Wendy Wright

This endorsement concerns the costs arising from successful anti-SLAPP motions brought by the Crown Defendants and the Better Business Bureau of Central Ontario Inc. (BBB) against A&H Asset Auctions Inc. The court considered the presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act.

It found that the indicia of a SLAPP suit were not present, and therefore, an award of full indemnity costs was not appropriate.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis to both the Crown Defendants and BBB, fixing the amounts at $150,416 and $87,122.55 respectively.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied their applications for habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's refusal to reclassify and transfer them to lower-security institutions.

The application judge found that these denials did not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld the application judge's finding, concluding that a refusal to reclassify an inmate to a lower security level, without a change in the conditions of detention or an entitlement to greater liberty, does not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty for the purposes of habeas corpus.

The Court affirmed that the existing grievance procedure and judicial review in the Federal Court are the appropriate avenues for such challenges.

The dissenting judge argued that an unlawful reclassification refusal could crystallize an initially lawful deprivation of liberty into an unlawful one, making it reviewable by habeas corpus.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal of the actions due to the plaintiffs' alleged breach of court orders regarding privileged documents.

In the alternative, they sought removal of the plaintiffs' counsel and an increase in security for costs.

The court denied the motion, finding that there were reasonable excuses for the alleged breach of the Crown Privilege Order and that no likely prejudice was suffered by the defendants.

The request for increased security for costs was also denied, as it would be unjust to the plaintiffs and there was no evidence of their inability to pay.

The plaintiff, an auction business, brought an action for defamation against the Crown Defendants and the Better Business Bureau (BBB) regarding statements made about the plaintiff's relationship with the federal government in selling seized gemstones.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the statements related to matters of public interest.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show its claims had substantial merit against the Crown Defendants, failed to show the defendants had no valid defences (including qualified privilege and justification), and failed to establish that the harm it suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions.

The motions were granted and the action was dismissed.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the availability of habeas corpus to challenge the refusal of prisoner transfers to lower security institutions.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, sought to overturn a lower court's denial of their habeas corpus application.

The Court of Appeal granted intervention to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Black Legal Action Centre, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, and the Canadian Prison Law Association, finding that the appeal raises issues of constitutional and public importance.

The court determined that the proposed interveners offered distinct and useful perspectives, and that their participation would not cause injustice to the parties, even if aligned with the appellants' position.

The Court of Appeal addressed the status of an intervener, the John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC), in an appeal.

The JHSC had been granted party intervener status in the court below.

While the appellants and respondent consented to the JHSC's continued leave to intervene as an added party, they disagreed on the scope of its participation.

The court clarified that interveners granted party status in the lower court generally expect to continue as parties on appeal without needing a fresh motion, unless there are intervening events or exceptional circumstances.

The JHSC's status as an added party intervener was confirmed, with the terms of participation to be determined later.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' $20 million claim arising from the revocation of the plaintiff's aviation delegation.

The court struck the claims for conspiracy, breach of contract, injurious falsehood, negligence, wrongful dismissal, and intentional interference with contractual relations for failing to plead necessary elements, but granted leave to amend.

The court declined to strike the claim for misfeasance in public office, finding it adequately pleaded, and dismissed the defendants' motion to strike portions of the claim as scandalous or an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for outstanding amounts under a construction contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that summary judgment was appropriate, that the respondent had not waived its right to rely on the contract's strict notice requirements, and that equitable claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment were precluded by the existence of a valid contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendants to answer fifteen refusals from examinations for discovery and written interrogatories.

The underlying action involves an environmental investigation.

The court reviewed each refusal, upholding several on the basis of solicitor-client privilege, proportionality, and sufficient prior answers, while ordering the defendants to answer others, including clarifying transcript discrepancies and conducting specific email searches.

The motion was granted in part.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to answer questions refused on discovery and for a declaration that the plaintiffs waived solicitor-client privilege over legal advice received from their former counsel.

The defendants argued privilege was waived through the plaintiffs' pleadings of duress, their discovery evidence, and by publicly filing documents in a separate small claims court action against the counsel.

The court held that the plaintiffs did not waive privilege in this action because they did not put the legal advice in issue or rely on it for their claims.

While privilege was waived over the publicly filed documents, those documents were deemed irrelevant to the current action.

The court also ruled on several other discovery refusals, upholding some and ordering answers or redactions for others.

The defendant, Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff contractor's claim for additional compensation related to alleged delays and extra work on a construction project.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to comply with the strict notice provisions of the contract, which barred its claims.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the defendant waived strict compliance with the contract or that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The defendants moved to dismiss four actions due to the plaintiffs' failure to post security for costs and other alleged breaches of interlocutory orders.

The plaintiffs cross-moved to vary or rescind the security for costs order or, alternatively, for an extension of time.

The court dismissed Patrick Whitty's claims in two actions and granted the corporate plaintiffs an extension until October 31, 2018, to post the outstanding security.

Despite initial inclination that the defendants were more successful, the disclosure of a reasonable offer to settle by the plaintiffs altered the assessment.

The court found both sides engaged in "expensive overkill" by seeking excessive relief instead of agreeing to a reasonable mid-ground.

Consequently, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs for the motions.

The defendants moved to dismiss four proceedings due to the plaintiffs' failure to post $130,000 security for costs as required by a prior order.

The plaintiffs cross-moved to vary the security for costs order or, alternatively, seek an extension of time.

The court dismissed Patrick Whitty's personal actions, finding he had indicated a lack of interest in proceeding personally by declining to post further security.

For the corporate plaintiffs, the court denied the motion to vary the security for costs order, finding no significant change in circumstances or a gap between ordered security and likely costs.

However, recognizing the overall goal of fair dispute resolution, the court granted the corporate plaintiffs a final extension until October 31, 2018, to post the outstanding security, emphasizing that failure to comply would result in dismissal without further notice.

The appellant imported four Hereford cattle from the United States in 1996, three of which were later discovered to be infected with anaplasmosis due to falsified American health documentation.

The Canadian government quarantined the appellant's herd and ordered the destruction of seven infected cattle.

The appellant received compensation under sections 51 and 53 of the Health of Animals Act.

The appellant subsequently sued the Crown for negligence, claiming damages for business losses and reputational harm.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act barred the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that section 9 operates to prevent actions for additional compensation arising from the same factual basis as the compensated loss.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment based on a two-year limitation period under section 45(1)(h) of the Former Limitations Act.

The plaintiff argued that the applicable period was a six-year period under section 45(1)(g) for 'actions upon a case.' The court, after its own research, agreed that section 45(1)(h) applies only to penal actions and was likely inapplicable.

The motion was adjourned, and the defendants were given detailed directions to amend their pleadings to rely on section 45(1)(g) and re-bring the summary judgment motion, with the court remaining seized of the matter.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a further extension of time to deliver their affidavits of documents and an expert report on damages in a $50 million action against the government.

The defendants did not oppose the extension but sought terms requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs and pay costs thrown away due to the plaintiffs' failure to comply with previous scheduling orders.

The court granted the extension but ordered the plaintiffs to post $230,000 in security for costs and pay $20,000 in costs thrown away, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to commit the necessary resources to advance their claims efficiently and had breached court orders.