Michael P. Taylor

The appellant sought a declaration that student loan debt was released under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, arguing the seven-year bar in s. 178(1)(g)(ii) should run from an earlier loan-funded study period rather than her final study period.

The Court held that s. 178(1)(g)(ii) adopts a single-date approach based on the date the bankrupt last ceased to be a full- or part-time student under applicable student loan legislation before bankruptcy.

Because the appellant remained a student until 2009 and filed a consumer proposal in 2013, the student loan debt was not discharged.

The Court also held that a student loan creditor relying on s. 178(1)(g) need not obtain a separate judicial determination beyond filing a proof of claim.

A partial dissent would have interpreted the provision as a conditional bar tied to seven continuous non-student years for specific loans.

The respondent Minister brought a motion to compel the appellant to answer outstanding discovery questions, request documents from third-party advisors, and produce documents over which the appellant claimed solicitor-client privilege.

The Tax Court granted the motion in part.

The appellant was ordered to answer questions regarding the purpose of the transactions, as they were relevant to the GAAR assessment.

The Court declined to order the appellant to request documents from third parties, finding the rules for partial disclosure did not compel such inquiries.

Finally, the Court reviewed 19 documents for solicitor-client privilege, finding that most were not privileged as the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence that the accounting firm was acting as an agent in the continuum of legal advice.

The Crown brought motions for leave to amend its pleadings to add a sham argument and for security for costs in two consolidated appeals concerning the validity of limited partnerships.

The Tax Court of Canada granted the motion to amend, finding it would assist in determining the real question in controversy and that any prejudice was compensable in costs.

The Court dismissed the motion for security for costs, holding that the Rules only permit such an order where the appellant appears to be resident outside of Canada, which was not the case here.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent denied the benefits, arguing the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) and the $3,500 funding limit had been exhausted.

The applicant claimed removal from the MIG was warranted due to psychological injuries, chronic pain, and a pre-existing right knee condition.

The Tribunal found the applicant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating his injuries fell outside the MIG.

The Tribunal preferred the respondent's psychological assessment over the applicant's, found no objective evidence of chronic pain, and concluded the pre-existing knee condition did not preclude recovery from the accident-related injuries.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant corporation, which held approximately $90 million in non-capital losses and other tax attributes it could not itself utilize, entered into a complex arrangement with a venture capital company to monetize those tax attributes.

Through a series of transactions, the appellant's assets and liabilities were stripped into a parent company, and the venture capital company obtained contractual control over the appellant's board composition and activities via an investment agreement, while never formally acquiring de jure control of its shares.

The appellant then carried on a new investment business using the tax attributes to shelter income.

The Supreme Court held, 7-1, that the transactions constituted abusive tax avoidance under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in s. 245 of the Income Tax Act.

The object, spirit and purpose of s. 111(5) is to prevent corporations from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct unused losses against income from another business for the benefit of new shareholders; the transactions achieved the functional equivalent of an acquisition of control and frustrated that rationale.

The Appellant brought a motion for an order requiring the Respondent to provide answers to questions on examinations for discovery that were refused, or to which unresponsive answers were provided.

The underlying appeal concerns the application of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to deny loss carryforwards and other deductions.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the motion in part, ordering the Respondent to provide certain sealed documents and GAAR Committee documents, subject to redactions for third-party information and claims of solicitor-client privilege, finding that these documents were relevant for the purposes of discovery as they were considered in the context of the audit of the Appellant or the decision to apply the GAAR.

Two family trusts petitioned for equitable rescission of transactions that had resulted in unanticipated income tax liability after the Canada Revenue Agency changed its interpretation of s. 75(2) of the Income Tax Act following the Tax Court's decision in Sommerer.

The majority held that a limiting principle of equity and the principles of tax law stated in Fairmont Hotels and Jean Coutu bar taxpayers from resorting to equity to undo freely agreed upon transactions in order to avoid unanticipated adverse tax consequences arising from the ordinary operation of a tax statute.

The prohibition against retroactive tax planning applies broadly to all equitable remedies, including rescission, not only rectification.

Côté J. dissented, holding that rescission is available in strictly limited circumstances where there is a clear causative mistake of sufficient gravity, and that neither Fairmont Hotels nor Jean Coutu generally precludes equitable remedies in a tax context.

A Luxembourg corporation created as a tax conduit sold shares in its Canadian subsidiary for approximately $680 million, realizing a capital gain in excess of $380 million, and claimed an exemption from Canadian income tax under the Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty's business property exemption for capital gains on shares deriving value principally from immovable property used in a business.

The Minister denied the treaty exemption and argued the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) applied because the respondent lacked genuine economic connections to Luxembourg.

The majority held that the Minister failed to discharge the burden of proving abusive tax avoidance, finding that the provisions of the Treaty operated as intended and that Canada had deliberately chosen not to include anti-conduit provisions in the Treaty.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's patent lack of economic connection to Luxembourg frustrated the underlying rationale of the Treaty's allocation of taxing rights.

The appellant Crown challenged court-ordered super-priority priming charges granted to an interim lender, monitor, and directors in CCAA restructuring proceedings, arguing that its deemed trust for unremitted employee source deductions under s. 227(4.1) of the Income Tax Act took priority over those charges.

The majority dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 227(4.1) does not create a proprietary interest in specific debtor assets and that court-ordered super-priority charges under s. 11 of the CCAA are not security interests within the meaning of s. 224(1.3) of the ITA, so no conflict arises between the two statutes.

The concurring justices agreed there was no conflict but relied on the CCAA's remedial flexibility and s. 6(3)'s requirement that the Crown be paid in full under any plan of compromise.

