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Sole decision-making granted; father’s parenting time restricted to supervised access.
A family law trial concerning decision-making responsibility, parenting time, and child support for a young child.
The court found credible evidence of intimate partner violence, coercive control, and inappropriate sexual conduct by the father, concluding that the child’s safety required strict supervision of parenting time.
The mother was granted sole decision-making responsibility, authority over travel and identifying documents, and a restraining order limiting the father’s proximity and communication.
Applying the Drygala framework, the court found the father intentionally underemployed and imputed income progressively over three years for child support purposes.
The accused was acquitted of entering a dwelling house with intent because the Crown failed to prove intent at the exact moment of entry.
The accused, a police constable, was charged with entering a dwelling house without lawful excuse and with intent to commit an indictable offence (criminal harassment) under s. 349(1) of the Criminal Code.
The court found that the accused did not have a lawful excuse to enter the complainant's residence, given the clear termination of their relationship and his deceptive conduct to gain entry.
However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite intent to commit an indictable offence *at the point of entry*, as particularized in the information.
The accused's intent to harass was found to have formed *after* entry, when he decided to unlock a door for future access.
Consequently, the charge was dismissed.
Accused acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of accessory after the fact following indictment amendment.
The accused was charged with attempted murder and related firearms offences following a shooting.
The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, as the accused was arrested shortly after the shooting in possession of the firearm used.
The court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the shooter or a party to the offence.
However, the court found the accused knowingly assisted the shooter by fleeing with the weapon.
The court amended the indictment to conform to the evidence and convicted the accused of being an accessory after the fact to discharging a firearm with intent to wound.
Firearms expert evidence matching spent casings to a recovered handgun ruled scientifically valid and admissible.
In a trial for attempted murder and firearms offences, the Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from a forensic firearms examiner to prove that spent shell casings found at the crime scene were fired by a handgun recovered near the accused.
The defence challenged the reliability of the expert's methodology, relying on a prior decision that rejected similar evidence.
The court admitted the expert evidence, finding the scientific foundation valid, the methodology reliable, and noting that the defence failed to put its critical literature to the expert during cross-examination.
Charter applications alleging excessive force, unlawful strip search, and delayed right to counsel dismissed.
The accused was charged with multiple firearms offences following a shooting and subsequent police pursuit.
At trial, the defence brought several Charter applications alleging excessive use of force by the Emergency Task Force during the arrest, an unlawful roadside strip search, excessive force during transport, and a delay in providing rights to counsel.
The court dismissed all applications, finding that the force used was necessary and reasonable given the accused's resistance and the dangerous circumstances.
The court also held that the roadside search was a lawful pat-down, not a strip search, and that the brief delay in advising the accused of his rights was justified by exigent circumstances including officer safety and the need for immediate medical assessment.
A minor breach of s. 10(b) occurred when officers asked questions before rights were given, but no evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).
Accused found guilty of pointing a firearm at police and possession offences following foot pursuit.
The accused was charged with pointing a firearm at a police officer and various firearm possession offences following a foot pursuit.
The court admitted the hearsay statement of an unknown dog-walker who pointed out the fleeing suspect under the spontaneous utterance exception.
The court found the officer's identification of the accused and observation of the firearm to be reliable.
The accused was found guilty of pointing a firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and breaching a prohibition order and recognizance.
Appeal of CTO renewal dismissed; statutory criteria inherently account for risk of deterioration if untreated.
The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of his Community Treatment Order (CTO).
The appellant argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by reading in a 'but for the CTO' requirement when assessing whether he met the criteria under the Mental Health Act, given he was currently asymptomatic due to medication compliance.
The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while words should not be read into the statute, a proper purposive interpretation of section 15(1.1) inherently accounts for the patient's history and the likelihood of deterioration if left untreated.
Children placed in extended society care with no access due to parents' history of medical neglect.
The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two young children were in need of protection and should be placed in extended society care with no access to the parents.
The parents had a history of child protection involvement, including the death of one child from malnutrition and the severe malnourishment of another child.
The parents sought the return of the children under a supervision order or placement with a kin caregiver, and requested access if extended care was ordered.
The court found the children in need of protection due to the parents' failure to acknowledge past medical neglect and their rigid adherence to religious beliefs that put the children at risk.
The court ordered extended society care with no access, finding that the parents' mistrust of medical professionals and the society would impair the children's future opportunities for adoption.
Appeal from Ontario Review Board detention order dismissed as Board lacks jurisdiction to issue Community Treatment Orders.
The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention order, arguing the Board erred by not considering a conditional discharge with a Community Treatment Order under the Mental Health Act.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the issue was not raised before the Board, the Board lacks jurisdiction to make a Community Treatment Order, and the appellant had a history of irregular medication compliance.
The court dismissed the mother's appeal, upholding the summary judgment placing the children in extended society care.
The mother (O.P.) appealed a summary judgment decision that placed her children in extended society care for adoption planning with discretionary access.
The motion judge had applied an incorrect summary judgment test.
The appellate court, applying the correct legal framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA), found no palpable and overriding errors in the factual findings regarding parental neglect, lack of insight, and failure to follow recommendations.
