Ayesha Laldin

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action on behalf of participants in the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), alleging that the program's tied employment provisions and compelled payment of Employment Insurance (EI) premiums infringe sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter and constitute unjust enrichment.

The Crown opposed certification, arguing that the SAWP is a voluntary program and pointing to an overlapping national class action already authorized in Quebec.

The court found that the plaintiffs pleaded tenable causes of action, noting the historical evidence of discriminatory intent behind the SAWP and the structural exclusion of SAWP workers from EI benefits.

The court concluded that the Ontario action was preferable as it focused specifically on the unique conditions imposed on SAWP workers and could proceed in parallel with the Quebec action.

The motion for certification was granted.

The applicants initiated a proceeding by application seeking declarations and substantial damages related to an anaerobic digester, and subsequently moved to add a party and for injunctive relief to prevent the digester's reactivation.

The court found the application procedurally inappropriate and outside its jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly due to the presence of material facts in dispute and the complex nature of the claims (nuisance and negligence).

Consequently, the court converted the application into an action, directing the applicants to file a Statement of Claim, and denied the immediate injunctive relief on the basis that it was not available in an improperly commenced application.

The applicants moved for an interlocutory injunction to stay the Public Order Emergency Proclamation and related orders pending a judicial review application.

Before the motion was heard, the Governor in Council revoked the proclamation and all related orders.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion as moot because the legislative instruments had already been revoked, leaving no live controversy affecting the parties' rights that could be resolved by a stay.

The Court also declined to award costs to the applicants, noting their motion was unlikely to succeed even if not moot, and directed that costs be in the cause of the underlying judicial review.

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

The Claimant sought review of a determination by the Administrator of the EI Sickness Benefits Class Action denying her claim for sickness benefits under the Settlement Agreement.

The Claimant argued she was wrongly advised by Service Canada in 2003 that she did not qualify for sickness benefits because she became ill at the beginning of her parental leave.

The Prothonotary upheld the Administrator's determination, finding no evidence that the Claimant had made a formal application for sickness benefits while in receipt of parental benefits, as required by the class definition.

The Prothonotary noted that the certified class explicitly excluded individuals who merely relied on oral or written advice not to apply.

The Claimant sought review of an Administrator's determination denying her claim for sickness benefits under a class action Settlement Agreement.

The Court found no evidence that the Claimant applied to convert her parental benefits to sickness benefits or suffered an illness during the relevant period.

As she did not meet the class definition, the Administrator's determination was upheld.

The Claimant applied for a review of the Administrator's determination denying her claim for sickness benefits under the Employment Insurance Sickness Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement.

The Claimant sought sickness benefits for a five-week period during which she was receiving maternity benefits, not parental benefits.

The Court upheld the Administrator's determination, finding that the Claimant did not meet the class definition because the illness occurred while she was on maternity leave, whereas the class definition requires the illness to have occurred while in receipt of parental benefits.

The applicant was successful on an interlocutory injunction related to a habeas corpus application challenging his placement in administrative segregation.

The issue was whether costs for the injunction should be payable immediately to the applicant or in the cause.

The court held that costs should be in the cause, noting that the injunction did not end the litigation, the issues were inextricably linked to the merits of the main application, and the application judge would be in a better position to assess costs with the benefit of hindsight.

The moving party, a federal inmate serving a life sentence, brought an emergency motion for an injunction to prevent his transfer from an Ontario institution to an Alberta institution pending his habeas corpus application.

The moving party argued the transfer violated his right to counsel and would disrupt his scheduled hip surgery and family support in Ontario.

The court applied the three-part test for an injunction and found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the moving party.

The injunction was granted, ordering the moving party's return to Ontario pending the outcome of the habeas corpus application.

An inmate, Brian Hickey, sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge his emergency transfer from a minimum to a medium security institution, arguing the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair.

The court found the transfer decision reasonable, based on credible allegations of threats against his step-father and deteriorating behaviour, which increased his public safety risk.

