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Student loan debt survived bankruptcy under the BIA single-date interpretation.
The appellant sought a declaration that student loan debt was released under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, arguing the seven-year bar in s. 178(1)(g)(ii) should run from an earlier loan-funded study period rather than her final study period.
The Court held that s. 178(1)(g)(ii) adopts a single-date approach based on the date the bankrupt last ceased to be a full- or part-time student under applicable student loan legislation before bankruptcy.
Because the appellant remained a student until 2009 and filed a consumer proposal in 2013, the student loan debt was not discharged.
The Court also held that a student loan creditor relying on s. 178(1)(g) need not obtain a separate judicial determination beyond filing a proof of claim.
A partial dissent would have interpreted the provision as a conditional bar tied to seven continuous non-student years for specific loans.
Securities disgorgement orders survive bankruptcy; administrative penalties do not.
The appellants, undischarged bankrupts, sought to have administrative penalties and disgorgement orders imposed by the British Columbia Securities Commission released upon bankruptcy discharge.
The Commission had sanctioned the appellants for market manipulation contrary to the Securities Act, ordering $13.5 million in administrative penalties and approximately $5.6 million in disgorgement orders.
The majority held that neither the administrative penalties nor the disgorgement orders fall within s. 178(1)(a) of the BIA because orders of an administrative tribunal registered with a court are not 'imposed by a court' within the meaning of that provision.
As to s. 178(1)(e), the majority held that administrative penalties do not result directly from the fraudulent scheme and therefore are dischargeable, but the disgorgement orders — representing the exact value of property obtained by fraud — are directly linked to the fraudulent misrepresentation and survive bankruptcy.
The dissent would have held that both orders survive under s. 178(1)(e) as debts resulting directly from deceitful conduct, without requiring a correspondence between the debt quantum and the gain derived.
