Cassandra Ann Kirewskie

The appellants challenged an order striking their contempt motion without leave to amend.

The court held the motion judge made no legal or principled error, upheld the costs framework used below, and dismissed both merits and costs-related challenges.

The appellant, Ontario, appealed a case management judge's order that directed multiple motions, including motions to strike, to proceed concurrently with the respondents' motion for leave to pursue a bad faith claim against the Crown.

Ontario argued that section 17(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 imposes an automatic stay on the entire proceeding until leave is granted.

The Divisional Court agreed, holding that the statutory stay applies to all claims in the proceeding, not just those against the Crown, and that the court's inherent jurisdiction cannot override this statutory mandate.

The appeal was granted, and all motions other than the leave motion were stayed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Perell J. dated May 9, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the responding parties to pay $5,000 in costs to the moving parties.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that jurisdiction over the proposed appeal lies with the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the responding party.

The applicants initiated a proceeding by application seeking declarations and substantial damages related to an anaerobic digester, and subsequently moved to add a party and for injunctive relief to prevent the digester's reactivation.

The court found the application procedurally inappropriate and outside its jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly due to the presence of material facts in dispute and the complex nature of the claims (nuisance and negligence).

Consequently, the court converted the application into an action, directing the applicants to file a Statement of Claim, and denied the immediate injunctive relief on the basis that it was not available in an improperly commenced application.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board that denied their claim for over $1.2 million in costs following a lengthy proceeding.

The underlying application concerned a nuisance claim against a greenhouse and anaerobic digester operated by a court-appointed receiver.

The Board had found that both parties engaged in unreasonable conduct and declined to award costs to either side.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the Board's discretionary costs decision.

Following a 20-day hearing where the Applicants successfully obtained a determination under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, both parties applied for costs.

The Applicants claimed over $1.2 million, alleging the Respondent acted in bad faith, including failing to disclose the sale of the digester operation.

The Respondent claimed up to $44,880, alleging the Applicants engaged in unreasonable conduct and caused unnecessary delays.

The Board found that while the Respondent acted in bad faith by failing to disclose the sale, the Applicants' counsel also acted unreasonably by showing a lack of respect, failing to comply with directions, and prolonging the hearing.

Concluding that neither party came with clean hands, the Board exercised its discretion to award no costs to either party.

This costs endorsement addresses the costs arising from a motion by the City of Mississauga to amend its Statement of Defence and cross-motions by the plaintiff, Amanda Martin.

The City was entirely successful on its motion and substantially successful against the plaintiff's cross-motions.

The court considered the principles governing costs awards, including the five purposes of costs rules and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Despite the plaintiff's arguments for divided success and an offer to settle, the court found the City largely successful and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court reduced the City's claimed costs, fixing them at $9,000, payable by the plaintiff within 90 days, noting the plaintiff's conduct contributed to the length and costs of the proceedings.

The applicants, neighbours of a greenhouse operation, applied to the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board complaining of severe odour and fly disturbances caused by an anaerobic digester on the respondent's property.

The Board found that the applicants were directly affected by the disturbances and that the digester operation fundamentally changed the character of the rural neighbourhood.

Applying the test from Pyke v. Tri Gro Enterprises Ltd., the Board concluded that the digester was not a normal farm practice in these circumstances.

The Board ordered the respondent to cease the digester operation and decommission the facility.

In a wrongful dismissal action, the City of Mississauga sought leave to amend its Statement of Defence to withdraw an allegation of just cause termination.

The Plaintiff opposed, arguing this constituted a withdrawal of admissions under Rule 51.05, and brought a cross-motion to compel production of an investigation report and permit discovery on the cause allegation.

The court granted the City's motion, finding that withdrawing a just cause allegation was an amendment under Rule 26.01, not a withdrawal of an admission.

The Plaintiff's cross-motion to compel production and discovery was largely dismissed as premature, but the City was ordered to provide its position on the report's production within 7 days and serve its Affidavit of Documents within 45 days.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting partial summary judgment to the respondents on the issue of product ownership.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that there was no triable issue regarding the appellant's ownership of the product, noting the appellant's pleadings and a 1996 licensing agreement were inconsistent with ownership.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the declaration that the respondent owned the product because the respondent had not filed a counter-claim.