The court also determined that procedural fairness was met, including the proper withholding of certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The application was dismissed.

The respondents (Ontario, the Attorney General of Ontario, and the Attorney General of Canada) sought to dismiss two appeals brought by the appellant under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the appeals were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

In C62801, the court found the record inadequate to assess the request for dismissal.

In C62802, the court granted the Rule 2.1 request, finding that while the appeal lacked merit, it was also abusive in nature, as the appellant had failed to perfect her appeal despite being given guidance and an extension of time to do so.

The appellant sought to review a chambers judge's order denying an extension of time to perfect an appeal from a motion judge's decision that struck portions of the appellant's statement of claim and dismissed the action against Canada.

The appellant had failed to perfect the appeal within the required time and sought an extension nearly three years after filing the notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension, finding that the chambers judge applied the correct legal test and that the justice of the case did not compel an extension given the unexplained delay and the lack of merit in the underlying appeal.

The moving party brought motions to set aside the decisions of two chamber judges.

The first chamber judge held that the Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to issue an originating process such as a Notice of Application, and could only hear appeals from lower courts.

The second chamber judge agreed and granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the chamber judges' decisions and dismissed the motions, noting the appellant had taken no steps to perfect her appeal.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of the applicant's habeas corpus application with certiorari in aid.

The Attorney General of Canada (AGC), as the successful party, sought $5,000 in costs, arguing the applicant's arguments lacked merit and necessitated significant expenses, including transcripts.

The applicant contended for no costs or minimal costs, emphasizing the importance of access to justice for habeas corpus.

The court considered the principles from *Wood v. Atlantic Institution (Warden)*, balancing the general rule that costs follow the cause with the need to avoid creating a barrier to accessing habeas corpus.

Applying *Rule 57.01* factors, including complexity and the importance of the issues, the court fixed costs at $5,000, all inclusive, payable by the applicant to the AGC.

Following a successful habeas corpus and certiorari application challenging a correctional institution’s decision to reclassify the applicant from minimum to medium security, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The applicant did not seek costs despite succeeding on the judicial review application.

The court therefore declined to award costs to any party.

The judge also declined to comment on the broader argument that prisoners should never face cost consequences when bringing unsuccessful habeas corpus–type judicial review applications.

The appellant, previously declared a dangerous offender and a vexatious litigant in Federal Court, appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant in Ontario courts.

He argued he was denied natural justice and that the application judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, specifically regarding the refusal to allow a 55-day adjournment to cross-examine the respondent's affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly exercised discretion to control the court's process and that the vexatious litigant finding was fully supported by the appellant's history of meritless proceedings.

The applicants brought an application alleging that the provincial and federal governments breached ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter by making decisions and implementing program changes which eroded access to affordable housing.

The respondents brought motions to dismiss the application on the grounds that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and that the issues raised were not justiciable.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the application, finding that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to provide affordable housing, and the impugned decisions did not deny the applicants a benefit given to others under s. 15.

The court also held that the issues raised were not justiciable as they involved broad policy choices.

Following a judgment declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, the applicant sought costs of $36,868.25.

The respondent opposed the costs submissions, characterizing them as an abuse of process.

The court found the applicant's claim for partial indemnity costs to be fair and reasonable, noting the substantial preparation required to review the respondent's extensive litigation history.

The court discounted the amount sought for pleadings and fixed total costs payable by the respondent at $29,951.49.

The Attorney General sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant and prohibiting further proceedings without leave.

The court reviewed the respondent’s extensive litigation history, including numerous meritless habeas corpus applications, contempt proceedings, collateral attacks on prior decisions, abandonment of proceedings, and repeated unsuccessful appeals.

Applying the principles articulated in Re Lang Michener and Fabian and other authorities, the court found the respondent had persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable grounds and conducted litigation in a vexatious manner.

Considering the cumulative pattern of abusive litigation and misuse of judicial resources, the court concluded that restricting future access to the courts without leave was necessary.

The application was granted and the respondent was declared a vexatious litigant in Ontario courts.