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Incapacity for primary treatment automatically authorizes necessary ancillary treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.
Two consolidated appeals concerning the proper interpretation of section 23 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 regarding "necessary and ancillary treatment." The appellants, both found incapable of consenting to primary psychiatric treatment, challenged both their incapacity findings and the Board's practice of making separate findings of incapacity for ancillary treatments.
The Court of Appeal clarified that once a person is found incapable of consenting to primary treatment, section 23 automatically authorizes ancillary treatment without requiring a separate incapacity finding, even if the person is capable of consenting to the ancillary treatment.
Leave to appeal granted to determine whether police owe a private law duty of care to potential victims of a known criminal.
The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.
The plaintiffs sued the police for negligence, Charter breaches, and public misfeasance after being victims of a drive-by shooting, alleging the police failed to arrest the known shooter.
The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions between two judges on similar pleadings and reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's novel approach to determining police liability.