Alexandra V. Mayeski

The court considered whether the plaintiffs could pursue a negligence action against a lawyer who drafted a will, after a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will (CAETW) had been granted.

The plaintiffs alleged the will failed to reflect the testator’s intentions, resulting in a partial intestacy.

The court held that the action was a collateral attack on the CAETW, which is conclusive as to the will’s validity and contents, and dismissed the action.

The court also addressed the principles of summary judgment, the legal effect of probate, and awarded costs to the defendants.

The applicants brought a motion to remove Tiffany Jean as Estate Trustee of the Estate of Warren Nelson Holbrook and for an interpretation of the Hotchpot Clause in Mr. Holbrook’s Will.

The court dismissed the motion to remove the Estate Trustee, finding that the applicants had not met the high threshold for removal, despite ongoing family friction and concerns about conflict of interest regarding a family business (Rejenmor).

The court provided directions for the future of Rejenmor, requiring its windup or sale within two years.

Regarding the Hotchpot Clause, the court adopted the Estate Trustee's interpretation, which treated lifetime advances to beneficiaries as gifts rather than loans requiring repayment, resulting in an unequal distribution where only one beneficiary would receive a residual share.

Maria Sophia Furtado, a tenant and caregiver to the deceased Endel Lindaja, sought an ownership interest in his condominium based on an alleged promise, unjust enrichment, or dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Estate Trustee, Tonu Peep Tosine, sought a declaration of ownership, an order for Furtado to vacate, and occupation rent.

The court dismissed Furtado's claims for dependant support and unjust enrichment, finding she was not a "dependant" and there was a juristic reason for any enrichment (free room and board for services).

The court declared the condominium wholly owned by the Estate.

However, the court also dismissed the Estate Trustee's claims for Furtado to vacate and pay occupation rent, finding she remained a tenant and any termination or rent claim must comply with the Residential Tenancies Act.

Maria Sophia Furtado, a tenant and caregiver to the deceased Endel Lindaja, sought an ownership interest in his condominium based on an alleged promise, unjust enrichment, or dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Estate Trustee, Tonu Peep Tosine, sought a declaration of ownership, an order for Furtado to vacate, and occupation rent.

The court dismissed Furtado's claims for dependant support and unjust enrichment, finding she was not a "dependant" and there was a juristic reason for any enrichment (free room and board for services).

The court declared the condominium wholly owned by the Estate.

However, the court also dismissed the Estate Trustee's claims for Furtado to vacate and pay occupation rent, finding she remained a tenant and any termination or rent claim must comply with the Residential Tenancies Act.

This appeal concerned the rectification of a will.

The Estate Trustee sought to rectify the will of the deceased, John Ihnatowych, to exclude his biological son from a prior relationship and that son's children, arguing John intended to benefit only his children from his marriage and their offspring.

The application judge granted rectification, finding the will did not accurately reflect the testator's instructions to his lawyer.

The appellants (the biological son and his children) appealed, arguing the judge applied an incorrect test for rectification and misassessed the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the application judge correctly applied the test for will rectification, which permits correction when a testator's instructions are not carried out.

The court distinguished the test for rectification of agreements from that of unilateral wills and found the evidence of the testator's clear instructions to his lawyer was sufficient to support the rectification.

The applicant, Ulana Olha Gorgi, as sole Estate Trustee, sought to rectify the Last Will and Testament of John Ihnatowych to limit the beneficiaries of the residue and grandchildren clauses to his biological children, Ulana and Markian, and their children, thereby excluding Alexander Erik de Berner and his children, who claimed to be the deceased's biological issue and grandchildren.

The court found that the drafting solicitor failed to accurately reflect the testator's clear instructions, which consistently indicated an intent to benefit only Ulana and Markian and their children.

The application for rectification was granted, and the Notice of Objection filed by the de Berner Respondents was removed.

The appellant, W.C., appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board (the "Board") that confirmed his incapacity to consent to or refuse antipsychotic medication.

W.C. argued that the Board erred by accepting evidence obtained during an unlawful detention and by misinterpreting the test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 (HCCA).

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the invalidity of the appellant's admission under the Mental Health Act did not void the capacity assessment under the HCCA, and that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply in this administrative context.

The court also found that the Board's application of the HCCA capacity test was reasonable, as the Board's conclusion that W.C. was unable to weigh the foreseeable outcomes of treatment was rooted in the evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board erred in applying the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the legal principles from Starson v. Swayze and reasonably concluded the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decision.

The respondent physician brought a motion to dismiss the appellant patient's appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision on the basis of mootness and delay.

The Board had upheld a finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant had since been discharged but was later readmitted and found incapable by a different physician.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the appeal was not moot because a successful appeal would establish a prior capable wish that could protect the appellant from unwanted treatment.

The court also found no inordinate or inexcusable delay.

Two consolidated appeals concerning guardianship and personal care arrangements for an elderly woman with Alzheimer's disease.

The applications judge appointed one daughter as guardian of personal care and a trust company as guardian of property, with compensation awarded to the daughter for past care services.

A subsequent motion to vary the guardianship order was heard based on changed circumstances.

The appellants challenged the guardianship appointments, the compensation award, and alleged judicial bias and misconduct by the section 3 counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no error in the applications judge's decisions and rejecting allegations of bias and misconduct.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a hospital.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the certificate of involuntary admission expired and the appellant was discharged.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion to declare the appeal moot.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case, as future proceedings based on the Board's findings were too speculative.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order and her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Community Treatment Order expired and was not renewed.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals on the basis of mootness.

The court granted the motion and quashed the appeals, finding that there was no longer a live controversy and a decision would have no practical effect.