Simon Peter Borys

Two federal inmates serving indeterminate sentences applied for reclassification from medium- to minimum-security facilities.

Despite recommendations from their case management teams and wardens, administrative decision-makers denied the reclassifications.

The appellants sought habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid, challenging the denials as unlawful deprivations of their residual liberty.

The majority held that a decision to deny a lower security reclassification constitutes a deprivation of liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus, as it has the qualitative effect of restricting liberty without requiring proof of a change in status quo or a pre-existing legal entitlement to the less restrictive state.

The dissent maintained that habeas corpus is only available where an inmate has acquired a legal entitlement to the lower security classification, consistent with the framework in Dumas.

As both appellants had been reclassified and transferred by the time the appeal was heard, the Court allowed the appeal on the moot legal question of public importance.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied their applications for habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's refusal to reclassify and transfer them to lower-security institutions.

The application judge found that these denials did not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld the application judge's finding, concluding that a refusal to reclassify an inmate to a lower security level, without a change in the conditions of detention or an entitlement to greater liberty, does not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty for the purposes of habeas corpus.

The Court affirmed that the existing grievance procedure and judicial review in the Federal Court are the appropriate avenues for such challenges.

The dissenting judge argued that an unlawful reclassification refusal could crystallize an initially lawful deprivation of liberty into an unlawful one, making it reviewable by habeas corpus.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the availability of habeas corpus to challenge the refusal of prisoner transfers to lower security institutions.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, sought to overturn a lower court's denial of their habeas corpus application.

The Court of Appeal granted intervention to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Black Legal Action Centre, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, and the Canadian Prison Law Association, finding that the appeal raises issues of constitutional and public importance.

The court determined that the proposed interveners offered distinct and useful perspectives, and that their participation would not cause injustice to the parties, even if aligned with the appellants' position.

The Court of Appeal addressed the status of an intervener, the John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC), in an appeal.

The JHSC had been granted party intervener status in the court below.

While the appellants and respondent consented to the JHSC's continued leave to intervene as an added party, they disagreed on the scope of its participation.

The court clarified that interveners granted party status in the lower court generally expect to continue as parties on appeal without needing a fresh motion, unless there are intervening events or exceptional circumstances.

The JHSC's status as an added party intervener was confirmed, with the terms of participation to be determined later.

The applicants, federal inmates, sought a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) refusal to reclassify them to minimum security, which prevented their transfer to lower-security institutions.

The core legal question was whether such a refusal constitutes a "deprivation of liberty" reviewable by habeas corpus.

The court, applying the principle of judicial comity and reviewing extensive jurisprudence, concluded that maintaining an existing security classification does not amount to a deprivation of liberty, as it does not impose new or additional constraints on residual liberty.

Consequently, habeas corpus was not an available remedy, and the applications were dismissed.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge his reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent involuntary transfer.

The court found the Correctional Service of Canada's decision to be reasonable and procedurally fair, based on a holistic review of the applicant's conduct, including involvement in contraband importation and prior misconducts.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay costs.

The applicant, a young person charged with terrorism-related offences, sought certiorari to quash a youth justice court judge's decision.

The judge had ruled that the Crown was entitled to apply for a de novo bail hearing under s. 33(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), notwithstanding that the young person had previously been released into the care of responsible persons under s. 31(1) of the YCJA by a justice of the peace.

The applicant argued that s. 31 constituted a distinct release scheme, and challenges should proceed under s. 31(4), not s. 33(1).

The Superior Court dismissed the application, affirming that s. 33(1) provides a mechanism for a youth justice court judge to conduct a de novo bail hearing, integrating with the Criminal Code provisions and the YCJA's purpose of providing enhanced procedural protections and avoiding youth incarceration.

An inmate, Brian Hickey, sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge his emergency transfer from a minimum to a medium security institution, arguing the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair.

The court found the transfer decision reasonable, based on credible allegations of threats against his step-father and deteriorating behaviour, which increased his public safety risk.

The court also determined that procedural fairness was met, including the proper withholding of certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The application was dismissed.