The court affirmed that extended society care was in the children's best interests, considering their stability with the kin caregiver and their mature understanding of their needs versus their wishes.
The appeal was dismissed.
The Court of Appeal varied an Ontario Review Board detention order to permit hospital-approved community living.
An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition regarding a detention order for the appellant.
The appellant challenged two aspects of the Board's decision: (1) whether the Board erred in making a detention order rather than granting some form of discharge, and (2) whether the Board erred in not including a term allowing the appellant to live in community accommodation approved by the hospital.
The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order but found the Board had misapprehended the hospital's evidence regarding a community living provision and failed to consider that evidence.
The appeal was allowed to the extent of inserting a clause permitting community living in hospital-approved accommodation into the detention order.
Motion to change support and cross-motion to set aside consent order for fraud both dismissed.
The applicant brought a motion to change a 2011 final order, seeking to reduce his child and spousal support obligations due to an alleged decrease in income.
The respondent opposed the motion and sought to set aside the 2011 order, alleging it was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the applicant's property purchases.
The court dismissed both motions, finding the applicant failed to prove a material change in circumstances and the respondent failed to meet the high threshold for fraud.
However, the court ordered adjustments to child support to reflect periods when two of the children were no longer eligible.
The court upheld a Crown wardship order, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision affirming a trial court order making two children Crown wards without access following the death of a third child in the parents' care from complications of vitamin D deficiency and malnutrition.
The appellants challenged the Crown wardship order on multiple grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel, abuse of process, and the trial judge's findings regarding the children's need for protection.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings that both children were in need of protection and that Crown wardship without access was in their best interests.
Appeal of an expired Community Treatment Order dismissed as moot; board's decision found reasonable.
The applicant appealed a board decision confirming the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO).
By the time of the appeal, the CTO had expired and had not been renewed.
The court found the appeal was moot because a decision would have no practical effect on the parties' rights, and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue.
The court also held that the board's decision was reasonable and its reasons were sufficient, even though it did not explicitly detail the requirement for 'continuing supervision,' as the evidence supported the finding.
The court dismissed a children's aid society's motion for summary judgment for Crown wardship, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the parents' current ability to care for the child.
A Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking statutory and protection findings under the Child and Family Services Act, and an order for Crown wardship of a child apprehended at birth.
The respondent parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of another child due to malnutrition and failure to provide necessaries of life.
Two other children had been made Crown wards without access.
The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the child was in need of protection and the appropriate disposition, despite the serious history of parental neglect and the parents' lack of demonstrated change.
Appeal dismissed; motion judge properly declined to hear moot appeal regarding restored capacity to consent.
The appellant appealed an order quashing his appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision that had found him incapable of consenting to treatment.
Before the initial appeal could be heard, the respondent determined the appellant had regained capacity, rendering the appeal moot.
The motion judge applied the Borowski test and declined to hear the moot appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and concluding the case did not raise issues of public importance.
Appeal of Consent and Capacity Board decision dismissed as moot following appellant's discharge from hospital.
The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a hospital.
Prior to the appeal hearing, the certificate of involuntary admission expired and the appellant was discharged.
The respondent brought a preliminary motion to declare the appeal moot.
The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case, as future proceedings based on the Board's findings were too speculative.
Charter application rejected; internet access breach of long‑term supervision order proven.
The accused, a designated long-term offender subject to a long‑term supervision order, was charged under s. 753.3(1) of the Criminal Code for breaching a condition prohibiting internet access except for employment purposes with written authorization.
The accused brought a Charter application alleging that police and correctional officials had tampered with his cellphone and planted electronic evidence, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.
The court rejected the allegations of evidence planting and found no Charter breach, concluding the defence failed to establish misconduct on a balance of probabilities.
Although certain cellphone browsing data was given no evidentiary weight due to uncertainty about its origin, other forensic evidence and witness testimony demonstrated that the accused accessed the internet to create and use an online dating profile during the prohibited period.
The court found the offence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appeal dismissed; Crown wardship upheld where kinship plan was unrealistic.
A mother appealed a Crown wardship and no-access order made following a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act.
The appeal challenged the trial judge’s findings regarding kinship placement with the maternal grandmother and alleged errors in weighing evidence, assessing the grandmother’s plan, and considering expert psychological evidence.
The court held that the trial judge applied the correct statutory framework under the CFSA, properly considered kinship placement, and made factual findings supported by the evidence.
The appellant failed to demonstrate palpable and overriding error or an error of law.
Fresh evidence regarding the grandmother’s post‑trial efforts did not justify disturbing the disposition given the child’s need for stability and permanency.
Sole custody awarded to mother; retroactive child support ordered based on father's imputed income.
A ten-day family law trial addressing custody, access, and child support for three children.
The father sought joint custody, specified access, and no child support obligation while in school.
The mother sought sole custody, supervised access, and retroactive child support from the date of separation.
The court awarded sole custody to the mother, established regular weekend access for the father in Toronto, and imputed income of $30,000 to the father for child support purposes, ordering $591 per month retroactive to August 2008.
The court found the father engaged in blameworthy conduct by not paying support and taking the position he had no obligation while in school.
The court also imposed restrictions on future litigation and criticized the conduct of both parties and their counsel during the trial.