Marvin Joel Huberman

The applicant, convicted of planned and deliberate first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code for judicial screening of a "faint hope" application to reduce his parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the statutory factors under ss. 745.61 and 745.63, including the horrific nature of the offence, the applicant's post-offence conduct, his purported acceptance of responsibility and remorse, his conduct in custody, victim impact evidence, and risk assessments.

Despite acknowledging some genuine progress in custody and low to low-moderate risk of reoffending, the court found that the applicant's late-breaking claim of remorse was opportunistic and not genuine, his criminal thinking remained entrenched, and there was no reasonable prospect a unanimous jury would reduce his parole ineligibility.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder for his role in a contract killing, brought a faint hope application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code seeking to reduce his 25-year parole ineligibility period.

The court conducted a judicial screening to determine if there was a reasonable prospect of success before a jury.

Despite some recent positive behaviour in custody, the court dismissed the application, citing the heinous nature of the contract killing, the applicant's failure to fully accept responsibility, and his extensive history of institutional misconduct.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner decision ordering a hospital to disclose a linen services contract and a memorandum summarizing its terms.

The applicant argued the records contained financial information supplied in confidence during a bid process, exempting them from disclosure under s. 17(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator reasonably concluded that the contract was the product of negotiations and the information was mutually generated, not supplied in confidence.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, breach of a weapons prohibition, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown and defence agreed that the appropriate sentence before pre-sentence custody credit was seven years.

The court considered the exceptionally harsh conditions of the offender's pre-sentence custody, including frequent lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

Applying the principles from Duncan and Marshall, the court reduced the otherwise appropriate sentence by two years to account for these harsh conditions, resulting in a five-year sentence.

After applying enhanced credit for time served, the offender was sentenced to 98 days going forward.

The court issued a protective order on consent of the parties in a case involving allegations of appropriation and misuse of confidential technical and business information.

The order governs the handling and protection of confidential documents and information exchanged during discovery, requiring advance notice before filing such materials in court, but explicitly stating it does not constitute a sealing order or publication ban.

The court also provided specific case management directions for the litigation.

This is the first case management endorsement for an action accepted into the Civil Case Management Pilot Project.

The court outlined the purpose of case management, emphasizing efficiency and proportionality.

The parties had agreed on a Discovery Plan.

A joint request for a "Confidentiality Order" which constituted a sealing order, was declined without substantive determination because it required a formal motion satisfying the Supreme Court's test for restricting access to the court.

The endorsement provided specific directions for documentary production, examinations for discovery, and the scheduling of future motions, including for a sealing order or security for costs.

It also set the date for the next case management conference and general directions for cooperation and efficiency.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $187,500 in commission from the defendant for an alleged breach of a Buyer Representation Agreement.

The defendant opposed the motion and maintained a counterclaim for damages, alleging the agreement was incomplete when signed and backdated.

The court found significant contradictory evidence regarding the execution and terms of the agreement, concluding there were genuine issues requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, as the use of enhanced fact-finding powers would not be in the interests of justice.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered the disclosure of a KPMG forensic investigation report prepared for Algoma Public Health concerning potential conflicts of interest in the hiring of an interim Chief Financial Officer with a criminal record.

The report contained personal information of Dr. Kim Barker, the former Medical Officer of Health and Chief Executive Officer.

The Commissioner found that although the personal information was exempt from disclosure under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the public interest override under section 16 applied, warranting full disclosure.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decisions, finding the reasons inadequate because the Commissioner failed to identify each piece of protected personal information and separately weigh it against the public interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Commissioner's reasons were adequate and his decision reasonable, rejecting the requirement for a piece-by-piece analysis in all circumstances.

This is a costs endorsement following a partial appeal of a trial judgment concerning adverse possession and prescriptive easements.

The appellants successfully set aside the trial judge's finding that the respondent was entitled to a prescriptive easement over a cedar trail, but the appellants' appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Court of Appeal reduced the trial judge's costs award from $42,954.63 to $32,000, finding that although the respondent lost on the cedar trail issue, he still bettered the offer to settle and his claims to adverse possession of the house lands and a prescriptive easement over the laneway were more significant than the cedar trail claim.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between neighbouring property owners near Markdale, Ontario.

The respondent claimed possessory title to a portion of the appellants' land where his house and outbuildings were situated, and prescriptive easements over a cedar trail and laneway.

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent on all claims.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the findings regarding possessory title and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the possessory title finding and the laneway easement but set aside the cedar trail easement, finding insufficient evidence of continuous use for a utility purpose as required by law.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment order requiring it to pay HST to the respondent supplier.

