Shahana Kar

The plaintiffs, who lost money in syndicated mortgage investments, sought leave under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 to proceed with a class action against the provincial regulator (FSCO) and its senior employees.

The plaintiffs alleged that FSCO's failure to take regulatory action earlier despite warnings of a Ponzi scheme constituted bad faith.

The court granted leave for the claim of misfeasance in public office, finding a reasonable possibility that a trial judge could infer bad faith from FSCO's inexplicable carelessness.

However, leave was denied for the claims of misconduct by a public authority (which does not exist in Ontario) and negligence (as FSCO owed no private duty of care to individual investors).

The appellants challenged an order striking their contempt motion without leave to amend.

The court held the motion judge made no legal or principled error, upheld the costs framework used below, and dismissed both merits and costs-related challenges.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to commence a class action against the Crown and Crown employees for losses suffered from investments in syndicated mortgage investments marketed by Tier 1 Transaction Advisory Services Inc. The defendants moved to strike an affidavit from Krista Zingel on the grounds that she is not a compellable witness under the Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006.

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of that Act.

During cross-examination of the defendant Monid on his affidavit, the plaintiffs sought rulings on the propriety of objections to various questions.

The court ruled on the scope of cross-examination on a leave motion, considering relevance, proportionality, and improper legal argument.

The court considered a motion to strike or exclude expert reports filed by the plaintiffs in a proposed class action concerning alleged regulatory failures in the oversight of syndicated mortgage investments.

The court found that the expert evidence was relevant to the leave motion but ultimately struck the affidavit of one expert and portions of another for lack of impartiality and proper qualifications.

The decision clarifies the threshold requirements for admissibility of expert evidence, including relevance, qualifications, and impartiality, in the context of motions for leave under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister's Designee ordering him to repair and plug 62 hazardous petroleum wells owned by a bankrupt company.

The company was previously run by the applicant's deceased father.

The applicant, who had no financial interest in the company, volunteered to help his ailing father by reading meters and communicating with regulators.

The Designee found the applicant was an 'operator' under the Oil, Gas and Salt Resources Act.

The Divisional Court held this decision was unreasonable, as there was no evidence the applicant had decision-making authority or the power to influence his father's decisions.

The application was allowed and the Designee's order was set aside.

The appellant, Ontario, appealed a case management judge's order that directed multiple motions, including motions to strike, to proceed concurrently with the respondents' motion for leave to pursue a bad faith claim against the Crown.

Ontario argued that section 17(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 imposes an automatic stay on the entire proceeding until leave is granted.

The Divisional Court agreed, holding that the statutory stay applies to all claims in the proceeding, not just those against the Crown, and that the court's inherent jurisdiction cannot override this statutory mandate.

The appeal was granted, and all motions other than the leave motion were stayed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Perell J. dated May 9, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the responding parties to pay $5,000 in costs to the moving parties.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 considering the dismissal of the applicants' judicial review application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The notice cited the litigation guardian's failure to retain counsel and the deficient nature of the Notice of Application.

The court found the applicants had cured the representation defect by retaining counsel.

Although the Notice of Application remained fundamentally deficient, the court granted the applicants an indulgence to file an amended pleading, staying the Rule 2.1 process pending compliance.

The applicants, acting through litigation guardians, sought judicial review of decisions regarding secondary school programs offered by the Toronto District School Board.

At a previous case conference, the litigation guardians were directed to retain counsel as required by Rule 7.05(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to amend their deficient notice of application.

At a subsequent case conference, the applicants sought a continued stay pending the outcome of a similar case, while the respondent sought dismissal for non-compliance.

Finding that the litigation guardians had failed to retain full counsel and that the notice of application remained deficient, the court directed the Registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.01 considering dismissal of the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The tenant appealed orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Board had initially ordered eviction for rent arrears, but upon review, allowed the landlord to withdraw its application after the tenant paid the arrears.

The tenant argued the landlord could not withdraw the application after the hearing started.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law as the Board had granted permission for the withdrawal, and noting the appeal was moot since there was no longer a live controversy between the parties.

The applicant, LifeLabs LP, brought a motion seeking additional disclosure from the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to complete the record for its application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia privacy commissioners rejecting LifeLabs' claims of privilege over documents related to a cyber-attack.

