6 total
The court granted the plaintiffs' request to assign multiple related actions for case management.
The plaintiffs requested that their action and several related actions be assigned for case management pursuant to Rule 77.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The request was heard by the Civil Team Leader-Toronto Region, to whom the Regional Senior Judge had delegated this responsibility.
The court applied the criteria under Rule 77.05(4) and found that the actions should be assigned for case management.
Justice W.S. Chalmers was assigned as the case management judge for the consolidated actions.
Motion to add plaintiffs denied because discoverability was neither pleaded nor supported by evidence.
The plaintiff sought leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add her two daughters as plaintiffs under section 61 of the Family Law Act, after the action had been set down for trial.
While leave to bring the motion was granted, the motion to amend the Statement of Claim itself was denied.
The court found that the Family Law Act claims were likely statute-barred under the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate discoverability was a triable issue for the proposed new plaintiffs.
Additionally, the proposed amended Statement of Claim failed to plead discoverability.
The court refused to approve a proposed settlement for a minor plaintiff due to deficient evidentiary materials.
This motion concerned the approval of a tentative settlement under Rule 7 for a minor plaintiff who suffered catastrophic injuries in a boating accident.
The court refused to approve the proposed settlement of $57,500 due to deficient materials.
Concerns included unsatisfactory evidence on the defendant's potential liability, lack of information regarding insurance coverage for either boat, and inadequate affidavits from both counsel and the litigation guardian failing to properly justify the settlement given the severity of the plaintiff's injuries.
The court emphasized its gatekeeper function in Rule 7 motions and directed counsel to submit further, proper affidavit evidence.
Court of Appeal overrules prior precedent, holding vehicle owners vicariously liable despite breach of operational conditions.
The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the plaintiff's action against the owner of an all-terrain vehicle.
The driver had been given permission to drive the vehicle on farm property but drove it on a highway, resulting in an accident that injured the plaintiff passenger.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the owner was vicariously liable under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act because he consented to the driver's possession of the vehicle.
In doing so, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal explicitly overruled its prior decision in Newman v. Terdik, affirming that an owner who consents to possession remains vicariously liable even if the driver breaches a condition restricting the vehicle's operation.
Summary judgment denied where conflicting evidence required trial on boating negligence.
The moving party sought summary judgment dismissing negligence claims arising from a boating accident in which a child riding on an inner tube collided with the moving party’s boat.
The primary operator of the towing vessel had been noted in default, admitting negligence.
The court considered whether there was any evidentiary basis for potential negligence by the moving party and whether the action against him had no reasonable chance of success.
Finding inconsistencies between affidavit evidence and prior sworn testimony about the positioning and movement of the boat, the court held that issues of negligence and causation required a full evidentiary assessment.
Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.
Court refused to set aside jury verdict where some evidence supported liability apportionment.
The plaintiff brought a post‑trial motion seeking to set aside a civil jury verdict arising from a rear‑end motor vehicle collision, arguing there was no evidence to support the jury’s apportionment of liability and damages.
The jury had found both parties negligent, assigning 90% fault to the plaintiff and 10% to the defendant, and awarded damages subject to that apportionment.
The court reviewed the limited circumstances in which a trial judge may refuse to accept a jury verdict, namely where the verdict is devoid of evidentiary support or legally incapable of supporting judgment.
The court held that the plaintiff’s Highway Traffic Act conviction and the evidence presented at trial constituted some evidence capable of supporting the jury’s findings.
The motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial or substitute judgment was dismissed.