Linda Hsiao-Chia Chen

The applicant sought a sealing order for her medical and educational records in the context of an application for judicial review against the Information and Privacy Commissioner and Toronto Metropolitan University.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the sealing order for the applicant's medical and highly sensitive biographical information, finding it necessary to protect her dignity.

However, the court declined to seal her academic transcripts, concluding that concerns about embarrassment did not outweigh the open court principle.

On a motion in a judicial review of an access-to-information order, the moving party sought a sealing order over records that remained exempt from disclosure and over unredacted versions of emails containing exempt personal information.

Applying the open-court sealing-order framework, the court held that disclosure would create a serious risk to the important public interest in a fair adjudication of the judicial review because public disclosure would predetermine the merits and render the proceeding moot.

The court found the proposed order narrowly tailored, with redacted versions of the relevant emails to remain in the public record.

The sealing order was granted and no costs were ordered.

The self-represented appellant attempted to appeal a single Divisional Court judge's direction made during a judicial review proceeding concerning a freedom of information disclosure dispute.

The court held that no appeal as of right lay to the Court of Appeal from that direction.

Depending on whether the order was made on a motion, the proper route was either a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act or, otherwise, a leave appeal under s. 6(1)(a).

Because the notice of appeal clearly failed to engage the court's jurisdiction, the proceeding was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

No costs were ordered.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner decisions ordering the Cabinet Office to obtain and review entries from the Premier's personal cellphone call logs that related to government business.

The IPC had found that these specific call logs were under the control of the Cabinet Office pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's application of the National Defence control test was reasonable and that the decisions appropriately balanced the public's right of access to government information with the protection of personal privacy.

The applicants, a reporter and a newspaper, sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision that upheld the refusal to disclose the names and badge numbers of police officers subject to misconduct complaints.

The applicants argued the IPC Adjudicator failed to consider their freedom of expression rights under section 2(b) of the Charter when applying the public interest override in section 23 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the Adjudicator erred by dismissing the Charter argument solely because a formal notice of constitutional question was not filed.

The application for judicial review was granted, the IPC decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The Township of Carling sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring disclosure of severance and termination clauses in the employment contracts of several municipal employees.

The Township argued the adjudicator erred in finding the clauses constituted 'benefits' under s. 14(4)(a) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, rather than protected personal information.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator's decision was reasonable, adequately reasoned, and properly distinguished between benefits negotiated in an initial employment contract versus those negotiated post-termination.

The applicant sought judicial review of a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioners rejecting claims of solicitor-client and litigation privilege over documents related to a 2019 cyberattack.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review for privilege claims is correctness.

The Court found the Commissioners correctly determined that facts existing independently of privileged communications must be disclosed pursuant to statutory duties under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the joint investigation breached procedural fairness, finding it was statutorily authorized and the applicant had acquiesced to the process.

The appellant sought to withhold 23 mandate letters delivered by the Premier of Ontario to each minister upon forming government in 2018, claiming exemption under s. 12(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as Cabinet records that would reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure, finding the letters were non-exempt outcomes of the Premier's deliberative process rather than records revealing the substance of Cabinet deliberations.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the IPC failed to give meaningful weight to the constitutional conventions of Cabinet confidentiality, the fluid and dynamic nature of the Cabinet decision-making process, and the central role of the Premier within that process.

The Court found the mandate letters were revealing of the substance of Cabinet deliberations, both on their face and when compared against subsequent government action, and that the IPC's narrow interpretation of s. 12(1) was unreasonable.

The Toronto Star requested records from the LCBO regarding the number of shoplifting incidents at its stores.

The LCBO denied the request under various FIPPA exemptions, arguing disclosure would endanger safety, facilitate crime, and harm economic interests.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court (majority) set aside the IPC's order, finding the adjudicator misapplied the standard of proof, misapprehended evidence regarding the risk of targeted thefts, and provided inadequate reasons.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario denying him access to his son's personal health information held by a family services agency.

The applicant argued he was entitled to the records under the Divorce Act and various privacy statutes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator's decisions to be reasonable.

The court upheld the adjudicator's findings that the Divorce Act did not mandate disclosure and that the agency properly exercised its discretion in considering the best interests of the child and the applicant's motives.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC) brought a motion to seal a portion of its record of proceedings in an application for judicial review.

The applicant sought judicial review of IPC decisions regarding redacted police records.

The IPC sought to file an unredacted 'private' record under seal to prevent the premature disclosure of the very information at issue in the judicial review.

The court granted the sealing order, finding it necessary to prevent a serious risk to the integrity of the judicial review process and noting that disclosure would render the application moot.

LifeLabs brought a motion to vary an order dismissing its request for the production of documents from the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC).

LifeLabs sought internal documents related to a joint investigation by the IPC and its British Columbia counterpart into a cyber-attack, arguing they were necessary for its judicial review application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the motion judge's conclusion that the requested documents were protected by deliberative secrecy.

The applicant, LifeLabs LP, brought a motion seeking additional disclosure from the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to complete the record for its application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia privacy commissioners rejecting LifeLabs' claims of privilege over documents related to a cyber-attack.

LifeLabs sought internal policies, correspondence between the commissioners, and documents generated during the decision-making process, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the requested documents were protected by deliberative secrecy (adjudicative privilege) and that LifeLabs had not established a sufficient foundation of procedural unfairness to displace the privilege.

The applicant university brought a motion within its CCAA proceedings for an order extending the stay period and an order approving the refinancing of its debtor-in-possession (DIP) facility with the provincial government.

The court found that the applicant had acted in good faith and with due diligence, and that the cash flow forecast demonstrated sufficient liquidity to operate during the extended stay period.

The court granted the requested orders, noting the significant interest rate reduction under the replacement DIP facility.

The City of Brockville applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of redacted legal fee invoices related to collective bargaining.

The city argued the records were entirely excluded from the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under the labour relations exclusion in s. 52(3)2.

Applying the Vavilov reasonableness standard, the Divisional Court upheld the adjudicator's decision, finding it was reasonable to conclude that the connection between labour relations and accounting documents detailing public expenditures was insufficient to trigger the exclusion.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered the disclosure of a KPMG forensic investigation report prepared for Algoma Public Health concerning potential conflicts of interest in the hiring of an interim Chief Financial Officer with a criminal record.

The report contained personal information of Dr. Kim Barker, the former Medical Officer of Health and Chief Executive Officer.

The Commissioner found that although the personal information was exempt from disclosure under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the public interest override under section 16 applied, warranting full disclosure.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decisions, finding the reasons inadequate because the Commissioner failed to identify each piece of protected personal information and separately weigh it against the public interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Commissioner's reasons were adequate and his decision reasonable, rejecting the requirement for a piece-by-piece analysis in all circumstances.

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The applicant, a young African-Canadian man, filed a human rights complaint alleging racial profiling after being stopped by police.

The Commission and the police settled the complaint, agreeing to a limited data collection project, but the applicant sought broader systemic remedies, including data collection for pedestrian stops.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the applicant's request without a full hearing, deferring to the settlement and finding it lacked jurisdiction to order remedies for pedestrian stops.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, holding that while the summary process was procedurally fair, the Tribunal's conclusions on jurisdiction and its complete deference to the Commission's settlement were unreasonable.