Ian S. Epstein

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the approval of a settlement in three consolidated class actions against three immigration lawyers for professional negligence.

The class members were Roma refugee claimants from Hungary whose applications failed or did not proceed while represented by the defendants.

The court approved the settlement of $500,000 in damages and $50,000 in costs, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved class counsel fees of $181,500 and a $2,500 honorarium for the representative plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a director of a company that contracted with the defendant to host a television festival, sued the defendant for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty after the defendant cancelled the agreement due to unpaid fees.

The defendant moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred as it was commenced more than two years after the claim was discovered.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff lacked privity of contract to sue personally, and that the defendant owed no duty of care or fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought motions to certify three proposed class actions for settlement purposes against three immigration lawyers.

The plaintiffs alleged professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in the defendants' representation of Roma refugee claimants from Hungary.

The court found that the criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met, noting that compliance is not as strictly required for settlement purposes.

The motions for certification were granted.

This decision addresses the costs of a summary judgment motion brought by the Law Society of Ontario against Rosemary Cremer, which Cremer successfully defended.

The Law Society did not dispute Cremer's entitlement to costs but argued for a partial indemnity basis and a lower amount.

The court found that the Law Society's motion, though unsuccessful, was not unreasonable and did not warrant punitive costs.

While Cremer claimed $55,778.43 in partial indemnity costs, the court deemed this excessive and disproportionate to a focused summary judgment motion, noting that counsel's extensive time expenditure might be more relevant to the trial on the merits.

The court awarded Cremer $46,000 in partial indemnity costs, all inclusive.

The plaintiff sued the Law Society of Ontario for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, negligence, misfeasance in public office, and infliction of mental injury.

The Law Society moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act, or constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the Law Society's motion, finding that the plaintiff's claims were not statute-barred, as the limitation period did not begin until her beneficial ownership of funds was confirmed by court order.

The court also found genuine issues requiring trial regarding statutory immunity and declined to strike portions of the claim as an abuse of process.

The TNS Defendants brought two motions seeking leave to add three engineering firms (Chung & Vander Doelen Engineering Ltd., M.A. Bryan Engineering Inc., and Tacoma Engineers Inc.) as defendants to their counterclaim, alleging negligence in the design and coordination of a septic and plumbing system.

The proposed defendants opposed, arguing the claims were statute-barred due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The court granted leave to add Chung & Vander Doelen Engineering Ltd. and M.A. Bryan Engineering Inc., allowing them to plead a limitations defence at trial, as there was a factual dispute regarding discoverability.

However, the motion to add Tacoma Engineers Inc. was dismissed, as the court found the material facts against Tacoma were known or ought to have been known by the TNS Defendants by spring 2015, making the claim against Tacoma statute-barred.

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

The plaintiff, Robert Weidenfeld, brought a motion seeking permission to participate by teleconference and an order confirming impecuniosity.

The defendants, Robert Andrew Leck and Stiver Vale (law Firm), brought a cross-motion for security for costs against the plaintiff.

The court found that the plaintiff, residing outside Ontario with no assets in the province, failed to provide sufficient evidence of impecuniosity.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's claim against the moving defendants, alleging negligence and breach of duty of care by real estate lawyers for transferring property without investigating outstanding family law proceedings, did not appear obviously meritorious.

Consequently, the defendants' motion for security for costs was granted in the amount of $20,000, payable in installments, and the plaintiff's motion was dismissed.

The defendants requested a review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, who had commenced multiple similar actions, sued various government entities and a legal clinic over his involuntary committal to a hospital in 2010.

The court found the statement of claim lacked material facts, contained grandiose and legally baseless claims, and was barred by the six-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's subrogated property damage claim on the basis that it was commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

Following a mini-trial on the issue of the insurer's due diligence, the court found that the insurer had all the necessary material facts to support a claim in negligence well before the expiry of the limitation period.

The court rejected the insurer's argument that it was waiting for the Fire Marshal's report to discover the claim.

The defendants' motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

This case conference endorsement addresses interim steps leading up to a mini-trial.

The court ordered the plaintiff to review un-redacted files for communications predating the statement of claim that relate to the decision to commence the proceeding, and to advise the defendants of their existence and nature.

The mini-trial was scheduled for September 1, 2016, with witness examinations in chief to be tendered by affidavit evidence, followed by cross-examination at the mini-trial.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's subrogated action, arguing it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, having been commenced more than two years after a fire and explosion.

The plaintiff, through its insurer Intact, contended that the claim was not discovered until the Ontario Fire Marshal's report identified the cause as arson.

The court found Intact's evidence regarding its due diligence in investigating the claim to be significantly lacking, relying on hearsay.

Despite the evidentiary deficiencies, the court, applying the enhanced powers under Rule 20, ordered a mini-trial to determine the issue of Intact's reasonable diligence in discovering the claim, emphasizing the need for a fair and just adjudication and the unique circumstances of pending official investigations.

Following dismissal of an action for delay against several defendants, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving defendants sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $200,000.

The plaintiff did not dispute entitlement to costs but argued for nominal costs based on impecuniosity.

The court accepted that financial hardship may be considered but emphasized that impecuniosity cannot shield a litigant from the costs consequences of unreasonable conduct or prolonged delay.

Balancing the plaintiff’s financial circumstances against the lengthy litigation history, the court reduced the claimed costs and fixed costs at $50,000 for each group of defendants.