Sheldon Inkol

The moving party, who was previously declared a vexatious litigant and prohibited from filing further materials without leave, sought leave to file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her action for delay.

The underlying action involved allegations of improper disclosure of confidential youth records by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed notice of appeal contained the same fatal flaws as her previous pleadings and failed to raise tenable grounds.

The court also declined to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal, finding that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the respondent would suffer prejudice.

The motion for leave to file a notice of appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal that set aside the dismissal of their action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, the appellants sought costs of the motion below.

The respondents argued that the presumption against costs in s. 137.1(8) should apply.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellants that the presumption should not apply because the underlying dispute was a private matter and not a SLAPP.

The court awarded the appellants costs of the motion below fixed at $30,000.

The appellants, a home builder and its owner, brought a defamation action against the respondent homeowners over negative social media posts following a renovation dispute.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the online reviews reflected a purely private dispute and did not relate to a matter of public interest.

The Court also held that the motion judge erred in her approach to the 'no valid defence' requirement and the public interest weighing exercise, concluding that the defamation action should be permitted to proceed.

The applicant sought to enforce a judgment from the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, awarding her USD $157,158.96 for battery.

The respondent did not appear at the Ontario application but had participated in the Nevada trial through counsel.

The court proceeded in the respondent's absence, finding proper service and a deliberate choice not to participate.

The court recognized and enforced the foreign judgment, determining it was final and conclusive, and that the Nevada court properly assumed jurisdiction through both the respondent's attornment and a real and substantial connection (the tort occurred in Nevada).

No valid defences of fraud, lack of natural justice, or public policy were found.

The application was granted, and the Nevada judgment was recognized as an Ontario Superior Court of Justice judgment, with costs of $7,500 awarded to the applicant.

This endorsement concerns the costs arising from successful anti-SLAPP motions brought by the Crown Defendants and the Better Business Bureau of Central Ontario Inc. (BBB) against A&H Asset Auctions Inc. The court considered the presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act.

It found that the indicia of a SLAPP suit were not present, and therefore, an award of full indemnity costs was not appropriate.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis to both the Crown Defendants and BBB, fixing the amounts at $150,416 and $87,122.55 respectively.

The plaintiff, an auction business, brought an action for defamation against the Crown Defendants and the Better Business Bureau (BBB) regarding statements made about the plaintiff's relationship with the federal government in selling seized gemstones.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the statements related to matters of public interest.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show its claims had substantial merit against the Crown Defendants, failed to show the defendants had no valid defences (including qualified privilege and justification), and failed to establish that the harm it suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions.

The motions were granted and the action was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses two motions: the plaintiff's motion to compel an affidavit of documents from one defendant (Drake Cartier), and a defendant's (Lowe, Gravelle & Associates Inc., also known as EFI Engineering) motion for leave to amend its Statement of Defence and, if necessary, withdraw admissions.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion against Drake Cartier, ordering the affidavit by August 1, 2023, but without costs due to short service.

The court also granted EFI Engineering's motion to amend its Statement of Defence, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff, particularly regarding limitation periods.

The court found no admissions were made that needed withdrawal, but would have granted leave if they had been.

Costs for the second motion were awarded against the plaintiff.

The defendant, Law Society of Ontario, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Rosemary Cremer, to answer questions refused during her examination for discovery and to reattend for further discovery.

The plaintiff had sued the Law Society for damages, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and other torts related to the handling of trust funds.

The court found the questions relevant to the pleadings, particularly concerning the Law Society's justification for its actions as trustee and the plaintiff's role as bookkeeper.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument of undue prejudice based on proportionality.

The motion was granted, ordering the plaintiff to answer the specified questions and reattend discovery, with costs awarded to the defendant.

The Township of Clearview appealed a motion decision that largely dismissed its anti-SLAPP application against an action for defamation, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty brought by the respondents.

The action stemmed from the Township posting resident letters on its website that contained negative comments about the respondents' farming practices and proposed micro-brewery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the defamation claim, finding that the motion judge erred in his analysis of the qualified privilege and indemnity defences, which had a real prospect of success.

