David E. Litwin

Two consolidated appeals concerning the proper interpretation of section 23 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 regarding "necessary and ancillary treatment." The appellants, both found incapable of consenting to primary psychiatric treatment, challenged both their incapacity findings and the Board's practice of making separate findings of incapacity for ancillary treatments.

The Court of Appeal clarified that once a person is found incapable of consenting to primary treatment, section 23 automatically authorizes ancillary treatment without requiring a separate incapacity finding, even if the person is capable of consenting to the ancillary treatment.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated February 16, 2017, regarding an application under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, an involuntary patient at Brampton Civic Hospital, wished to attend the hearing of his appeal.

The respondent did not oppose the adjournment request.

The court granted the adjournment to a date to be fixed.

The applicant appealed a board decision confirming the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

By the time of the appeal, the CTO had expired and had not been renewed.

The court found the appeal was moot because a decision would have no practical effect on the parties' rights, and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue.

The court also held that the board's decision was reasonable and its reasons were sufficient, even though it did not explicitly detail the requirement for 'continuing supervision,' as the evidence supported the finding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant suffered a crush injury to his forearm requiring amputation when his arm became caught in a loop of rope during a tug-of-war event at a campground owned by the respondent Marina.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against the Marina and its principal, excluding key discovery evidence on technical grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in excluding discovery evidence of third parties and in concluding there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding vicarious liability of the Marina and its principal for the actions of the principal's son, who had provided the defective rope.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellants, The Regional Municipality of Sudbury and The City of Greater Sudbury, appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 17, 2015.

The appeal was unsuccessful.

The court awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $95,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

A tragic motor vehicle accident occurred on November 22, 2000, when a 20-year-old driver lost control of her vehicle on a snow-covered regional road during a winter storm and collided with an oncoming school bus, sustaining catastrophic injuries.

The plaintiff and her family sued the municipality for negligence, alleging failure to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair under the Municipal Act.

At trial, the municipality was found 100% liable for approximately $12 million in damages.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the trial judge's findings regarding statutory defences under sections 284(1.2) and 284(1.3) of the Municipal Act and the trial judge's rejection of a contributory negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that the municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of road refreezing and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the hazardous conditions that caused the accident.