The central issue was whether a supplier can issue invoices disclosing HST payable after the supply transaction has occurred, or whether such disclosure must be made at the time of the transaction to comply with section 223(1) of the Excise Tax Act.

The respondent sold unrefined gold to the appellant over a two-year period without collecting or remitting HST.

After a CRA audit, the respondent issued invoices months later demanding payment of the HST.

The court held that section 223(1) is silent on timing and permits post-transaction invoices, affirming the summary judgment.

An appeal concerning when an international commercial arbitration award becomes "binding" on the parties for purposes of judicial recognition and enforcement under the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The appellants obtained an arbitration award from a rabbinical court in New York for significantly less than sought.

After unsuccessfully applying to set aside the award, they sought recognition and enforcement.

The respondents opposed on the ground that the award had not yet become binding because they intended to pursue further issues before the arbitral tribunal.

The application judge dismissed the recognition application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the award was binding and should be recognized and enforced.

The court clarified that the potential jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain new issues about post-award events does not affect the binding nature of the award.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of an unredacted forensic investigation report.

The Commissioner found that the report contained personal information exempt from disclosure under s. 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, but ordered full disclosure based on the public interest override in s. 16.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, holding that the Commissioner's failure to identify the specific personal information exempted under s. 14 made it impossible to assess the reasonableness of the s. 16 balancing analysis.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $1,573,903.94 from the defendant for unremitted HST on the sale of unrefined gold.

The Canada Revenue Agency had audited the plaintiff and assessed the outstanding HST, which the plaintiff paid.

The defendant argued the claim was precluded by the Excise Tax Act and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, holding that the cause of action under section 224 of the Excise Tax Act only arose when the plaintiff paid the tax, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

Summary judgment was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce a settlement reached on February 3, 2017, under which the defendants agreed to pay $10,000 plus costs to be assessed, argued, or negotiated.

The court noted that a motion to enforce was unnecessary as the settlement was conceded, and the only remaining issue was the quantum of costs.

Applying principles of proportionality and the factors under Rule 57.01, the court fixed the plaintiff's costs of the action at $33,414.31 and awarded $1,500 for the costs of the motion.

The appellant homeowner appealed an order confirming a master's report that allowed the respondent contractor's action for unpaid renovation work and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim.

The appellant argued the master failed to address allegations of post-contractual misrepresentations and breach of the duty of honest performance, and that the motion judge erred in finding the entire agreement clause excluded these claims.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the entire agreement clause could not exclude the duty of honesty, but dismissed the appeal because the master's factual findings—that the parties had agreed to the charges for extra work—disposed of the factual underpinnings of the appellant's claims.

State Farm insured a property damaged by fire and issued a cheque to Alfedany.

A person purporting to be Alfedany cashed the cheque at Money Mart.

Alfedany later claimed he had not received the cheque and disputed the endorsement as forged.

State Farm brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Money Mart's action seeking payment as a "holder in due course." The court found the cheque's negotiation was affected by fraud or illegality, meaning Money Mart was not deemed a "holder in due course" under s. 57(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

Furthermore, Money Mart failed to prove it was a "holder in due course" under s. 55(1) due to its wilful disregard of multiple discrepancies in the customer's identity, which indicated a lack of good faith.

The court also noted that even if Money Mart were a holder in due course, it would be barred from enforcing payment by s. 48(1) of the Act due to the forged signature, as State Farm was not estopped from raising this defence.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was granted, and Money Mart's claim was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that denied its claim for damages for breach of contract and allowed the respondent employee's counterclaim for unpaid commission.

The employee had been terminated for cause after the employer discovered he was performing work for another business on company time and taking steps to start a competing business.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to order the disgorgement of the $5,152.15 the employee earned from the undisclosed work.

The award for unpaid commission was upheld, and the trial costs award against the employer was set aside due to the employee's egregious conduct.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to dismiss a small claims action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while it would have been procedurally preferable for the respondent to move to transfer the action to the Superior Court, the motion judge was entitled to refuse to dismiss the action.

The Court found that dismissing the claim would be disproportionate to the procedural irregularity that occurred, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was assaulted by the appellant and his brothers at the butcher shop where they worked.

At trial, the appellant admitted to the assault but argued the respondent provoked it.

The trial judge rejected the provocation defence, made favourable credibility findings for the respondent, and found the brothers were joint tortfeasors.

On appeal, the appellant challenged these factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to disturb the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual conclusions regarding provocation and joint liability.