Marvin Joel Huberman

The court issued a protective order on consent of the parties in a case involving allegations of appropriation and misuse of confidential technical and business information.

The order governs the handling and protection of confidential documents and information exchanged during discovery, requiring advance notice before filing such materials in court, but explicitly stating it does not constitute a sealing order or publication ban.

The court also provided specific case management directions for the litigation.

This is the first case management endorsement for an action accepted into the Civil Case Management Pilot Project.

The court outlined the purpose of case management, emphasizing efficiency and proportionality.

The parties had agreed on a Discovery Plan.

A joint request for a "Confidentiality Order," which constituted a sealing order, was declined without substantive determination because it required a formal motion satisfying the Supreme Court's test for restricting access to the court.

The endorsement provided specific directions for documentary production, examinations for discovery, and the scheduling of future motions, including for a sealing order or security for costs.

It also set the date for the next case management conference and general directions for cooperation and efficiency.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered the disclosure of a KPMG forensic investigation report prepared for Algoma Public Health concerning potential conflicts of interest in the hiring of an interim Chief Financial Officer with a criminal record.

The report contained personal information of Dr. Kim Barker, the former Medical Officer of Health and Chief Executive Officer.

The Commissioner found that although the personal information was exempt from disclosure under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the public interest override under section 16 applied, warranting full disclosure.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decisions, finding the reasons inadequate because the Commissioner failed to identify each piece of protected personal information and separately weigh it against the public interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Commissioner's reasons were adequate and his decision reasonable, rejecting the requirement for a piece-by-piece analysis in all circumstances.

This is a costs endorsement following a partial appeal of a trial judgment concerning adverse possession and prescriptive easements.

The appellants successfully set aside the trial judge's finding that the respondent was entitled to a prescriptive easement over a cedar trail, but the appellants' appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Court of Appeal reduced the trial judge's costs award from $42,954.63 to $32,000, finding that although the respondent lost on the cedar trail issue, he still bettered the offer to settle and his claims to adverse possession of the house lands and a prescriptive easement over the laneway were more significant than the cedar trail claim.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between neighbouring property owners near Markdale, Ontario.

The respondent claimed possessory title to a portion of the appellants' land where his house and outbuildings were situated, and prescriptive easements over a cedar trail and laneway.

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent on all claims.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the findings regarding possessory title and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the possessory title finding and the laneway easement but set aside the cedar trail easement, finding insufficient evidence of continuous use for a utility purpose as required by law.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment order requiring it to pay HST to the respondent supplier.

The central issue was whether a supplier can issue invoices disclosing HST payable after the supply transaction has occurred, or whether such disclosure must be made at the time of the transaction to comply with section 223(1) of the Excise Tax Act.

The respondent sold unrefined gold to the appellant over a two-year period without collecting or remitting HST.

After a CRA audit, the respondent issued invoices months later demanding payment of the HST.

The court held that section 223(1) is silent on timing and permits post-transaction invoices, affirming the summary judgment.

An appeal concerning when an international commercial arbitration award becomes "binding" on the parties for purposes of judicial recognition and enforcement under the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The appellants obtained an arbitration award from a rabbinical court in New York for significantly less than sought.

After unsuccessfully applying to set aside the award, they sought recognition and enforcement.

The respondents opposed on the ground that the award had not yet become binding because they intended to pursue further issues before the arbitral tribunal.

The application judge dismissed the recognition application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the award was binding and should be recognized and enforced.

The court clarified that the potential jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain new issues about post-award events does not affect the binding nature of the award.

State Farm insured a property damaged by fire and issued a cheque to Alfedany.

A person purporting to be Alfedany cashed the cheque at Money Mart.

Alfedany later claimed he had not received the cheque and disputed the endorsement as forged.

State Farm brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Money Mart's action seeking payment as a "holder in due course." The court found the cheque's negotiation was affected by fraud or illegality, meaning Money Mart was not deemed a "holder in due course" under s. 57(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

Furthermore, Money Mart failed to prove it was a "holder in due course" under s. 55(1) due to its wilful disregard of multiple discrepancies in the customer's identity, which indicated a lack of good faith.

The court also noted that even if Money Mart were a holder in due course, it would be barred from enforcing payment by s. 48(1) of the Act due to the forged signature, as State Farm was not estopped from raising this defence.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was granted, and Money Mart's claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a gas station property after the vendor forcibly repossessed the property while the purchaser was in possession pending final closing.

The defendant argued the agreement was unenforceable due to misidentification of the vendor, non‑payment of deposits, unpaid supplier accounts, lack of readiness to close, and absence of uniqueness of the property.

The court found the misidentification of the vendor was an inadvertent drafting error, that the plaintiff had substantially paid the required deposits and complied with the agreement, and that the vendor had no justification to retake possession.

The property was sufficiently unique to justify specific performance and the equities favoured the purchaser.

The court ordered specific performance and directed a reference to account for deposits, operating profits, and inventory values prior to closing.