that the CCB proceedings were procedurally unfair.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the procedure used by the CCB was indeed procedurally unfair, specifically regarding the granting of an adjournment to the assessor to obtain corroborating evidence and the decision to permit the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) to intervene as a party.

The court noted that the PGT's investigative role under s. 27 of the Substitute Decisions Act was improperly blurred with the voluntary assessment process under s. 16, leading to a lack of transparency and an unfair advantage for the PGT in controlling the hearing.

Emphasizing the high standard of procedural fairness required in cases affecting personal autonomy, the court set aside the CCB's decision.

This endorsement addresses costs following a guardianship application where the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) was appointed as guardian for Phary Saing.

The applicant, Konthear Saing, sought substantial indemnity costs against Sokly Saing and a non-party, Vothy Saing.

Sokly Saing and Phary Saing also sought costs.

The court found Phary Saing's offer to settle invalid due to the PGT's non-consent.

It declined to award costs against non-party Vothy Saing due to lack of notice and failure to meet the legal test.

The court ordered Sokly Saing to pay Konthear Saing $15,000 in partial indemnity costs, citing Sokly Saing's more significant conflict of interest and problematic conduct.

Konthear Saing and Sokly Saing were also ordered to each pay $282.50 to the PGT for its fees.

The costs of a prior capacity assessment motion were reserved to the judge hearing the balance of the main application.

The applicant moved to be appointed as litigation guardian and guardian of property for her sister, the respondent, in the context of an underlying application regarding the ownership of a shared property.

The respondent was assessed by a designated capacity assessor and found incapable of managing property and highly susceptible to undue influence.

The court found that the respondent required a litigation guardian and a guardian of property.

Due to severe family acrimony and conflicts of interest among the siblings regarding the property dispute, the court declined to appoint any family member.

Instead, the court appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as both litigation guardian and guardian of property.

The plaintiff, a nightclub operator, brought an action against the City of Toronto and a city councillor for misfeasance in public office, abuse of public office, unlawful interference with economic relations, and conspiracy to defame and injure.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants conspired with the Toronto Police Service to target the nightclub with searches and inspections to force its closure.

The court dismissed the action, finding no evidence of a conspiracy, bad faith, or unlawful conduct by the defendants.

The court held that the city councillor's statements were protected by qualified privilege and statutory immunity, and that the City was not liable for the actions of the police.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the proper interpretation of section 23 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 regarding "necessary and ancillary treatment." The appellants, both found incapable of consenting to primary psychiatric treatment, challenged both their incapacity findings and the Board's practice of making separate findings of incapacity for ancillary treatments.

The Court of Appeal clarified that once a person is found incapable of consenting to primary treatment, section 23 automatically authorizes ancillary treatment without requiring a separate incapacity finding, even if the person is capable of consenting to the ancillary treatment.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of Brian's Law, which amended the Mental Health Act to expand criteria for involuntary committal and introduce community treatment orders (CTOs).

They argued the law violated section 7 of the Charter by authorizing forced treatment with neuroleptic medication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of the challenge, finding that the legislation's highly individualized assessment criteria ensured it was not arbitrary, overly broad, or grossly disproportionate.

The court also dismissed claims under sections 9, 10, 12, and 15 of the Charter.