The negligence claim dismissal was not appealed.

The breach of fiduciary duty claim dismissal was upheld.

The appellant, M.E., appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that dismissed her motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposed a leave requirement for future filings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to the appellant's history of relitigating decided issues, non-compliance with court orders and rules, failure to pay costs, and making baseless allegations against opposing counsel.

The court also imposed a further restriction requiring leave to file any future materials.

The defendant Township brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for defamation, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The action arose after the Township posted unsolicited, unvetted, and allegedly defamatory public comments about the plaintiffs' proposed farm brewery on its website.

The court found the breach of fiduciary duty claim did not arise from an expression and could proceed.

The negligence claim was dismissed for lacking substantial merit.

The defamation claim was allowed to proceed, as the court found it had substantial merit, the Township's defences lacked a real prospect of success, and the public interest in allowing the claim to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the unvetted, vitriolic public comments.

The moving party sought to appeal an order dismissing her motion to add new causes of action and parties, which had been dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

After the Divisional Court dismissed her motion for leave to appeal, she applied to the Court of Appeal.

A single judge adjourned the matter to a full panel to determine whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that an order refusing leave to amend pleadings to plead a new cause of action, or to add a party, is a final order.

Consequently, leave to appeal was not required, and the appeal could proceed as of right to the Court of Appeal.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking various forms of relief against the defendants and their counsel.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the motion was an attempt to re-litigate a contempt motion and a summary judgment motion that had already been dismissed and upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and ordered that the plaintiff must seek leave before bringing any further motions in the proceeding.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his claim for indemnification against the respondent condominium corporation and refusing to vacate a lien.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the indemnification claim was barred by res judicata as a collateral attack on a prior decision finding the appellant acted in bad faith as a director, and that the lien was validly registered.

The court affirmed that the lien could be revised in accordance with the motion judge's order without affecting its underlying validity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This endorsement addresses costs for two motions heard on October 22, 2019.

The Regional Municipality of Peel and Bi-Views Building Service Ltd. sought costs, while the plaintiff Aparna Sanwalka also claimed costs.

The court found Peel and Bi-View to be the more successful parties, particularly regarding the dismissal of Ms. Sanwalka's motion for examination for discovery accommodations and the necessity of Peel's motion to advance the action.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis to Peel ($2,500) and Bi-View ($750), payable by Aparna Sanwalka.

This decision addresses the costs of a summary judgment motion brought by the Law Society of Ontario against Rosemary Cremer, which Cremer successfully defended.

The Law Society did not dispute Cremer's entitlement to costs but argued for a partial indemnity basis and a lower amount.

The court found that the Law Society's motion, though unsuccessful, was not unreasonable and did not warrant punitive costs.

While Cremer claimed $55,778.43 in partial indemnity costs, the court deemed this excessive and disproportionate to a focused summary judgment motion, noting that counsel's extensive time expenditure might be more relevant to the trial on the merits.

The court awarded Cremer $46,000 in partial indemnity costs, all inclusive.

The plaintiff sued the Law Society of Ontario for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, negligence, misfeasance in public office, and infliction of mental injury.

The Law Society moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act, or constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the Law Society's motion, finding that the plaintiff's claims were not statute-barred, as the limitation period did not begin until her beneficial ownership of funds was confirmed by court order.

The court also found genuine issues requiring trial regarding statutory immunity and declined to strike portions of the claim as an abuse of process.

Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No 1371 (MTCC 1371) brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss Jermark Plumbing & Mechanical Services Ltd.'s (Jermark) claim for breach of contract and duties of good faith.

Jermark alleged it was the winning bidder for a piping replacement project and that MTCC 1371 breached its obligations by awarding the contract to another company after unit owner objections and a court order.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning contract formation, the exact terms of any agreement, and good faith performance, which depend heavily on witness credibility and the factual narrative.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for indemnification as a former director and to vacate a condominium lien.

The defendant sought summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for indemnification, finding it barred by res judicata and the limitation period, and upheld the validity of the lien under the Condominium Act.

However, the court ordered the defendant to recalculate and reduce the lien amount, as it included unauthorized costs.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis.