Jim Kapches

The applicant sought judicial review of a correctional decision reclassifying his offender security level from minimum to medium security.

The decision acknowledged that the Security Reclassification Scale may have been inflated due to an inaccurate count of recorded institutional incidents, but correctional authorities failed to address that concern when making the final determination.

The court held that the resulting decision lacked justification, transparency, and intelligibility under the reasonableness standard.

Because the respondent could not demonstrate that the transfer decision fell within the range of acceptable outcomes, the decision was found unreasonable.

The application was granted and the applicant was ordered returned to a minimum security institution.

The appellant, a federal inmate convicted of offences committed prior to the enactment of the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA), appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

He argued that the retroactive abolition of accelerated parole review (APR) violated his rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Lewis, the Court of Appeal held that the abolition of APR appreciably increased the appellant's expected incarceration time, constituting an unjustified variation in punishment.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was declared eligible for the APR regime.

The appellant, a federal inmate convicted of drug offences committed before the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA) came into force but sentenced after, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

He argued that the AEPA's abolition of accelerated parole review (APR) violated his s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

Relying on the companion case of Canada (Attorney General) v. Lewis, the Court of Appeal held that the abolition of APR appreciably increased the appellant's incarceration time, constituting a variation in punishment that violated s. 11(i) and was not saved by s. 1.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was declared entitled to the APR regime.

The respondents committed offences before the Abolition of Early Parole Act came into force, but were convicted and sentenced after.

They successfully applied for a declaration that they were eligible for accelerated parole review under the previous regime, arguing that the retrospective application of the Act violated their rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Attorney General appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the denial of day parole constitutes punishment and that the retrospective application of the Act unjustifiably violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

A federal inmate applied for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, alleging that the abolition of accelerated parole review under the Abolition of Early Parole Act violated rights under ss. 7, 10, 11(i), and 24(1) of the Charter.

The applicant argued that his eligibility for accelerated parole review should be determined by the date of the offence rather than the sentencing date.

The court declined to review decisions of the Correctional Service of Canada and the Parole Board, holding that a comprehensive statutory review mechanism already existed.

It further found that the repeal of accelerated parole review did not violate the applicant’s Charter rights because parole eligibility does not constitute punishment and the applicant had no constitutionally protected expectation of liberty based on the repealed regime.

The application for habeas corpus and related relief was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default after failing to deliver a defence within the time required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The self‑represented plaintiffs initially opposed the motion and brought a cross‑motion seeking to remove defence counsel from the record but abandoned their opposition during argument.

The court found the defendants had a reasonable explanation for the delay, had consistently indicated an intention to defend, and had an arguable defence on the merits.

The default was set aside and the defendants were granted leave to deliver a statement of defence within ten days.

The plaintiffs’ motion to remove counsel was dismissed and costs of $1,500 plus HST were awarded to the defendants due to inappropriate allegations made in the plaintiffs’ materials.

The applicant brought an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid challenging the legality of his detention.

Prior to the scheduled hearing, the applicant sought directions regarding the order of filing evidence at the second stage of the application, specifically whether he could file rebuttal evidence after the respondents filed their record.

The respondents argued the applicant should file all evidence first, consistent with typical application procedures.

The court held that habeas corpus proceedings are unique because the burden shifts to the respondents to justify the deprivation of liberty.

The court permitted the applicant to file rebuttal evidence after the respondents' materials so that the applicant could tailor his response to the case advanced against him.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of a statement of claim alleging numerous torts and statutory breaches against the Federal Crown.

The self-represented plaintiff alleged misfeasance in public office, conspiracy, fabrication of evidence, Charter violations, and other wrongs arising from actions of police officers and provincial officials.

The court held that the pleading failed to disclose material facts linking any federal Crown servant to the alleged conduct and improperly attempted to attribute liability to the federal government for actions of provincial actors.

The allegations were found to be vague, speculative, and comprised of bald conclusions without necessary particulars.

The court struck the impugned paragraphs and dismissed the action as against the Attorney General of Canada without leave to amend.

Following the dismissal of a motion by a proposed intervenor seeking to be added as a party to an unrelated civil action, the court addressed costs.

The court held that the proposed intervenor had no connection to the underlying action and that the motion raised no issue of public interest or bona fide legal concern.

Exercising its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court determined that costs should be awarded to the defendants despite their representation by Crown counsel.

While acknowledging the unsuccessful party’s limited financial means, the court emphasized that litigants, including incarcerated individuals, remain responsible for the costs consequences of misguided or unnecessary procedural steps.

Costs of $500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes were awarded.

The proposed intervenor, an inmate, brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added plaintiff in an action commenced by another inmate against his parole officers.

The proposed intervenor argued that his own separate action against different parole officers involved similar claims of misfeasance in public office and negligence, and that a negative outcome in the plaintiff's case could adversely affect his own.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed intervenor failed to meet the test under Rule 13.01.

The disputes were purely private, involved different factual matrices and defendants, and the proposed intervenor's involvement would only complicate the proceedings.