LifeLabs sought internal policies, correspondence between the commissioners, and documents generated during the decision-making process, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the requested documents were protected by deliberative secrecy (adjudicative privilege) and that LifeLabs had not established a sufficient foundation of procedural unfairness to displace the privilege.

The respondent was successful on an application for judicial review concerning environmental regulation and hazardous gas wells.

The parties agreed that if costs were awarded, $20,000 all-inclusive would be reasonable.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded because the application raised novel issues of public importance.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that while there were few decisions under the specific Act, related environmental protection case law provided sufficient guidance.

The court declined to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event and ordered the applicant to pay $20,000 in costs to the respondent.

This is an appeal concerning the application of limitation periods to tort claims, including sexual assault, against a police officer.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellant's motions to strike and for summary judgment, finding that the sexual assault allegations triggered s. 16(1)(h) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and that s. 16(1.3) extended this to related torts due to the officer's position of trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision regarding the application of s. 16(1.3) to claims against the perpetrator and related torts, but set aside the declaration that no limitation period applied to all claims, stating this ultimate determination should be left to the trial judge.

The appeal regarding costs was dismissed, affirming the motion judge's award.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Minister's Designee decision upholding a plugging order that required him to plug 11 inactive oil and gas wells.

The applicant argued he was not an 'operator' under the Oil, Gas and Salt Resources Act, that the corporate veil should not have been pierced, and that the regulatory obligations were extinguished by bankruptcy proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable for the Designee to conclude the applicant had management and control of the wells, to pierce the corporate veil to enforce environmental remediation, and to determine the non-monetary regulatory order was not a provable claim in bankruptcy.

The applicant physician sought a stay, a sealing order, and a publication ban pending judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) of the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court also dismissed the request for a sealing order, citing the open court principle.

However, the court granted anonymization and limited redactions to protect the applicant's personal medical records and her status as a victim of sexual assault.

The applicant pharmacy sought judicial review of a decision by the Executive Officer of the Ontario Drug Benefit Program to revoke its billing privileges.

The Executive Officer found the pharmacy had made over $87,000 in unsubstantiated billings and over $62,000 in improper billings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Executive Officer's decision was reasonable and that the applicant was not denied procedural fairness.

Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario sought to lift a stay on its $330 billion health care cost recovery action against three tobacco companies (JTI-Macdonald Corp., Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.) and eleven co-defendants, which was imposed under CCAA proceedings.

Ontario proposed to temporarily stay the effects of any judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the need to preserve the status quo in CCAA proceedings to facilitate a global resolution of significant claims.

Allowing Ontario's action to proceed would alter the level playing field, distract from restructuring efforts, and impose significant costs, prejudicing other stakeholders.

The applicants, JTI-Macdonald Corp., Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, Imperial Tobacco Company Limited, and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc., sought protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) following a $13.5 billion judgment from the Quebec Court of Appeal and other ongoing litigation.

JTI-Macdonald Corp. and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. moved for orders to file Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) leave applications but suspend further proceedings.

Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited and Imperial Tobacco Company Limited sought a blanket stay of all proceedings and limitation periods.

The Quebec class action plaintiffs opposed the motions and sought to partially lift the stay.

The court affirmed its broad jurisdiction under CCAA s. 11 to stay all actions, including appellate proceedings and limitation periods.

The court dismissed the motion by JTI-Macdonald Corp. and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc., and granted Imperial Tobacco's motion, finding that a blanket stay best preserved the status quo and facilitated a global resolution for all stakeholders.

The appellant sought an interim injunction in the Superior Court of Justice to prevent the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) from collecting unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties pending a breach of contract claim.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction under s. 18(1) of the Federal Courts Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 18(1) applies to all injunctions, including interim ones, and that the CRA is a federal board, commission, or other tribunal when exercising tax collection powers.

The applicant property management company collected rent on behalf of landlords and deposited the funds into trust accounts.

After the applicant accrued tax arrears, the respondent issued requirements to pay and garnished funds from the applicant’s bank accounts.

The applicant sought declarations in the Superior Court that the seized funds belonged to the landlords, that the respondent could not seize them, and an order requiring the return of the funds.

The court held that the substance of the relief sought amounted to injunctive relief against a federal board exercising statutory tax‑collection powers.

Under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act, such remedies fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court.

The Superior Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested orders.