Four justices dissented, concluding that Parliament's use of broad notwithstanding language in s. 227(4.1) granted the Crown's deemed trust absolute priority over all claims including CCAA priming charges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, Abella, Moldaver, Brown and Rowe JJ. dissenting.

The Minister reassessed the appellant under the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) to disallow the deduction of non-capital losses from prior years.

The Minister argued that the appellant's restructuring circumvented the loss restriction rules in subsection 111(5) of the Income Tax Act by avoiding an acquisition of de jure control while transferring effective control.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the object, spirit, and purpose of subsection 111(5) relies on the bright-line test of de jure control.

Since there was no acquisition of de jure control, the transactions did not abuse the provision, and the GAAR did not apply.

A provincial Crown corporation (BCI) created to provide investment management services to public sector pension plans held pooled investment portfolio assets in trust.

The federal Crown argued that BCI was required to collect and remit GST on costs recovered from those portfolios under the Excise Tax Act.

The majority held that s. 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867 renders the relevant ETA provisions constitutionally inapplicable because BCI, as a provincial Crown agent, holds legal title to the portfolio assets and imposing GST would tax Crown property.

On the cross-appeal, the Court unanimously held that the Reciprocal Taxation Agreement and the Comprehensive Integrated Tax Coordination Agreement are legally binding intergovernmental agreements and that BCI is subject to them by virtue of s. 16(6) of the Public Sector Pension Plans Act.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

Wagner C.J. dissented in part, finding that s. 125 immunity should not extend where private pension boards are the beneficial owners and the real impact of the tax falls on them.

The applicant sought reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that capped the cost of home accessibility and alternative housing assessments at $2,000 under s. 25(5)(a) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued the cap should only apply to medical assessments of a claimant's health status, not housing evaluations.

The adjudicator denied the request, finding no error of law or fact in the original decision's application of the modern approach to statutory interpretation.

The plain meaning of 'any one assessment or examination' includes the housing assessments, which inherently involved an appraisal of the applicant's health status.

The plaintiffs requested that their action and several related actions be assigned for case management pursuant to Rule 77.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The request was heard by the Civil Team Leader-Toronto Region, to whom the Regional Senior Judge had delegated this responsibility.

The court applied the criteria under Rule 77.05(4) and found that the actions should be assigned for case management.

Justice W.S. Chalmers was assigned as the case management judge for the consolidated actions.

The applicant, who was catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident, sought funding for home accessibility and alternative housing assessments.

The insurer partially approved the first assessment up to the $2,000 limit and denied the second as a duplication.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal held that both assessments are subject to the $2,000 cap under section 25(5)(a) of the 2010 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, as they constitute clinical evaluations or appraisals of the applicant's health status.

The Court allowed the appeal, adopted the dissenting reasons from the Federal Court of Appeal, and reinstated the Federal Court order answering the stated legal question in the affirmative, with costs throughout in favour of the appellant.

The Court expressly declined to comment on the scope of the deemed trust or liability under s. 222 of the Excise Tax Act before bankruptcy.

The applicant sought payment for three assessments related to a catastrophic impairment determination following a 2009 motor vehicle accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the situational and community occupational therapy assessments were reasonable and necessary to determine the functional impact of the applicant's psychological condition, and that the $2,000 fee for each was reasonable under the Schedule.

The triage assessment was denied for lack of evidence.

The Tribunal dismissed the applicant's claim for a special award under Regulation 664, finding that the insurer had not acted unreasonably in relying on file reviews and providing medical reasons for its denials.

The applicant's request for costs was also dismissed.

The applicant sought expenses following a successful arbitration for statutory accident benefits.

The parties agreed on most costs but disputed the allowability of three expert reports totaling $4,000.

The arbitrator found that the reports from an exercise physiologist and a physician were necessary for the conduct of the arbitration, as they established the continuity of the applicant's disability and chronic pain syndrome.

The arbitrator awarded the applicant $29,589.48 in total expenses, plus $209.50 for the costs of the expense hearing.

The respondent insurance company brought a motion to dismiss the applicant's claim for statutory accident benefits, arguing it was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The applicant had filed for mediation with FSCO prior to the expiration of the limitation period, but the mediation was cancelled due to the respondent's failure to confirm attendance.

The Tribunal held that the 90-day extension of the limitation period following a failed mediation under the pre-April 1, 2016 Insurance Act applied, despite the transfer of jurisdiction to the Tribunal.

The motion to dismiss was therefore dismissed.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for various treatment plans, including rehabilitation, occupational therapy, rehabilitation support worker, and psychological services.

The Insurer denied the plans based on assessments from its own experts.

The Arbitrator found the Applicant's experts, who diagnosed chronic pain syndrome and severe depression, to be more credible and qualified than the Insurer's assessors.

All six treatment plans were deemed reasonable and necessary and were approved.

However, the Arbitrator declined to order a special award, finding that the Insurer had not acted unreasonably in requesting assessments and denying the claims given the circumstances.

In a customs tariff appeal, the appellant challenged a judgment that had set aside a tribunal classification of imported hockey gloves.

The Court held that Rules 1 and 2 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Harmonized System operate conjunctively within a hierarchical framework when determining prima facie headings.

The majority found the tribunal reasonably concluded the goods were classifiable as gloves under heading 62.16 and reasonably rejected classification under heading 39.26 on the record and applicable notes.

The appellate intervention was set aside and the tribunal decision restored, with dissenting reasons concluding the tribunal’s interpretation was unreasonable.