Michael P. Taylor

The appellant sought a declaration that student loan debt was released under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, arguing the seven-year bar in s. 178(1)(g)(ii) should run from an earlier loan-funded study period rather than her final study period.

The Court held that s. 178(1)(g)(ii) adopts a single-date approach based on the date the bankrupt last ceased to be a full- or part-time student under applicable student loan legislation before bankruptcy.

Because the appellant remained a student until 2009 and filed a consumer proposal in 2013, the student loan debt was not discharged.

The Court also held that a student loan creditor relying on s. 178(1)(g) need not obtain a separate judicial determination beyond filing a proof of claim.

A partial dissent would have interpreted the provision as a conditional bar tied to seven continuous non-student years for specific loans.

The appellant corporation, which held approximately $90 million in non-capital losses and other tax attributes it could not itself utilize, entered into a complex arrangement with a venture capital company to monetize those tax attributes.

Through a series of transactions, the appellant's assets and liabilities were stripped into a parent company, and the venture capital company obtained contractual control over the appellant's board composition and activities via an investment agreement, while never formally acquiring de jure control of its shares.

The appellant then carried on a new investment business using the tax attributes to shelter income.

The Supreme Court held, 7-1, that the transactions constituted abusive tax avoidance under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in s. 245 of the Income Tax Act.

The object, spirit and purpose of s. 111(5) is to prevent corporations from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct unused losses against income from another business for the benefit of new shareholders; the transactions achieved the functional equivalent of an acquisition of control and frustrated that rationale.

The plaintiffs requested that their action and several related actions be assigned for case management pursuant to Rule 77.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The request was heard by the Civil Team Leader-Toronto Region, to whom the Regional Senior Judge had delegated this responsibility.

The court applied the criteria under Rule 77.05(4) and found that the actions should be assigned for case management.

Justice W.S. Chalmers was assigned as the case management judge for the consolidated actions.

The moving parties sought partial summary judgment declaring that a Vespa involved in a motor vehicle accident was insured under the "newly acquired automobile" provision of the Standard Automobile Policy (OAP 1).

The court examined whether the insured satisfied the preconditions of s. 2.2.1, including whether the insurer insured all automobiles owned by the insured and whether any additional premium was paid.

The evidence showed the insured owned other automobiles, including a vehicle insured abroad and two motorcycles, that were not insured by the insurer.

The court held these vehicles fell within the statutory definition of "automobile", meaning the insured did not meet the requirement that all owned automobiles be insured by the same insurer.

As a result, the Vespa was not insured under the OAP provision and the statutory bar in s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act prevented the insured from pursuing damages against the other driver.