L. Craig Brown

The court considered a motion to remove the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as litigation guardian for Stephen Duffy, following a new capacity assessment that found him capable of managing property.

The court found the evidence insufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that Stephen was no longer a party under disability within the meaning of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice, and the PGT remains as litigation guardian.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision which found he was not entitled to an income replacement benefit because he knew or ought reasonably to have known his motorcycle was uninsured.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in applying the contextual objective test and overlooked evidence that the MTO and dealership accepted his insurance certificate.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding the applicant was attempting to re-weigh the evidence and that no error of law or fact was made in the original decision.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motorcycle accident.

The respondent insurer denied benefits, arguing the applicant was excluded under s. 31(1)(a)(i) of the Schedule for driving without valid insurance.

The applicant claimed he was a victim of fraud, having purchased what he believed was a valid policy from an unknown individual in a parking lot.

The Tribunal applied a contextual objective test and found that an ordinary rational person with the applicant's age, education, and prior experience purchasing insurance ought reasonably to have known the insurance card was fraudulent and the vehicle was uninsured.

The application for benefits was dismissed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal three orders of Morgan J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $35,500.

The plaintiff in a putative class action sought court approval for a third-party funding agreement.

The agreement aimed to indemnify the plaintiff for adverse costs in exchange for a share of any litigation proceeds, as the plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining financing from the Class Proceedings Fund.

The court reviewed the agreement against the requirements of the recently amended s. 33.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, which codifies the approval process for such agreements.

The court found the agreement fair and reasonable, ensuring plaintiff control over litigation, and confirmed the funder's financial capacity.

The defendants did not oppose the motion.

The motion was granted, and the third-party funding agreement was approved.

The Plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., was successful in a certification motion and related motions.

This endorsement addresses the costs for these motions, which involved two rounds of hearings due to a recusal by the initial judge.

The court determined the appropriate costs, considering the re-usable work from the first hearing and the work for the second hearing, ultimately awarding the Plaintiff $1,000,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

This case concerns a re-hearing of a certification motion for a class action against Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, Aviva General Insurance Company, and Aviva Canada Inc. regarding business interruption insurance claims arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., sought to certify a class of businesses whose claims were denied or not submitted due to the defendants' alleged blanket denial policy.

The defendants brought cross-motions for summary judgment against Nordik and a declaration concerning the tolling of the limitation period.

The court certified the class action, dismissed the defendants' summary judgment and limitation tolling motions, and allowed the addition of three new representative plaintiffs (Cash and Carry Inc., Hangar9 Studios Inc., and Real Food for Real Kids Inc.).

The decision addresses the adequacy of the representative plaintiff, the identifiable class, and the common issues, particularly regarding notice requirements and the interpretation of insurance policy clauses in the context of pandemic-related business closures.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add three additional representative plaintiffs during a certification hearing for a class action regarding COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims.

The court found that the original plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., had an arguable cause of action and was a suitable representative plaintiff.

The court also found that the three proposed additional plaintiffs—Hangar9 Studios Inc., Cash and Carry Inc., and Real Food for Real Kids Inc.—had viable causes of action and met the requirements under s. 5(1)(e) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The class action was fully certified with all four as representative plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs brought motions to certify three proposed class actions against Aviva Insurance for the blanket denial of coverage for COVID-19-related business loss claims.

The claims focused on 'restricted access' and 'negative publicity' coverage provisions in Aviva's standard-form policies.

The court found that the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act were met, noting the commonality of the standard-form policies and the identical denial letters.

The two Lerners Actions were certified, and the Nordik Action was conditionally certified pending a motion regarding the representative plaintiff.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim was statute-barred as it was commenced more than two years after the accident.

The court found that due to the statutory threshold requirements, the limitation period did not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or ought to have known she had a viable tort claim.

The court concluded there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the cause of action was discovered, and dismissed the motion for summary judgment.

The applicant insurer sought an order compelling seven respondents to attend examinations under oath regarding their statutory accident benefits claims, specifically attendant care benefits, due to concerns about validity.

The respondents refused, citing insufficient notice of the reasons for examination and their medical conditions.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the insurer's generic notice ("determining whether State Farm is liable to pay benefits") was inadequate under s. 33(4)3 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court emphasized that specific reasons for the examination are a condition precedent to the obligation to attend, allowing insureds to prepare adequately.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the plaintiff's action against the owner of an all-terrain vehicle.

The driver had been given permission to drive the vehicle on farm property but drove it on a highway, resulting in an accident that injured the plaintiff passenger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the owner was vicariously liable under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act because he consented to the driver's possession of the vehicle.

In doing so, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal explicitly overruled its prior decision in Newman v. Terdik, affirming that an owner who consents to possession remains vicariously liable even if the driver breaches a condition restricting the vehicle's operation.

The plaintiff, a party under a disability due to a severe head injury sustained in a jail assault, settled his negligence action against the Crown for $750,000.

The plaintiff and his litigation guardian opposed structuring the settlement funds.

On a motion for settlement approval under Rule 7.08, the court ordered the funds to be structured to protect the plaintiff's financial interests and preserve his ODSP benefits.

The court also approved the plaintiff's solicitors' request for legal fees of approximately $250,000, finding the fees reasonable given the complexity of the case, the risk assumed by the solicitors over nine years, and the favourable result achieved.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of a $10 million class action settlement and class counsel fees regarding an alleged investment leveraging scheme.

While the court found the settlement quantum and proposed counsel fees to be fair and reasonable, it refused to approve the settlement at this time due to a lack of procedural fairness.

Specifically, the settlement administrator failed to implement a transparent challenge process for class members to dispute their individual compensation amounts, as required by the settlement agreement.

The motion was adjourned to allow the parties to implement the required challenge process.

The court considered a motion seeking approval of a proposed $10 million class action settlement relating to investment advice involving leveraged borrowing to purchase mutual or segregated funds.

Although the court found the overall settlement amount to be fair and reasonable in light of litigation risks, potential appeals, and the complexity of individualized damages, it determined that the settlement administration process lacked procedural fairness.

Specifically, the settlement agreement required a “challenge” mechanism allowing class members to contest the calculation of their compensation, but the administrator had not implemented a meaningful challenge process.

Several objectors raised concerns about how their losses were calculated and were given no adequate opportunity to dispute the administrator’s determinations.

The court therefore declined to approve the settlement at that stage and adjourned the motion to allow implementation of a proper challenge process.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle personal injury action, the plaintiffs moved for an order staying the determination of costs pending satisfaction of the judgment or resolution of a separate insurance coverage dispute involving the liable defendant and his insurer.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be deferred because the verdict was under appeal and because the defendant’s ability to pay costs was uncertain pending determination of coverage, particularly given their intention to seek a Sanderson costs order.

The court held that the existence of an appeal or unresolved insurance coverage litigation does not justify departing from the usual practice of fixing costs after trial.

The ability to pay costs is only one factor in determining whether a Sanderson order is appropriate and does not require postponement of the costs determination.

The motion for a stay of the costs determination was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against financial advisors and their dealer, alleging they systemically recommended a 'Leveraging Scheme' to borrow money to invest in mutual funds without regard to suitability.

The court granted certification, finding that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, the class was identifiable, and common issues existed regarding the duty of care, breach of duty, and punitive damages.

The court declined to certify damages as a common issue, finding it required individual assessment.

The court also held that a class proceeding was preferable to the Ombudsman for Banking and Investment Services (OBSI) process, which lacked binding remedial powers and adequate investor participation.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence of an MFDA settlement was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a post‑trial motion seeking to set aside a civil jury verdict arising from a rear‑end motor vehicle collision, arguing there was no evidence to support the jury’s apportionment of liability and damages.

The jury had found both parties negligent, assigning 90% fault to the plaintiff and 10% to the defendant, and awarded damages subject to that apportionment.

The court reviewed the limited circumstances in which a trial judge may refuse to accept a jury verdict, namely where the verdict is devoid of evidentiary support or legally incapable of supporting judgment.

The court held that the plaintiff’s Highway Traffic Act conviction and the evidence presented at trial constituted some evidence capable of supporting the jury’s findings.

The motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial or substitute judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a finding of liability after the respondent tripped and fell over pipes left on the sidewalk in front of the appellant's house.

The pipes had been left for five days, contrary to the City of Toronto's by-laws for special collection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant breached the standard of care and materially contributed to the injuries was supported by the evidence.

The applicant sought ongoing income replacement benefits (IRBs) and payment for a medical assessment following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer sought repayment of IRBs, alleging the applicant had been working full-time while claiming complete disability.

The arbitrator found overwhelming evidence, including surveillance and employment records, that the applicant had been employed full-time installing GPS units while simultaneously telling medical assessors he was completely disabled.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant obtained benefits through deliberate and material fraud.

The insurer was relieved of its obligation to pay ongoing IRBs and was awarded repayment of all IRBs paid since December 9, 2002, with interest.

The applicant's claim for the cost of a medical report was dismissed because the report was rendered useless by his intentional misrepresentations.